The Congregational Quarterly

EDITORIAL.

WHILE we are in the press there comes the news of the death of the doyen of Congregational historians, Dr. F. J. Powicke. Dr. Powicke was perhaps the outstanding example of the scholar-pastor in the Congregational ministry. His first church was at Alnwick, and about his experiences there and the help he received from Thomas Campbell Finlayson he has written in our pages. Subsequently for thirty years he was minister at Hatherlow, Cheshire, where he gained the affection, not only of his own people, but of men of all denominations over a wide area. Alike during student days and during his time in the ministry, Dr. Powicke gave himself to research, beginning with the study of John Norris of Bemerton which was to lead to knowledge of the Cambridge Platonists quite unrivalled. Dr. Powicke subsequently made himself a great authority, first on Henry Barrow, and then on Richard Baxter.

Congregationalism has never given to its historians, except perhaps to Dale, the recognition they deserved, and Powicke was no exception. Had he belonged to the Church of England he would have received a Canonry which would have given him ample leisure for the studies he loved and which he was so well qualified to pursue. Although he was twice Chairman of the Cheshire Union, the Congregational Union of England and Wales did not give him the highest honour in its power. As a Governor of the Rylands Library he found occupation after his own heart, while he was always at the call of students who needed advice. He was fortunate in his children, one of whom is in the Congregational ministry and another Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford. Of his daughter Gertrude, who gave her life serving the starving poor in Eastern Europe after the war, he was specially proud.

The Congregational denomination should thank God for a man of Powicke's sterling quality and great attainments. It is sad to think that we shall receive no more letters in the strange crabbed handwriting, and no more "copy" from his pen.

* * *

THE Labour Party did badly in the election, the Liberal Party did worse, and the Churches did worst of all. The Archbishop of York spent his time making a jig-saw of Pacifist heresies, the Free Church Council committed hara-kiri on Mr. Lloyd George's doorstep. Dr.

VOL. XIV, NO. 1, JANUARY, 1936

Pacific School of Religion

Scott supported the Council of Action and Dr. Lidgett the National Government, while the efforts of some of the Free Church leaders to run with the Baldwin hare and hunt with the Lloyd George hounds were a subject for laughter wherever politicians were gathered together; let us pay a momentary tribute to their skill as mental gymnasts—and their endurance, for the contortions must have been very uncomfortable—and then bury the episode for ever in the deepest oblivion, and hope that others will do the same, so that the Churches will not have too big a price to pay.

The Government is back, and the aim of all right-thinking men must be to see that the re-armament section does not get beyond control. One of the most encouraging signs for the future is that Mr. Baldwin has not invited Mr. Churchill to join the Government, despite the fact that the latter's tone was tuned to Government pitch as the election approached. But soon there will be a vacancy at the Admiralty, and Sir Roger Keyes and others are already demanding Mr. Churchill's appointment. We hope the Prime Minister will be strong enough to resist.

* * *

One of the greatest values of the Peace Ballot was the way it made people think seriously who had never thought before; but the anxieties of many as to how to answer questions 5 (*a*) and 5 (*b*) were as nothing to the disturbance of mind which now affects Christian people. The question of sanctions economic and/or military is no longer an academic one. Those who have to advise to-day are often at a loss, and the greatest sympathy must be felt, especially for young pacifists and supporters of the League of Nations. We have received many communications from men of military age who had concluded that they would on no account take up arms, but are now in the greatest perplexity. They have been supporting the League of Nations to the utmost of their power, they believe that if the League fails at the present time the world will inevitably revert to pre-War politics, and yet they are conscious that if economic sanctions are made strong enough to be effective war may be the result. Should they or should they not take part in it? The disturbance of mind, almost amounting to agony, of many young people at the present time should press heavily on the conscience of the Christian Church.

In this connexion it is interesting to note that Sir Philip Gibbs in *England Speaks* quotes this conversation between a Yorkshire manufacturer and a friend at a dinner at the Dorchester Hotel:

> "It looks as if Europe were boiling up for another war. I don't see how we can keep out of it, unless by some supreme act of faith and sacrifice we refuse to fight in any cause whatever".
>
> "Is that possible, old man?"——
>
> "I believe any country would be safe, and would abolish war

in Europe, if it took its stand on the highest ideal of Christianity and allowed itself to be invaded if need be, without resistance. No one could fight a non-resisting country. But of course no nation, least of all ours, has reached such spiritual height".

* * *

In a little book which well deserves reading, *When the Church Was Very Young* (Allen & Unwin, 3s. 6d.), the Rev. E. G. Looseley argues that, while the Church in its early days possessed an experience, a store of teaching from Christ, and a gospel, it had no buildings, no denominations, no fixed organization, no New Testament, no vocabulary of its own, no dogmatic system, no Sabbath rest (in the Gentile world). It is a striking thing that when Christians met in private houses, "not many wise, not many mighty, not many noble" being called, they were an effective evangelizing force. As Mr. Looseley says:

> It cannot be denied that, under the changed conditions of to-day, *our property often becomes our problem*. In furtherance of our aim to evangelize a neighbourhood, we erect a building, and we become thereby rooted to that particular spot. The neighbourhood in the course of a generation or two, may change completely, but there we are. Residences may give place to shops, offices, and warehouses; but the structure remains, immovable if not imperishable. To follow a population, and to minister to its spiritual needs, becomes much more difficult, when the problem is presented as one involving a site and a building.
>
> To the early Christians the problem did not present itself as one concerned with buildings, and we may well ask whether they were not right. It is almost impossible for us to think ourselves back into a stage of development anterior to that of church buildings. To us, the whole life and work of the church have been centred for hundreds of years in the buildings in which they have been carried on. But *are* we right—or at any rate are we *wholly right*—in viewing the problem of the evangelization of the people so predominantly from the standpoint of buildings? *Must* we secure a site and build a church in order to reach and win men for Christ? Apparently the Communists do not regard such steps as prime necessities for the spread of their propaganda. They do not seem to think that, in order to win the world for Communism, the great thing to do is to build halls and fill them with audiences. In shops and factories, and in the open air, their propagandist work is carried on. By personal contact and by the circulation of literature, they seek to win fresh adherents to the movement. The measure of their success, from what appears to be their standpoint, is not their ability to multiply halls and fill them, but their skill in persuading people to accept a principle, a policy, and a programme.
>
> And that is precisely what we as Christians are aiming at, when we "get right down" to our real work. The purpose to

which we are devoting our efforts is not to fill buildings, but to win men to a new way of life, with Christ as Saviour and Lord. It is true that one method of accomplishing this, as the long experience of the church shows, is by putting up buildings and persuading people to attend the services that are held in them. But it is in our actual contacts with men day by day that we should pursue our propaganda in season and out of season. In this important question of tactics, the Communists are surely right. The witness to the new way of life must be borne primarily and supremely in the ordinary paths of human intercourse.

* * *

In fixing our eyes on the relations of Church and State in Germany and Russia, we should not overlook what is happening in France. Do Free Churchmen in this country realize that French Protestant Churches refuse to ordain men who have a conscientious objection to military service? The Union of French Reformed Evangelical Churches decided in 1933 that

> Propaganda in favour of conscientious objection is incompatible with the exercise of the office of the Ministry,

and propaganda was held to include attracting attention by suffering in prison! A fully-trained student, the son of Madagascar missionaries, who has been in prison two years, has been refused ordination. The Synod of the Lutheran Church adopted the same principle, though by a small majority. It is clear that even Protestant Churches in France put the claims of the State above the rights of the individual. Will history, we wonder, esteem Huguenots who deemed Paris worth a mass more highly than those who suffered on St. Bartholomew's day?

* * *

I venture to suggest, as a question worthy of serious consideration, whether some of our existing colleges might not, with great advantage, be united? Even should insuperable obstacles be found to hinder their being incorporated, might not some practicable plan be devised for two or more being brought into immediate juxta-position, so that one body of professors might deliver their lectures, and communicate their instructions to a larger number of students? In this, as in other respects, I believe *union* would be *strength*. As a question merely of economy, it surely cannot be wise to keep up distinct establishments of tutors and lecturers, not to mention housekeepers and servants, when important benefits would be secured by bringing several detached colleges under one general and comprehensive scheme of ministerial education.

Would it not be greatly conducive to our true interest, to establish *two* theological institutions, comprehending most, if not the whole, of the present colleges, each having four or five professors in different departments, at which the students, having

> *previously to their admission,* gone through a course of classical, mathematical, and general studies, should, for three years at least, give *undivided attention* to theology in all its various branches, and to those studies which are specifically adapted to qualify and prepare them for the appropriate duties of their office as *preachers* of the Gospel, and *pastors* of churches? The scheme proposed would not involve the sale and abandonment of *all* the other colleges. Some of them might be retained for the prosecution of introductory studies, under the direction of competent classical and general scholars.

No, this is not part of the evidence given at one of the sessions of the Commission on the Congregational Colleges now sitting. They are the words of Joshua Wilson written in 1846 in the Life of his father. They are preceded by these words:

> Although my father hailed, as among the favourable signs of the times, the establishment of new Independent colleges in Birmingham and Manchester, yet he was led, some time before his death, to entertain serious apprehensions as to the injurious effect of these new foundations on the previously existing institutions. In a letter, dated Dec. 13th, 1841, he says—"I fear we are multiplying our colleges too fast"; and in another, Nov. 25th, 1842, "I am sometimes in fear that the new colleges in Manchester and Birmingham will injure the old ones."
>
> I consider this a matter of great practical importance to the Congregational denomination. It is a remarkable fact, that at present only two or three out of eleven colleges, have nearly their complement of students; and . . .

* * *

In an article by the Rev. John Foster in the current *International Review of Missions* an account is given of a flying visit paid by Dr. John R. Mott to Canton. Dr. Mott asked the missionaries he met to say what was the greatest encouragement to them in the present situation. The answers were:

> The enthusiasm for evangelism among so many of our Chinese brethren, the growth of responsible Chinese leadership, the new interest in religion in this middle school and that university, the beginnings of concern for the rural areas in what has been largely an urban Christianity, the unparalleled circulation of the Scriptures owing to improved communications and greater security.

On these and similar answers Mr. Foster comments:

> To me it seemed that all we had to say fell into two columns, and between them lay a third which was left almost blank. Some successes should be put down under the heading, "Individual Christians". Others find a suitable title in "The Christian Movement". The almost blank column is labelled, "The Christian Church".

> There can be no doubt that the first task is the winning of the individual. It is equally beyond dispute that Christians everywhere need to lift their eyes from themselves and the mere perpetuation of their own small groups. Our mission is through salvation to service, and through the salvation of the individual to the salvation of society. It seems to me that there is ample evidence of success at both ends of our task. The most disquieting lack is at its very centre. The centre of our task is the growth of the Church.

This deserves the consideration of Christians in every land.

Meanwhile there is need that individual Christians should bestir themselves. Many of them to-day seem so tired: perhaps once upon a time they laboured "in season and out of season", but now they sit at ease in Zion—if they get as far as Zion—and are weary in well-doing. Well, the Kingdom of God will not come that way: the belief in automatic progress went down with the *Lusitania*. Dr. Parkhurst's dictum is trite but true—the reason why the world does not get better faster is that good people get tired of being good faster than bad people get tired of being bad.

* * *

Mr. Harold Nicolson's fascinating life of Dwight Morrow is packed with points worthy of note. How well it would be if men ever kept his counsel before them:

> Remember that we are all inclined to judge *ourselves* by our ideals; *others* by their acts.

This principle he applied to nations as well as to individuals:

> All nations are prone to judge themselves by the loftiness of their own purposes, and to judge other nations by their failure to attain their high purposes. To judge any nation by its lapses from its standards is to do it an injustice. Nations, like men, are to be judged not alone by what they are but by what they earnestly desire to become. Our belief in democracy rests upon a faith in what humanity can become as well as upon the frank recognition of what humanity is.

It is because Morrow acted upon this maxim that he was so successful a negotiator. It is good, too, to have a man of his experience making the confessions:

> As I get older I become more and more convinced that good government is not a substitute for self-government.
>
> I do not think that a war ever brought anything that could not have been brought much better without the war.

* * *

It may be conservatism, but we have not yet learned to like the more popular style of the *Times Literary Supplement*, with its headlines and illustrations. The development of advertising in the *Observer* and the *Sunday Times* has no doubt adversely affected this

indispensable weekly, but we do not think that popularizing is the correct reply. There were perhaps other ways in which the paper might have increased its interest and its usefulness. Sometimes the sub-editing might have been improved: in a recent issue two books on Kierkegaard were reviewed. The writers had an equal right to the title "Doctor". One was consistently called by that title, the other uniformly referred to as "Mr.". Sentences like

> Caught when travelling in a Dutch ship by the British as the result of an indiscretion ascribed to the German Military Attaché in New York . . . .

should never be allowed to pass. We have the impression, too, that some reviews have been rather belated—here the editor will have the sympathy of all other editors, for the spate of books is a continual problem—and certainly a wider use might be made of reviewers with knowledge of and sympathy with the history and witness of the Free Churches, and periodicals other than those that regularly advertise in the *Literary Supplement* might be given fuller treatment! We hope this will not be considered to be carping criticism. In its front page articles, its reviews, and its correspondence columns, the *Literary Supplement* has rendered unique service to the cause of letters. It is because we desire it to retain and extend its usefulness that we make these suggestions.

* * *

We hope that Manchester gladly recognizes what a fine instrument of learning it possesses in the John Rylands Library. It is perhaps only when people who have lived within reach of it move further away that they realize what a great convenience the Library is. Not only so, but its *Bulletin* is now welcome in all parts of the world, and by its exhibitions it draws attention to the commemoration of great events. We have been very interested to see a catalogue of an exhibition illustrating the transmission of the Bible, issued in commemoration of the 400th anniversary of the publication of Coverdale's Bible in October, 1535. Dr. Guppy himself writes an introductory sketch of the history of the Bible, amply illustrated, and the catalogue of the exhibition makes us realize again the wealth of the Library's contents.

The Library has also just published *An Unpublished Fragment of the Fourth Gospel* (2s. 6d.). This fragment, containing on one side part of verses 31-33 and on the other part of verses 37-38 of *John* 18, is one of the Greek papyri discovered in Egypt; it was recently spotted in an examination of the Library's treasures. Like other early Christian works found in Egypt, this Gospel was in the form of a codex, not in a roll. A facsimile is given, and Mr. C. H. Roberts describes the fragment. He dates it in the first half of the

second century A.D., which makes it the earliest known portion of the New Testament in any language.

* * *

ONCE again the Religious Tract Society celebrates Christmas time by the publication of its annuals. In recent years, through the Lutterworth Press, it has made some real contributions to learning, but it is well that its publications for young people and others run along parallel lines with its theological works. *The Boy's Own, The Girl's Own,* and *The Woman's Magazine* (12s. 6d. each) will again receive a warm welcome, and then there are bound volumes of *The Sunday at Home* (12s. 6d.) and of *Great Thoughts,* series XI, volumes 8 and 9 (7s. 6d. each). Parents who desire book presents would do well, too, to look at the excellent selection of books for boys and girls at 2s. 6d. and 2s. These are written by such well-known authors as Major Charles Gilson, Lettice Bell, A. T. Rich, Robert Harding, and May Wynne. Another book which will please children is Commander King-Hall's *Young Authors and Artists of 1935* (Pearson, 5s.) in which stories and illustrations alike are by children between 7 and 17. Commander King-Hall hopes to make this an annual volume, and offers prizes for contributions to the 1936 edition.

* * *

HERE John Newton gives advice to vacant churches—and to Moderators.

> I have no idea of the size of a table if you only tell me how *long* it is; but if you also say how *wide,* I can tell its dimensions. So when you tell me what a man is in the pulpit, you must tell me what he is out of it, or I shall not know his size.

* * *

TWO Yorkshire stories from Mr. W. L. Andrews's *Yorkshire Folk* (we improve upon Mr. Andrews's dialect).

Sam is dying. The widow of his best friend is saying good-bye.

"Good-bye, Sam. Tha mun tell ahr Tom Ah'm gettin' on all reight".

"Nay", answers the sick man with almost his last breath, "Dost ta think 'at Ah s'all a nowt else to do but goa clomping all ovver luking for yor Tom?"

Explosion in *Leeds Mercury* office. Smoke and fumes pour out. Editor rushes to spot, relieved to find no casualties. Says to Yorkshire head of department "Can you tell us what has happened?", to get the reply: "Ay, theer's summat up".

MUSSOLINI AND MAZZINI.

An Italian book, published a few years ago in Genoa, bears the inscription:

> To Benito Mussolini, who, after ten lustrums, took from Giuseppe Mazzini the unquenchable torch of his Italian passion.

Mazzini and Mussolini, the prophet of the old liberalism and the demagogue of the new absolutism—the association of these two names is piquant and provocative. And, indeed, if we are to consider the distinctive ideas of Fascism as a historical Italian phenomenon, and epecially if we are to consider them in relation to those ideals of the *Risorgimento* which Fascism claims to have inherited, we can hardly do better than elaborate the comparisons and contrasts implicit in that dedication. Not, of course, that Mazzini represented *Risorgimento* liberalism as completely as Signor Mussolini represents the new absolutism. The older movement was too various and complex to be symbolized by any one leader. But certainly, as the bearer of the "unquenchable torch" of the "Italian passion," Mazzini had an undisputed distinction even in an age when Italy could boast so many carriers of the sacred fire. It is not, however, the purpose of this article to attempt an elaborate comparison of the "Italianity" of Mazzini and that of Signor Mussolini; nor is it necessary. To recognize the difference in the *ethos* of the two movements we need consider no more than one or two contrastive attitudes.

I.

According to Mazzini, Humanity was yet to be constituted. A house is something more than the sum of its building materials, and Humanity is more than the totality of the populations of the world; it implies a vital, constructive fellowship, a world-union slowly built up and cemented by the covenanted consent of the peoples themselves. Thus to "constitute" Humanity was, as Mazzini saw it, the supreme task of the future; Association must be the watchword of the new age, and apart from this conception of the One Life of the world there could be neither a creative religious faith nor a sound national morality. This was the great dogma with which he sought to indoctrinate his Italian working-men in an era of captivating nationalistic achievement:

> Your first duties in point of importance—for without understanding these you can only imperfectly fulfil the rest—are to Humanity. Those who teach morality, limiting its obligations to duties toward family or country, teach you a more or less narrow egoism and lead you to what is evil for others and for yourselves. Country and family are like two circles drawn within a greater circle which contains them both.

Wherever we turn in Mazzini's writings we find this humanitary emphasis. As early as 1844 he was complaining that there was nothing collective in Europe to "represent the consolidation of the families of Humanity"; there was a league of despots (the Holy Alliance) to enforce tyranny but "no league to accomplish good"—to defend the weak and "further the peaceful development of progressive tendencies." Six years later he began a movement looking toward the democratic federation of the peoples—"not a temporary agitation which will have to be reproduced everlastingly, but something permanent, a great Association of nationalities, functioning regularly and all the time." Sixteen years earlier, in 1834, he had founded his *Young Europe* society, based upon the same general principles. To be sure, these forecasts and dreams were not original with Mazzini, but he was the first to fashion them into projects that invaded the region of practical politics. It was Italy—the Italy of the *Risorgimento*—which gave us the flame-bearer of the new internationalism, the pioneer of whatever is constructive in our modern approach to collective security and co-operation.

Moreover, it was out of his doctrine of Humanity that Mazzini developed his theory of democracy—a theory which had little in common with the doctrinaire democratism of the French Revolution and less with any sort of demagogic populism. "Give the suffrage," he would declare,

> to a people unfitted for it, governed by hateful reactionary passions, and they will sell it or make a bad use of it; they will introduce instability into every part of the State; they will render impossible those great combined views, those thoughts for the future, which make the life of a nation powerful and progressive;

and this he preached not after, but before, the sorry disillusionments provided in his later years by Italian democracy itself. Incidentally, he disliked the term "democracy," regarding it as being too exclusively political in its associations, and preferring the term "social government." Certainly our twentieth century democracies, with their cumbersome legislative machinery, their political and economic sectarianism, their exploited insincerities of Party rivalry, would have had in him a relentless and revolutionary critic. In a sense he believed in the "Corporative State"—in the sense, that is to say, that what he desired was a national and international democracy acknowledging one sole class, the People, and uniting capital and labour by means of a gradually evolving system of industrial co-operation. Only so, as he saw it, could the nations be integrated into autonomous units and organized into an international confederation capable of functioning as such—capable of functioning as a league of *nations* and not as a congeries of governments representing a medley of interests and classes.

The truth is, of course, that the democracy which Mazzini proclaimed was never approached even in his own Italy. From Cavour to Crispi, and from Crispi to Salandra and Giolitti, Italian liberalism, no less than Continental liberalism generally, was a *bourgeois* makeshift, an affair of checks and balances, of class divisions and regional egoisms, the technique of politics consisting in securing and holding office by playing off one set of interests against another. Thus, too, in spite of appearances, the dream of Italian Unity—or at least of "spiritual" unity in the Mazzinian sense—remained unrealized. For the Italian revolution was caught and halted half-way round, and under the *régime* of its *bourgeois* liberalism the nation was never really consolidated; instead, the opportunist handling of all national problems, and the reluctance to pass from the democratization of politics to the corresponding democratization of economic and social life, exacerbated internal and regional antagonisms, drove the working-classes into the ranks of revolutionary Socialism, and left Italy divided against itself.

And whoever else may have been deceived by liberal appearances, Mazzini himself was not. The Economic Question, he declared, was, for the leaders of the new Italy, the riddle of the Sphinx; they must solve it or run the risk of being devoured.

> Remember, if the people, called inevitably to rise, should receive at the hands of those who have already risen nothing more than stern repressions and injustice on the one hand, and neglect and antipathy on the other, then they will move forward not as a fertilizing river but as a devastating flood; they will rally to watchwords of wrath and vengeance and to the subversive ideas already rampant in Europe.

So he warned the upper and middle classes in 1870, two years before his death. It is well that this should be remembered and set over against the plausible fiction that the working-out of Italian liberalism in the *post-risorgimento* era has exposed the inadequacy of Mazzini's democratic faith. It would be nearer the truth to say that the last sixty years of Italian history have singularly confirmed Mazzini's foresight. If he were with us now he would have some right to claim that democracy, so far from being played out in Italy, has never yet been played in, and that the collapse of constitutional government after the War was due, not to too much democracy, but to too little. The people had in very truth been met with "repression and injustice," with "neglect and antipathy," and had accordingly rallied to those "subversive ideas" that were "rampant in Europe"; the "devastating flood" had risen, and it was the panic produced by the post-War spate of revolutionary Socialism and Syndicalism which gave Fascism its opportunity.

But to return: Mazzini's insistence upon the democratic principle

was at one with what may be called his humanitary fundamentalism. For one thing, the Democratic principle was the only one which preserved a proper flexibility in the system of government—the only principle through which a nation could readjust and reform its order of life without recourse to sedition and violent revolution. And this flexibility was vital, since the proper function of government was neither to recreate human nature to a standardized pattern nor to construct a fixed, immobile social system, but to help to carry human nature and society forward in a world in which constant adaptation was the price of progress. Moreover, democracy was the only principle which conserved the true *initiative* of progress (which, as Mazzini understood it, came from God through the living heart of the people rather than from, or through, any privileged order or dominant class); it was indeed the only principle through which the people could be educated in such political duties and responsibilities as looked toward world-citizenship. And so, above all, democracy was the only principle through which the peoples, the nations, could ever be constituted as a world-fellowship. External union might be imposed by other means—as, for instance, by the pact of a group of dictators; but such union could not rise above its own nature and quality; it would be outward and not inward, artificial and not vital, and would pass away. Union, if it was to be vital and not mechanical, moral and not servile, must involve the consent of the parties most affected—the peoples themselves: and democracy alone conserved this principle of popular consent.

Now we can well understand how formal and pedantic such considerations as these must have seemed to the young Italians of post-War Italy. Mazzini was outmoded—and not in Italy only; we had, all of us, grown away from the idiom of his day. Can we, for example, imagine Mr. Ramsay MacDonald or Lord Snowden exhorting the English working-classes in such terms as these?—

> If God exists, there necessarily exists between Him and His creation a Thought, an Idea, a Providential Design—exists, alike for the individual life and for Humanity, a plan, a purpose, an end—exists for us all, individually and collectively, a holy, absolute duty to co-operate for its fulfilment. And such an *end*, whatever it be, assigned to Humanity, has need, for its attainment, of the united energies of all the faculties and powers, active or latent, of Humanity itself: therefore, gradually to achieve and constitute through Association the moral unity of the human family is the indispensable means of attaining to it. Herein exists the reason for our movement, its justification, and the certainty of its victory.

Nevertheless it is true that, so far as European liberalism is concerned, this conception of Humanity as a moral fellowship and, politically, as a confederation of free peoples, has held the field up to

now; and, in spite of inconsistencies and tragic reverses, the general tendency of constructive statesmanship has been toward this ideal.

II.

It is precisely at this point, then—that is, in the region of fundamental principles and ideals—that Fascist ideology breaks with Mazzinian thought and with the liberal faith. It must be recognized, of course, that the Fascist creed is still in process of crystallization. Signor Mussolini's genius is pre-eminently a genius for action. It has been his way to act first and philosophize afterward, and it was less as a philosophy than as a *fever* that Fascism first swept over Italy. For this we have its founder's own pronouncement:

> Fascism was not the nursling of a doctrine worked out beforehand with detailed elaboration; it was born of the need for action, and it was itself from the beginning practical rather than theoretical.

For this reason it would be vain to look to its Italian spokesmen for unanimity of interpretation, and unfair to criticize writers like Gentile or Alfredo Rocco or Luigi Villari if they fall short of a complete intellectual agreement. And not unnaturally this diversity of interpretation is still more pronounced among non-Italian sympathizers. Thus Mr. James Strachey Barnes (whose *Universal Aspects of Fascism* was published with the approval of the Duce) sees the movement as the political and national expression of Roman Catholicism, and Signor Mussolini himself as the avatar of a Catholic civilization. "God," he declares, "is the centre of Mussolini's universe. Not Napoleon but rather St. Ignatius is his spiritual companion." On the other hand M. Melhis, writing before the emergence of the Hitler *régime*, found in Fascism an incipient religionism of its own—the religion of nationalism. As Comte "divinized" Humanity, so, he declares, Fascism divinizes the nation.

> For Fascism the Fatherland is identified with God, it occupies the first place in the scale of absolute values. The things of the spirit—art, science, religion, and morals, are subordinated to this idea and have an importance only in strict relation to [it] . . . . Their one mission is to serve the Fatherland . . . .

In the Fascist view, he continues, a man belongs first and foremost to his own country; and if some critics of this ideology might wish to ascribe to, say, Truth, or Goodness, a higher value than to nationality, nevertheless Fascism must be acquitted of inconsistency. When it postulates the Nation as the one absolute form of collectivity, it follows that the Nation-State must be defined in terms of unique and transcendent authority.

On any showing, then, Fascist idealism terminates upon the nation, and there is justification for the view that the Fascist support

of Roman Catholicism goes no further, philosophically, than the recognition of the Papacy as a traditional *Italian* (national) institution. It was the Roman Church, argues Signor Rocco in his *La Trasformazione dello Stato*, which "splendidly revived" the "ancient Roman tradition" with its principles of "discipline, of hierarchy, and of the submission of the individual to the State"; and Dr. Luigi Villari in his book *The Fascist Experiment* (1926) writes:

> The essentially national character of Fascism has brought it to regard Catholicism as a national institution.

Here, apparently, are its values for Fascism; and, for the rest, Prezzolino remarks upon the curious fact that Fascist defenders of Roman Catholicism are apt to give it a wide berth in the matter of religious practice; so that, in fact, their private religious outlook is æsthetic and anti-intellectual rather than Catholic. And here Giorgio Melhis's comment, written in 1925 (*Il pensiero di Mussolini*), is pertinent:

> To-day there is a real tendency toward the revival of a new creed founded on instinct, with its own dogma to consecrate and establish it in the eyes of the world.

There were excellent reasons why this tendency received no official encouragement in Italy; but Melhis's discernment has been dramatically confirmed since the development of Fascism in Germany.

The Fascist repudiation of democracy, no less than its recognition of the Papacy, has grown out of practical politics. In the Fascist Quadrinity of "Fatherland, People, Sovereign, and God" there is nothing that necessarily inhibits the idea of a national democracy; rather, the repudiation emerged from the circumstances of the Mussolinian victory. For Fascism was a minority movement which came into power by a *coup de main*; it had to reckon with bitter, though disorganized, opposition, and it could hope to consolidate its position only by the policy of the high hand. Thus it was characteristic of Signor Mussolini that, faced with this situation, he promptly discarded his constitutionalism and republicanism and scrapped the democratic machinery. The formulation of an anti-democratic theory of the State came with later reflection. How convinced and uncompromising it was when it came is now a matter of history. "Fascism," declared its founder,

> combats the whole complex system of democratic ideology, and repudiates it, whether in its theoretical premises or in its practical application.

It seems to be true that from the theoretical point of view this repudiation was not accomplished without difficulty. For Fascism stood for the sovereignty of the Nation, and the nation was composed of the Italian people: so that the recognition, to some degree, of the democratic principle seemed to belong to the logic of the

situation. The difficulty was overcome by a bold transition from political realism to transcendental mysticism. The Nation was indeed sovereign, but it was so only in the sense that it was also "divine". And obviously divinity could not decently be predicated of a contemporary aggregation of Italian men, women, and children: instead it must be understood that the sovereign entity was a transcendent Being that included the Italy of the past and the future as well as the present. To quote again from Signor Mussolini:

> The Fascist State is itself conscious, and has itself a will and a personality . . . [It] is a spiritual and moral fact in itself . . . And the State is not only a living reality of the present, it is also linked with the past and, above all, the future, and thus, transcending the brief limits of individual life, it represents the immanent spirit of the nation.

It is this immanent spirit and will, then, as distinct from the fallible and fluctuant spirit and will of contemporary Italians, that is sovereign. It is not yet clear by what principle and process this sovereign and immanent spirit selects its authoritative interpreter, becomes articulate in him, and establishes him as the national oracle; but here again Fascism remains true to its own genius; it acts first and theorizes afterwards. For, of course, the authoritative interpreter of the immanent will of the Italian nation is Signor Mussolini.

When we come, then, to the question of the Fascist attitude to international and humanitary relationships, the answer is clear. Certainly Signor Mussolini claims for his apostolate a more than national significance. "It is our proud prophecy," he announces, "that Fascism will come to fill the present century with itself"; for while it is a "purely Italian phenomenon" its "doctrinal postulates have a universal character". The term "universal" may here be regarded as distinct from "international." Fascism, says Melhis, regards international movements as good for nothing, but it desires to propagate universally the National idea. This, indeed, according to the same authority, need not exclude good comradeship between the various national states.

> If all men sincerely loved their own country and recognized the value of other countries, a state of good relations . . . would be perfectly practicable.

But here Signor Mussolini is a more valuable (and voluble) authority, and in his exposition of Fascism contributed in 1932 to the *Enciclopedia Italiana* he deals with the question with his customary clarity and pungency. While, he says, the Fascist loves his neighbour, this love "puts no obstacle in the way of necessary educational severity, and still less to differentiation of status"; and certainly "Fascism repudiates any universal embrace". In short, "the Fascist State is an embodied will to power and government".

> Above all, Fascism, the more it considers and observes the future and the development of humanity . . . believes neither in the possibility nor utility of perpetual peace . . . War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it . . . Thus a doctrine which is founded upon [the] . . . harmful postulate of peace is hostile to Fascism. And thus hostile to the spirit of Fascism, though accepted for what use they can be in dealing with particular political situations, are all the international leagues and societies which, as history will show, can be scattered to the winds when once strong national feeling is aroused by any motive—sentimental, ideal, or practical.

It appears, therefore, that what Signor Mussolini envisages is a world of ego-centric nations organized as absolute States, each believing in its own "divinity", each cherishing and cultivating its "will to power", each controlled by an absolutist hierarchy which claims to interpret that will as distinct from the will of the existing people, and each regarding the ordeal of war as the supreme and indispensable exercise for the ennoblement of the national spirit. This is the faith which, according to its apostle and high priest, is "to fill the present century with itself, even as Liberalism filled the nineteenth century". Its logical outcome we may contemplate in Nazi Germany.

* * *

We return, then, to our curious Genoese text: "To Benito Mussolini who . . . took from Giuseppe Mazzini the unquenchable torch of his Italian passion." It seems by this sufficiently clear that, wherever that torch is to be found to-day (and one suspects that it is still cherished and unquenchable), it is not to be sought in the powerful grasp of Signor Mussolini. The controversy between "the Great Exile" and the Duce (and therefore between the liberalism of the *Risorgimento* and the new absolutism of the Italy of to-day) is one which must be fought out in the region of the fundamental loyalties of Man. And it is possible that in the coming days we shall have increasing need to keep the main issue to the fore—the alternative between a faith and a policy which, in their long result, make for "the constitution of Humanity" as a union of free and consenting peoples and the faith and policy which make for the disintegration of the world into a medley of absolute States, each inflamed with "the will to power and government" and with the lust of race-supremacy. It is a cleavage which, in the ultimate issue, divides those who believe in Humanity from those whose belief terminates upon racial and separatist aggregations.

* * *

Since the time (last August) when these lines were written, the Abyssinian crisis has developed. In this matter there is no need to

extol the superior morality of our British diplomacy, and our Government spokesmen will do well to check the temptation to an overdisplay of moral shirt-front. Neither Mr. Podsnap nor Mr. Pecksniff will help us here. But the cardinal fact remains that Signor Mussolini, by his arbitrary diplomacy, has achieved the moral and material isolation of his country to a degree which must make the bones of Cavour shiver in their grave. But in this course he has been dominated by that same anti-collectivist obsession which has formed the subject of our present discussion. He has defied Geneva because he has only contempt, not alone for its present state of development, but also for its fundamental principles and ultimate ideals. And because he has convinced himself that, before the first blast of strong national feeling, the League can be "scattered to the winds", he has unlaced the windbags of Æolus and let slip the Ethiopian gale; he has flung his brave legions into the Abyssinian wilderness and is flinging after them the financial resources of an already depleted treasury to the tune of £1,000,000 a week. Of this policy the Italian nation must be left to judge. For us the important consideration is that Italy has been committed to a course which can hardly be otherwise regarded than as a deadly blow aimed at the collective system of the world. But also we shall do well to note that the blow itself has exposed the vulnerable point in the League's defences; it has demonstrated that until the imperial Powers within the Covenant have dealt drastically with the whole problem of national expansion and colonization, the threat to peace will remain. And for the rest, if the League fails, we need not envy Signor Mussolini his vindication as prophet. He will have secured it through the tragic failure of Humanity itself. And if, indeed, his further prediction that Fascism is destined to "fill the present century with itself" is also vindicated, our own lot in Europe may be still less enviable. It will mean that we shall be committed to an era of mob hysteria and flag-waving, of demi-gods and demagogues; Governments will dread liberty more than the smallpox and our people will be inoculated against rational thought as if it were the bubonic plague. But is there not a voice, not yet completely silenced in Italy, that bids us hope for better things—a voice that calls to us from a forsaken tomb on the slopes of Staglieno?

GWILYM O. GRIFFITH.

THE TRUST OF FREEDOM.

It is a truism to say that the battle for freedom is never ended and that the only security for liberty is an unsleeping vigilance. I call this a truism because it has been said so often. Yet it is not said more often than it needs to be; and, certainly, it never more needed to be reiterated than in the world to-day. This, however, is not what I have mainly in mind as regards the future of freedom. What I want to say is that freedom is not a negative but a positive thing. It is not merely a freedom *from*, but also a freedom *to*. We may say of it what Dr. Chalmers said of Christianity—that we are "to proceed upon it". Many of us in this blessedly free land of ours—for such it is in comparison with other lands even in Europe—and many inheriting the heroically won liberty of the Free Churches here, are apt to repose in this possession, and to imagine that, for the preservation of the freedom which our fathers gained, sufficient service is done by the occasional commemoration of their achievements. But—and this is the moral of most of what I am going to say in this article—*it is only as a man or a nation or a church, possessing freedom, goes on to the worthy use of it that that freedom is justified or, indeed, is even safe*. In a word, freedom, which is our inheritance, is also our trust. We must realize this trust and discharge it faithfully; else, we shall forfeit it. This is the task of the future of freedom. It is to-day an urgent task.

We shall discuss the subject under two aspects—one political, or the relation of freedom to the State; the other ecclesiastical, or its relation to the Church.

I.

In the modern world, there is a revolt against many traditional standards and ideals, and, in particular, against two—the law of morals in personal life and the idea of freedom in the body politic. It is interesting that, in these two instances, the revolt is in opposite directions. In the sphere of personal morals, it is an antagonism to authority and an assertion of individual independence; in the political sphere, the reaction is against liberty and what is asserted is State authority. The latter trend is, I do not say the more important, but, in some ways, the more remarkable. For, in human nature—in what theologians call fallen human nature—there is always that which finds not only the Christian but any serious moral law unacceptable. The natural man is at heart a libertarian and wants to be free to do as he likes. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that, in an age when ethical libertarianism is not afraid to declare itself, an amoral view of life and conduct should have avowed exponents and a popular following. But there is no apparent similar reason in human nature

to make people ready to throw off civil liberty as they thus are ready to throw off ethical law. On the contrary, freedom seemed to be the accepted principle of the enlightened political mind in all schools of thought, and all parties paid it at least lip-homage. This is far from being the case to-day. In many parts of the modern political world there is what Lord Tweedsmuir (as we have now to call Mr. John Buchan) describes as "a widespread distrust of liberty". That is the accurate word—"distrust". For it is more than that certain peoples have been deprived of essential liberties; or, even, that under the pressure of exceptional circumstances, they have, as we all did during the war, temporarily surrendered them. In Europe to-day there are masses of people who not only have surrendered their liberty—or been robbed of it—but no longer believe in it. In them it has ceased to be an ideal, either politically or personally. And for political salvation they are looking elsewhere.

Now, what is the reason of this remarkable phenomenon? I cannot accept as adequate the reason Lord Tweedsmuir suggests—that it comes from a "loss of self-confidence" and a tendency "to seek salvation in herds" and "to surrender the will to any authority which would save trouble". This may sometimes be a contributing element; but it does not explain why this reaction against freedom captures so many earnest and strenuous spirits. We must seek a further and deeper reason. I suggest a twofold answer to the question which has been stated.

For one thing, political freedom, in the judgment of many, has not fulfilled its promise or carried out its task. The institutions of free democracy—I am speaking, for the moment, less of England than of other European countries—have not produced, as it was hoped they would produce, national strength and unity or social prosperity and happiness. Thus, many have turned away from the idea of freedom not from a theoretical denial of it but from—at least, in the first instance—a practical disappointment with its results. In the stress of the political and social situation, men's minds are to-day pragmatic rather than theoretic; and they are ready to accept almost any system which they believe or hope will—to use a popular vulgarism—"deliver the goods". Here is to be found the reason—or much of it—of the German devotion to Hitlerism. We think of it as a system which suppresses freedom of speech, which permits the existence of only one party in the State, which puts political dissent into concentration camps, and so on. The typical German to-day seems hardly to think of these things and will hardly discuss them. The latter reluctance may often be because it is safer not to discuss them; but another reason is that, whereas the German republic of a decade or so ago was not making Germany united, self-respecting, strong, and hopeful, the Nazi domination is doing these things.

If this be the truth—and it is true, though it is not the whole truth—then even the abstraction-loving German mind does not trouble about the loss of any principle of freedom; or rather it applies its love of transcendentalisms to the formulating of a philosophical terminology for the new political creed, for—and I say it quite friendlily and good-naturedly—there is something in the German mind which is persuaded that a thing is an eternal truth of reason when it is described by a sufficiently long abstract word. Meanwhile, efficiency is the test, and is its own sufficient title and justification.

Such, I am sure, is one reason—in, at least, some countries—for the present "distrust of liberty". It carries for us a very distinct lesson. In this country, we may not be in any immediate danger of being carried away by this reaction against freedom, which we distrust politically and disown ethically. We distrust it politically, feeling that no system of government is really strong or sure which requires for its existence the driving underground of all dissenting opinion. The engine of the State will explode some day if it has no safety valves. And we disown it ethically, believing that there are values—of which freedom of thought and speech is one of the first—which the State neither has the right to deny or wisely will deny. Whatever be the efficiency thus attained, the price to be paid is too high. For such reasons—which I do not now stay to expound—the normal Britisher has no wish to live in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. Yet all this must not keep us from taking serious note of the fact that to-day the idea of freedom is being judged by its fruits. We may deceive ourselves by talking confidently and complacently—as I have at times noticed eminent persons both in the State and in the Church doing—about our deep-ingrained English love of liberty, or about our constitutional rather than revolutionary methods, and so on; concluding, very likely, by quoting Tennyson's lines about the land

> where Freedom slowly broadens down
> From precedent to precedent.

These are features in the English constitution and the English temperament which have been developed in history; and we may well be proud of them—or, rather, thankful for them. But I repeat that we may talk in this strain too confidently and complacently. If the masses of the people even in liberty-loving and constitutionally-minded England see that some non-democratic system—be it Soviet or Nazi or Fascist—is producing better social results, then no doctrinaire devotion to principles of political freedom and no traditional respect for constitutional institutions will long stand in the way of the acceptance of that system. Against this, there is only one safeguard—that we realize that an inheritance of freedom is a trust, and that this trust must be worthily fulfilled or it will be forfeited. Free-

dom in this land or in any land will survive—and will deserve to survive—only as it can render a good account of its stewardship by the establishment or, at least the advancing, of social welfare, and as, under the institutions of liberty, righteousness is defended and human good is prospered.

This, I may say, is no new doctrine, nor does it emanate from some tainted foreign source. It is the doctrine of a great Englishman, who was a light in the days before the dawn of the Reformation. Writing in the fourteenth century—the watershed of European history—John Wyclif expounded, as a basal principle of his social teaching, a doctrine of what he called "dominion". He expressed it in the terms of the feudalism of his age; but its idea is this—that the proper use of possession or power is a condition of its being retained. In the feudal system, the possession of property or exercise of power was not given as an absolute right, but depended on the due rendering, to the overlord, of some accompanying service—such as service in war—and it was forfeited if this condition was not fulfilled. This principle, said Wyclif, applies to all human possession or authority. It is all held on condition of the holder discharging the service due in it. This doctrine, stripped of its medieval forms of expression, has its application to our political world. It is true of democratic liberty to-day as much as it was of any medieval lordship. The outward form of problems changes in the process of history; but the moral truth within remains, and it is always to be learned anew.

I said that I would offer a two-fold reason for the modern reaction against freedom. The second element in it is deeper than the merely practical test of results; but it can be comparatively briefly stated.

There has arisen in recent days a new political creed, the capital article in which is that the State is to be regarded as ethically ultimate. The essential elements in this doctrine are such as these. The criterion of national morality is not any ethical conception, such as justice or righteousness, but is the "national interest"; and the "justifying end" of the State is that it be power—of organization and also of arms—to serve that end effectively and, if opposition should arise, irresistibly. Thus "force gives a title to right". Further, this

> State of power (*Machtstaat*) has a right, through its force, to control the souls, minds, and bodies of every member of that State, and to concentrate the sum of this control on the achievement of national interests[1].

Such is the political creed which has captured—or been imposed upon—masses of people in great nations of Europe to-day. And to what has been said is to be added that this doctrine makes the State not

1 This sentence and some phrases preceding it are taken from a letter which appeared in the *Times* on September 19th by Sir Charles Grant Robertson (Vice-Chancellor of the University of Birmingham).

only ethically ultimate but also all-inclusive, or what is called "*totalitarian*". This means that no other authority—personal, moral, or religious—is permitted beside the claim of the State. To quote words of Herr Hitler, in an address delivered in 1933,

> there is now no authority coming from any special sphere in the Reich; there is now only one authority—the idea of the German people.

Thus it is not to use unfair or exaggerated language to say that this philosophy, first, by making the State ethically ultimate, places it in the seat of God; and, secondly, by making it the "one authority", puts into its mouth the words, "Thou shalt have no other god before me".

Now this political creed cuts right at the roots of the two ideas which, more than any others, have been the governing principles of progressive civilization. One is the idea of *law*; the other, that of *freedom*. With the former we are not immediately concerned at present, and I say on it merely a word. It conceives of the State not as its own self-justifying end—a doctrine which, obviously, can be made the excuse for any and every injustice and wrong—but as the organ of law which, in secular terms, may be described as public law, expressing itself in international covenants and obligations, and, in higher language (which, however, need not be translated into the terms of definite theology) may be described as Divine law, inasmuch as it is intrinsically superior to the arbitrary will of any earthly power, and its postulate of righteousness is the judge of all human government. In a word, there *is* an authority which is independent of any State, and over it; this is public and, still more, moral law. To repudiate this—the doing of which is nothing new, for it is centuries since Machiavelli wrote his *Prince*—simply means the ending of any security or solidarity among nations, for such security or solidarity necessitates a superior common moral standard somewhere. But, as I have said, we are here more concerned with the issue for personal freedom. The political creed which I have been describing does not pretend to leave room for such liberty, which Signor Mussolini declares is a "fetish". Herr Hitler says that the duty of the German is "a blind obedience in the will of the Führer", which is just the political application of the Jesuit doctrine of unquestioning surrender to a superior, except, indeed, that, for the Jesuit, this is only for those who voluntarily choose to take the vows of the order, whereas in Hitlerism, it is imposed, with pains and penalties, on the whole nation. This is the quite frank denial of personal freedom in the sense of the right of every man to think and act according to his own conscience; and the fruits of it are seen in the suppression of freedom of speech and of a free press, and in many other ways. The result may be a people so perfectly drilled as to be very powerful; but it

is not the way to a people's true greatness. And certainly here we may say—despite of the warning I gave a moment ago against this way of speaking—it is not our way. The age of even Cromwell and his dictatorship was also the age of Milton and the *Areopagitica* with its immortal plea for freedom.

We must not dwell longer on the political aspect of our subject. But, surely, if the things which I have been indicating are real facts to-day, then we in England who have inherited civil and religious freedom must realize how precious is our trust, and must indeed discharge that trust worthily if we are to preserve that freedom for our successors and for the world.

II.

Let us now pass to look at freedom in the Church.

Here the idea of a trust is both more immediate and also more imperative than it is in the State. The reason of this is plain. Our civil liberties are our own. We should value them for ourselves, and should preserve them for others. But, they are human rights; and we may, in special circumstances, surrender them. It is not so with the liberty claimed for the Church. This is His Whose the Church is, and Who said "My Church". The spiritual freedom of the Church is thus not a claim it makes simply for itself. It is made in Christ's Name; and, when it is made by His servants, it is or should be only that they may obey Him in some spiritual matter on which He, in His Word and my His Spirit, speaks to His Church. Now it is clear that liberty of this kind and thus claimed cannot—by faithful Christians and faithful churchmen—be surrendered as men may, in some circumstances, surrender their civil liberties. I may again quote Dr. Chalmers. The spiritual liberties of Christ's Church cannot be given over to the State or any other authority, because, said Chalmers in his simple and conclusive way, "they are not ours to give". This is the very nerve of the whole idea of spiritual freedom in the Church. This freedom is not an end in itself. It is not ecclesiastical privilege or arrogance. It is essentially and solely *a freedom to obey*. And this means, immediately and imperatively, that it is a trust.

Free Churchmen will consider it unnecessary to defend this vital church principle, or even extricate it from misconceptions and misrepresentations which—especially, one must be pardoned for saying, in England—have gathered round it. To name in a word but two of these, Free Churchmen know, first, that this freedom is spiritual, and, secondly, that it is not merely clerical. It is spiritual in that its claim is confined to matters which are matters of conscience to Christ and where He directs; and it makes no kind of claim to be "above the law" in temporal matters, such as questions of property, where

the State is the due and the divinely appointed authority for justice. And it is not merely clerical, for it is a claim of freedom for the *Church,* and the Church is not the clergy. If these simple points were always made clear, much of the prejudice on this subject which is often found among laymen would be dispelled. I add one word, less for laymen than for some clerics. Here is the only genuine "high" churchmanship. The word "high" is, as regards the Church, often absurdly used. It is often associated with ceremonial and even with clothes; and a cleric is regarded as "high" if he burns incense or wears a chasuble. This is puerile. The only genuine high churchman is the man who knows that the Church's allegiance in spiritual things is only to Christ; and the only man whose claim to be "high Church" is to be respected is one who will not consent, at any price, to live his church life under conditions which confute or compromise this allegiance. It is because, in England, it has been Nonconformists who have most clearly apprehended and, beyond question, most bravely maintained this principle, that they are to be called the genuine high churchmen of English ecclesiastical history since the Reformation. I admit they do not *look* the part so well as do their sartorially superior Anglican brethren. But, as "it is not the cowl that makes the monk", so it is not the vestments that make the churchman. Enough, however, has been said about a word.

Before speaking of this trust of freedom as it has been exercised in our Free Churches, I should like to find room for a few sentences on its position in two Churches outside of England, in one of which it has been remarkably vindicated and in the other is gravely menaced.

The Church in Scotland has won a recognition of this principle in a way unique in Christendom. Of the ecclesiastical side of this I do not speak, for it has been often described. But I want to emphasize its notable feature as regards the State, for this is insufficiently appreciated. Here—and so far as modern history is concerned, for the first time—*the State recognizes the Church as being what Christ's Church truly is.* Two words of comparison with other settlements or adjustments will make this clear. In England, the State recognizes the National Church; but—as the parliamentary rejection, under the recently accepted Enabling Act, of the proposed new Prayer Book shews—not as a society answerable in spiritual things to Christ alone. This is not to recognize the Church for what it is. On the other hand, a concordat was lately arrived at between Church and State in Italy; but the Church of this concordat is the Church of the new Kingdom of the Vatican city—a temporal Kingdom. This is to recognize the Church for what it is not—for what, indeed, Christ explicitly said His Church is not. The Scottish settlement has neither of these errors. In it, no temporal claim is made or acknowledged;

but every spiritual right is recognized by—not, be it noted, given from—the State. This, I say, is the civil power dealing with the Church as Christ's Church truly is. It is an object lesson for Christendom.

Very different is the situation in the other Church to which I shall refer—the Evangelical Church in Germany. Here, the conception of the totalitarian State (the character of which was indicated earlier in this article) with its denial of any other authority beside itself is the flat challenge to Christ's "My Church". The challenge is a very painful one to the patriotic German, who is devoted to his Fatherland and who feels that, under its present leadership, his nation has been rescued from great perils and has been restored to its rightful place among the nations. But, whatever be the sense of debt to the Führer, the faithful German churchman must say that the Church's Lord is Jesus Christ. The challenge has further been enormously aggravated by the new paganism which has arisen in Nazi Germany. The issue faces not the Evangelical Church only; for it goes deeper even than the Reformation divisions and concerns Lutheran and Roman alike. We in England—both Anglicans and Free Churchmen—cannot be merely spectators of this struggle. Many Anglicans detest the name of Luther; Free Churchmen repudiate much of Rome. But—if one may venture to alter a word in a familiar Shakespearian line—"conscience doth make *comrades* of us all". I cannot leave this matter without adding this. There is a great body of opinion in this country—especially in the churches, and not least in the Free Churches—which honestly desires friendship with Germany, and, further, sympathizes with that people's national restoration and with its legitimate aspirations. That friendly feeling is checked and that sympathy is chilled by the attitude of the Nazi State to freedom, and, in particular, to the freedom of Christ's Church.

But let us turn to ourselves in England. I do not propose to say anything here about freedom in the Church of England, partly because, while there are many matters in which we have much to learn from that Church, this is not one of them; and partly and more immediately because the Anglican Commission on Church and State is just publishing its report with its proposals for a measure of spiritual freedom for the Church of England. This report will receive careful and, I hope, friendly consideration from the Free Churches, which must never think of spiritual freedom as a kind of perquisite of their own but must remember it is a birthright of Christ's Church everywhere. Leaving then this matter as it concerns our Anglican friends, let us look at the trust of freedom in our own Free Churches of England.

I assume—and surely we have every right to assume it—that the Free Churches are recognized to have had an important and, indeed, invaluable part in the moral and religious life of this land and far beyond it. Of this much might justly be said; but it is more fitly said by another than a Free Churchman. It will be more salutary if here we look at defects or dangers which may have associated themselves with the Free Churches in their work and witness as Free Churches. I shall venture to suggest two things which bear on the two aspects of freedom we have been considering—one concerning the State, and the other the Church.

To take first the latter, it can hardly be denied that the Free Churches—though not all to the same degree—have often had an impoverished conception and consciousness of the Church catholic. They knew better the doctrine of the One Head than that of the One Body. Let this, however, not be said unqualifiedly. The classical Free Church teaching—in, for example, the greater Puritans—had a far truer idea of what Christ's universal Church is than had many a papal or episcopalian exposition of the topic. But in the average Nonconformist mind, what is called the "denominational" often confined the outlook and even absorbed the interest. I am far from disparaging any man's loyalty to that branch of the Church with which he is associated. I myself am a Presbyterian unashamed; and, indeed, at times—when, for example, there are bishops about who think of themselves and their office more highly than they ought to think—can be a fairly stiff one. But I should be ashamed of being a Presbyterian if I were a Presbyterian before being—in the right sense of the word—a catholic. This larger church consciousness has markedly developed in the Free Churches in recent years, and with this has come a greatly enriched fellowship. There is still need for the cultivation of this spirit as against not only the old dissenting denominationalism, but also, and even more, the new exclusiveness of a section of Anglicanism in which catholicity is no better than a party badge. On the whole, to-day, Anglicans and Free Churchmen are learning—and learning from each other—to say, with fuller and truer meaning, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church".

As regards, next, the Free Churches in their relation to the State, here too a larger view has grown. In olden days, English Nonconformity made the matter of Church and State too much the single issue of Establishment. But, whatever is to be said about Establishment—either for it or against it—the essential thing is far deeper. The essential thing is that "national religion" which means that the nation's political and social life recognizes and at least seeks to conform to the moral law and purpose of God and so to build up His Kingdom and its righteousness. Of this greater issue all the Churches have become increasingly aware—the Free Churches not

least so. One sometimes hears the remark that what used to be called "the Nonconformist conscience" is less in evidence than it was a generation or two ago. I do not accept this. The older "Nonconformist conscience", however sincere, was somewhat intermittent in its manifestations; and, also, it was mainly negative. I believe that there is to-day a more steady and a more constructive witness borne by the Free Churches—not, of course, by them alone, but we are here concerned with them—in public and political moral issues, and that this is a real and a really helpful element in our national life. Here is the true alliance between Church and State—that both co-operate in the building up of the Kingdom of God. Free Churchmen must take their share in this, and do so all the more because they are Free Churchmen. Their claim, as Free Churchmen, for the Church's spiritual freedom must not lead to a false view of the State as "secular". The State is "secular" in the sense that its province is the affairs of this *saeculum*—that is to say, temporal affairs. But it is not "secular" in the sense of being irreligious and unrelated to God and His Kingdom. Of course, it may be unfaithful and may even become apostate; but so may the individual. But we hold, with St. Paul, that "the powers that be are ordained of God"; and so the Prime Minister is called to serve the Kingdom of God and its righteousness as truly as the Archbishop of Canterbury is to minister the gospel of eternal life. I am not saying that State and Church are sacred in the same way or even to the same degree; for the Church has been, as the State has not been, "purchased"—again to use a Pauline phrase—"by the precious blood of Christ". But both are of God's ordinance; and both together are to build His Kingdom on earth. Free Churchmen should say this not only because they are Free Churchmen, but also because they are high Churchmen. High-Churchmen should be high-State men too.

While this share of the Churches in the public life of the nation is important, nothing could be more disastrous than that, in it, they should forget or even make secondary their primary and distinctive task, which is to be Christian and to make Christians. This is true for all Churches; but its truth is the more urgent where a Church proclaims itself to be free. For (as we have seen earlier in this article), the only freedom which the Church claims is Christ's and is a freedom to obey Him. What, then, is it even to attain that freedom unless it leads to this obedience? Such liberation should be also a consecration. To adopt one of Christ's own metaphors, the freedom of the Church is good; but, if it has lost its savour—which is that it exists in order to obey Him—it is fit for contempt. And so the trust of freedom, while it has its political and ecclesiastical aspects, comes to be, in the end, simply religious. A Church's freedom is nothing—and may be worse than nothing and a mere source of

ecclesiastical pride—except as it be a part of that Church's living Christianity.

What we have been discussing is a subject which is at present increasingly attracting the attention of Christian thinkers; and it is noteworthy that the World Conference of the Universal Christian Council on Life and Work, which is to meet in Edinburgh in 1937, announces as the title of its programme "The State, the Church and the Community". In any right consideration of this three-fold topic, the ideas and principles which we have been surveying must find a place—not because they are associated with the Free Churches and their struggle for freedom, but because they are religious and Christian. For the solution of the problem which lies in these topics is not to be found either in totalitarianism or in secularism. It is to be found, as we believe, only on lines which conceive of these three forms of association in terms such as the following: that the State is not an end unto itself, but is the organ of a Divine law of righteousness; that the Church is not its own nor the State's, but is Christ's and answerable to Him alone in things where He speaks to it; that the community is not a surrendering of the rights and responsibilities of human liberty, but is an ordered freedom, the members of which accept the obligations of communal and national life, but in which there is also respect for the prerogatives—intellectual, civil, moral—of personality, the free exercise and enjoyment of which is the only life in which man is man. *The State and law: the Church and conscience: man and freedom*—these are principles for which we stand, as for them our fathers stood and suffered. To re-assert them, and to vindicate them, not merely as ideas, but in the life of the world, of the Church, of the individual—there, indeed, is a task to-day for the descendants of those who, in days past, won for England civil and religious liberty; and thus shall we discharge our great and sacred trust of freedom.

P. Carnegie Simpson.

OUR DISCONTENTED QUEST FOR CONTENTMENT.

THERE is one good thing about our bad time; there are so many different ways of being wrong about it as to make almost any diagnosis of it right, and, since the patient exhibits so many different kinds of symptoms, almost any remedy proposed may be useful. When the family doctor of my country boyhood did not know what else to do, he mixed together with his broad, blunt-ended knife a little of everything out of rows of evil-smelling jars, folded the result deftly into little white paper parcels, directed four doses a day and left them in a pile by the patient's bedside with the generous hope that what one ingredient failed to do another would accomplish. These in his more expansive moments he called "shot-gun prescriptions." And his patients generally got well—unless their time had come to die.

Most current social, political, and religious prescriptions at present are very much like Dr. Turnbull's powders. There was never an age more busy about its self-diagnosis nor furnished with as many medicines, and the Faculties agree only in attributing lethal qualities to the medication of rival schools. One by-product of this temper is a literature of complaint and spiritual dis-ease, half-confession and half-quest, which the historian of the future may consider one of the most representative and symptomatic survivals of our period. The range and variety of it will supply him a fascinating material, and he will find his sources veined through all the printed matter of the day. What he will call the book he writes about it all will depend upon his temper and his approach. Wells, re-incarnate, might call it, "The Literature of Unrest in the First Phase of the Great Revolution." Some acutely penetrating historian may finally see in it all a by-product of the quest of the 20th Century for Contentment.

What one may call the Literature of Malaise is not, of course, peculiar to our time. Alfred De Musset, in his *Confession D' Un Enfant Du Siècle,* has written of the sad estate of youth after the Napoleonic Wars, lost between the wreckage of an irrecoverable past and "L' aurore d' un immense horizon", the allure of a still unrisen dawn. Many ages, like the mystic, have had their "dark night of the soul". If an anthology of the literature of complaint could be assembled, it would begin with Chaldea and Egypt. Even the bright-tempered Greek did not escape it; one sees the shadow behind the austere self-sufficiency of the Stoic. There is always *Ecclesiastes,* the *Lamentations of Jeremiah,* and considerable sections of any

Christian hymn book. Confusion and dis-ease are not peculiar to us and our contemporaries.

But our malaise is certainly more vocal and with an abundant opportunity not only for expression but for a profitable expression. Other times have likely been both perplexed and unhappy, but they lacked resourceful publishers. No one solicited an unhappy Greek to analyse his soul at so many drachma a sheet. Confessions so encouraged are always under the suspicion of being padded to add another sheet or two, and their artful shadows are more likely to be the nuances of a self-conscious style than the flight of the black butterflies of the soul. Honest despair would, I think, write more simply and be less careful of its adjectives than much of our contemporaneous complaint.

Our sorrows, says André Maurois, in substance, would be far less acute if we had no words to describe them. We give them thus a body, and a body not native to them. One must allow, then, in all this literature of complaint and confession, for what words do and add. Most sorrows would sooner or later die of themselves if they were not kept alive by words. Very likely other civilizations, which seem to us to have borne their unhappiness silently and died mutely, made their sufferings vocal, but their words have perished. It is also very likely that then as now those who had most cause for complaint were inarticulate. Our own time is not only rich in vehicles of expression and ingenious in finding words for its sadnesses; it is also anything but reticent. Socrates spoke freely of his own soul and Marcus Aurelius examined his own conscience, but neither of them seems to have anticipated the publicity he has received. There is amongst us a brisk market for confessions and a calculated art in the merchandizing of spiritual distress.

* * *

One must, therefore, feel his way through the restlessness and frustrations of our time by slow and cautious roads and with proper qualifications, but he does reach in the end a disorientation of life which it would be hard historically to parallel. Some of the sources of this malaise are plain enough. All the edges of our fractured economic system press in and hurt. The Western world is economically vulnerable through the enormous dislocations of the machine age. Its folk have been deracinated, the majority of them have lost their roothold in the soil, have no roothold at all save in crowded city pavements. The mal-adjustments of our economic order have reached and involved the minority who still live by the soil. The creative adjustment of life to its entire supporting environment—which is the test of any civilization—has for the time escaped us. Our whole social action is seamed with antagonisms which are the more dangerous because they are not honestly confessed.

Instead they are camouflaged with a spacious pretence of concern for the common good and hide their real concern behind such brave but rather shop-worn words (here in America) as Liberty, The Constitution, Americanism, and the like. Result: the very things which need examination most are waved heatedly in the air and lose their power. No little of our contemporaneous dis-ease is due to the smoke screens behind which crucial actions are being carried on. We can neither see clearly where the issues are joined nor what they are. It is all very much like King Arthur's last great battle in the West.

> He saw not whom he fought,
> For friend and foe were shadows in the mist.

Every region of life is involved and consequently under examination. The result, amongst other things, is a range of free, speculative, creative thinking which may itself date a new epoch in the making of the world mind. Each group of "re-thinkers"—social, economic, financial, political—believe they hold the key position. They are not inclined to recognize the cruciality of religion in the whole process, but it is there. It may be that the secret of all our malaise is in the region which religion has hitherto claimed and administered, that our creative re-adjustment must begin just there.

Those who believe this should not exaggerate the extent of religious unrest. What is happening back-of-behind to these confidences which have hitherto been the Pole Star and Southern Cross of Christianity is challengingly evident, but the majority of church people are neither theologians nor philosophers. They know something is happening to their inherited faith, but, in general, they live and die as their fathers before them "in the confidence of a certain faith and the comfort of a reasonable, religious, and holy hope".

If their confidence is a little less certain and their understanding of reasonable, religious hope more confused than in the great ages of faith, one may doubt whether the difference is after all as great as we assume. Those who have broken with the Church altogether do not, apparently, seem greatly distressed thereby, otherwise they would probably go back. They can find almost any kind of church to go to. There is still left a considerable minority of thoughtful folk who are sincerely distressed because they cannot maintain their religious faith save at what seems to them the cost of their intellectual integrity. And there is beyond debate a recession of the scientifically-minded from religion as it has been so far understood. All these things are contributory, some of them strongly so. No one of them is central.

* * *

For the first time the Western world is beginning to sense uneasily the failure of its philosophy of life. It is beginning to think in terms of doom rather than destiny. I do not think this implies

Henry Adams's or Spengler's or Nordau's conclusion that we are a spent race. Ortéga is more nearly right when he says Western humanity was never so vigorous. Our trouble at present is in the very vigour of a human stock which does not know what to do with its force. We have plenty of life and too little wisdom in the deployment of it. Actually there has been since the age of action-and-thing-creation began in the West an essential contradiction in our philosophy of life. Our inherited religion has been world-denying and world-escaping. Our practical philosophy has been world-seeking and world-exploiting; fiercely so. As long as the gospel of "getting on" worked happily, the contradiction did not seem to matter. The prosperous lived happily in both dimensions.

Now, through the dislocation of the economic system and some deepening sense of the inability of what we have made and own really to satisfy us, the strain in our life-wisdom begins to be felt even when it can not be named or traced to its sources. Our real human problem has always been to know what to do with what Tagore—quoting an old Veda—calls "the surpassing strength of the surplus." Somewhere in our long ascent we have gained a margin of impulse and faculty beyond our biological need. There is our peril and our power. It must once have taken all our human time and resource merely to exist. But the surplus margin increased and out of it we have created the whole structure of our culture. Out of it also we have wearied and wounded and often enough destroyed ourselves. How all this bears upon our economic situation is a commonplace. We have in hand all the elements for a fullness of life free from the desperate competitions of the struggle for existence, and we do not seem able to manage it—why?

Most of our current answers to that question are concerned with our mechanics. One may venture to believe that the emancipating answer must be in terms of motives, insights, appreciations, satisfactions—bloodless words but standing for issues warm with life. We are, or should be, delivered from the struggle for existence, and our very deliverance has left us without an adequate and dominant aim.[1] We are not and ought not to be delivered from the quest for fullness of life. St. Paul, according to our modern translations, urged the first-century Christian to have a sense of "what is vital". Which is quite as important for twentieth-century civilization as for first-century Christians.

A right sense of what is vital is, therefore, itself strategically vital and just there, perhaps, is the crux of all our problems and the tap root of all our malaise; we seem to have no sure sense of what is vital.

[1]This statement as it stands is perfectly indefensible. The vast majority have never been delivered from the struggle for existence. Here in America it is distressingly acute. But so far as we have achieved it in our relatively prosperous periods it has not brought fullness of life.

St. Paul himself did no more than supply the phrase and indicate some specific applications. It has always been an engrossing subject for debate. It has motivated the philosopher's quest for the *summum bonum*—the saint's passion for goodness—and, in murky ways, the orientation of cultures. The psychologist with his gospel of "urges" (he used to call them instincts) would furnish us our points of departure. There are not so many "urges" at the most, and it is difficult to tell where they cease to be "urges" and become acquired tastes. Most of our human problems really lie, so to speak, in the margin between bread and caviare. That is, they lie in the "surplus", which is perhaps another way of saying that they lie in the soul.

No one has, so far as I know, defined the soul as our individual surplus of life. The surpluses about which we have of late been most concerned are agri-cultural and not spirit-cultural. But it might be possible that the key to the proper adjustment of stuff-surplus (if and as) would be in the vital disposition of spirit-surplus. For in that frontierless region are our faculties of imagination, appreciation, haunting desire, creation, all our relationships, mind-employment, quest, and whatever else one cares to put in to fill the spaces between biological existence on the human level and fullness of life. The creative disposal of it is the test of life.

* * *

Here, if anywhere, is the focal infection of our sickness. We have carried—or better, tried to carry—the result of technical achievement over into the dimension of spiritual satisfactions. Because we can fly we should, we think, have winged souls. I do not know clearly how to put this into words, though enough of us are trying to say it. It should be, in a sentence, our persuasion that through having done so much in one dimension, we ought therefore to be equally effective in another and far more subtle dimension. And it does not follow. There *is* a searching discipline in the creation and control of our machines and in the direction of our grandiose enterprises, but it is specialized and does not of necessity reach the deep sources of personality. They demand another approach and another culture.

We do—the more fortunate amongst us—secure in such ways an abundance of action and interest in life, but we have had a staggering demonstration that all this creation and command of an unbelievable mechanism may not only conceal but actually project against the screen of contemporaneous civilization a pitiful poverty which has again and again involved us and our enterprises in almost irrecoverable disaster. Here in America all our investigation of high-powered finance and high-geared industry, and the hard-driven game of big business, after penetrating layer after layer of dubious or dishonest methods and a chrome-steel armour-plating of complacent greed, has come back—just to no real sense of what it is all about in the inside

insides of the gentlemen involved. You would not think that anything as imposing could be so empty.[2] It would be a sad comfort to believe all this peculiar to the United States. It has certainly been accentuated here by forces peculiar to our history; but it is common to Western civilization.

It is this interior emptiness where Tagore's surplus ought to be, or else our mismanagement of it, which is making us most of our trouble, creating our literature of malaise and leading us in our attempts to fill the void with activities which are emptying life of security, peace, and any actual contentment with what on the whole we are and are doing. Of course so sweeping a statement must be much qualified; but no qualification would seem to deny the fact.

* * *

To repeat: very likely our central difficulty is just the baffling simplicity of life's essential ends. Biologically, they have never gone far beyond food and race continuance, with a rough and ready elimination of individuals with little survival value. It is upon this almost raw basis that we have to build whatever structure the fruitful use of the surplus demands or makes possible. There is no denying the range and variety of our accomplishment; the trouble is the "surplus" has had to serve too many masters between whom there has been a distressing lack of co-ordination. One department tears down what another department builds.

If we could from the beginning have put the surplus entirely in charge of the human reason (which is itself a "surplus" and according to the psychologist not what we take it to be), we might have got on better. But reason has always had many competitors, older, with a deep inherited drive. It has had also and always to effect a working agreement with the imagination (a surplus protean faculty), which has not only tenaciously refused to be in bonds to reason but has demanded the high throne. It has been the resourceful producer of the picture show of life. By the noblest definition of imagination, no one can deny it that seat. It does not necessarily imply the unreal. At its best it is always the gateway (to change the figure) to the finally real. Through the vision of the prophet it is the source of all religious faith; through the vision of the artist and the poet it is the source of art and literature. It has built the Parthenon and the Empire State Building, made Fords and Rolls-Royces, helped to frame those relatively few laws which are essen-

2 The reported paragraph from the testimony of Mr. Frank Sheldon Jones of the Curtiss Wright Airplane Co. seems to sum up a good deal: "We are certainly in one hell of a business, where a fellow has to wish for trouble so as to make a living. It would be a terrible state of affairs if my conscience started to bother me now." Mr. Jones seems to have still left a sense of humour and a remnant of conscience with which something might be done. The Du Ponts who represent the munition business in its most polished form do not even seem to have a sense of humour left. Of course, this highly specialized business of merchandizing death is not a fair citation. But Mr. Jones's philosophy is, on the whole, representative.

tially right, and built in substance the structure of every civilization. No wonder the surplus loves to deal with so generous and magical a master.

Its main fault, beside destroying, for example, in war and the like what it has built in peace, is over-building. It is incurably and disastrously grandiose. For the elements with which it has to build, even when it uses our real surplus (including itself) are, to repeat, so simple that the imagination never considers them enough. Perhaps it is Siva, the creator and destroyer, for just this reason—what it does never satisfies it. It will not accept the limits of life, for that would be a denial of its own sovereignty, and so through the splendour of our dreams we miss the end of all dreaming. What does all this come to in so many plain words?

* * *

Well, first of all, that the true, though remote, half-hidden, approach to the control of life is through the control of the imagination, or better, maybe, the re-direction of it. Whatever the imagination singles out and magnifies will in the long, long run come nearer controlling creative initiation than any other faculty. That is, perhaps, the secret of our flair for the grandiose and the persistence amongst us of so much which a civilization with more insight would long ago have scrapped. It is easier to invest war with an imaginative glamour than peace; easier to make a song of the sword than of the plough.

It is hardest of all to invest simple happinesses with any appeal to the imagination comparable with its meanings for life. The poet now and then has done it and also the artist. Hobbema asks no more for a picture which the National Gallery treasures than a rutted road between wheatfields and beneath a sky of cold rain-washed light. Rembrandt asked only a lined old face and left the angels to whoever wanted to paint them, but the most part, being neither poets nor artists, are not great enough to discover the greatness of the essentially simple.

For just this reason any list we are able to make of what is really —in the words of St. Paul—vital becomes, apparently, a shop-worn catalogue of the commonplace. "Give me health and a day," said Emerson, "and I will make the pomp of emperors ridiculous." We quote his epigram, but we have not for the most part arranged coronation pageants for health and a day, unless health has come back to us after some long and trying absence and the day itself is epochal. But if one had the gift in one's self to make any day imperial and, so to speak, weave its coronation robes of near and simple things, he would be always living in a coronation ceremony. Emerson could do it—being Emerson. His little Indian-named river was, and is, a very little river of many indecisions in its course, but

he found sermons in its "shards and flints" and saw beneath its current "the inundation and eternal spending" of the stream of all existence. A walk to Sawmill Brook with "Henry" in search of yellow violets was an event, and, with Dante, he could see in light a fire which breaks the chains of darkness. Children have the same faculty, and so do all folk who can make an epic of small experiences. I knew a woman once whose life adventure had been five days on a canal boat between Albany and Buffalo. It is only when that magic gift is gone that the pomp of emperors becomes impressive and health and a day ridiculous.

That elusive phrase—whose roots are in the Fourth Gospel—*Fullness of Life,* might perhaps help us if we knew or could agree as to what really constitutes fullness of life, though we could at least begin by recognizing that it is not identical with the furnishings of life, and cannot be gained in a vacuum. If life is to be full it must be full of something. A simple life is a full life only as it is rich in interior resource—and most of all the gift to invest its simplicities with qualities which satisfy the imagination.

The "contemplative life" which is now being offered as the alternative to the life of action and possession is equally inadequate unless, apart from the contemplation of nature and the mystic's contemplation of God, it is joined to the faculty of creating something worth contemplating. The task of a time like ours, then, would seem to be the synthesis of the creative which finds its fullness of life in doing something worthy of our full creative faculty and the contemplation which, seeing our work and knowing that it is good, makes the circle complete.

* * *

The secret of it might be nothing more than a re-centring of our creative passion. Here with the best will in the world one begins to preach a little, but it is inevitable. I spent a Sunday not long ago in a region of great natural beauty, famous for great estates. They had been built, my host told me, upon the dispossession (willingly enough granted) of the native rural population, and now that the estates could no longer be maintained the quiet timeless hills had begun to extend their growths into the pastures where the opulent once played with their high-bred herds.

The old farm-houses and barns, the fields won from the wilderness and tilled by laborious generations, were gone beyond any hope of their return. The mines of the iron-producing states had been gutted, the oil wells of many fields had been drained, to create for a generation or two the perfect landscape beauty of a region beyond the reach of smoke and oil-stained sands and those who laboured there; and now forces beyond control were undoing what so much had been undone to make. There is matter for contemplation in

that, but not a happy contemplation.

If only there had been somewhere, somehow, the vision to share the power which creates beauty; if there had been less of it in the Berkshires and more in Oklahoma, the contemplation of the American scene (at least) would be more satisfying. If we are to have that fullness of life which is the appointed answer to our human quest, it must be the common possession of all human folk and if—what haunting "ifs" these are—that is to be at all accomplished, it must be our shared endeavour. Whenever in any region fullness of life becomes a monopoly, the monopolist has already lost it.

It belongs, to use Dr. L. P. Jacks's pregnant phrase, to the civilization of culture and not the civilization of power. It can only enrich itself by enriching others. In its noble appropriation of the great values of life and its creative use of the great ministries of life, it takes nothing which does not thus become our common property. There are now the beginnings of some movement in this direction. The growing demand for the abolition of the profit motive, the loose, popular uses of the word "service," the direction of the resources of the State toward the bare need of the unemployed, the almost lyric recital of how prosperous we all might be if we knew how to distribute what we could create, the highly idealistic programmes of the Shape of Things to Come, are significant, but they run counter as yet to the temper of the more forceful amongst us. The values which lie behind the approaches to fullness of life have as yet taken no hold of our general imagination.

* * *

One may venture to believe, for all that, that one release from our malaise is down or up such a road. It should certainly foster the contemplative life, for contemplation may, I take it, be as usefully directed toward consequences or situations as toward the glory of God, and toward the well-being of humanity as the raptures of salvation. It would give a new meaning to enterprises and power, and, because it associated personal initiative with the common good, would increase the dividends of satisfaction which are the final dividends any enterprise can pay.

All this demands a proper economic and industrial "set-up," of course, and the intelligent quest for such a "set-up," if we could be whole-heartedly committed to it, might become for a long period an occupation so engrossing as to make the technical achievements of the industrial epoch seem colourless beside it. One can dream that it might be so done as to furnish also in manifold ways the beauty for want of which, though they may not know it, the generality are pitifully hungry, and an employment of our restless creativeness which would leave us no time to be professionally unhappy. But there would still remain the conquest of what defeats

us through its simplicity—the subdual of all our restless power to kind and quiet ways of life in which labour and rest, health and a day, the happy use of all the senses, the enrichment of our higher faculties and the comradeship of the like-minded, would furnish the substance of our contentment.

Evangelical Puritanism cannot escape its responsibility for our malaise. I do not know, Chesterton to the contrary, whether Catholicism would have done much better. Christianity itself, in its first reactions from paganism, its costly struggle to get itself free from "this present world," lost a contact with all the earth-rooted, sense-served side of life it has never since been able to re-establish. Some fear of the happinesses which thus ripen has always haunted it. When at last Christianity accepted the world, some implication of taint in all its associations remained to colour the Christian conscience with an unescapable fear of all the happinesses which ripen from earth and sense.

From the first there have been in religion elements which not only remind the worshipper of his kinship with the ways and forces of nature and his dependence upon them, but in addition make of these ways and forces a sacramental approach to the spiritual order. Christianity ought not, therefore, to fear what fullness of life is thus secured. Earth is not all earthiness as long as it holds in the brooding heart of it the deposit of what was once alive and is on its way to become alive again.

Puritanism, whether Catholic or Protestant, has "blocked out" many of the natural joys of life, not so much in what it has forbidden—though, first and last, that is an arresting list—but in what it has so shadowed through implication as to make difficult a healthy joy in life either for the saint—or the sinner. And naturally the life-force so blocked had to carry too much traffic on the roads left open—labour, thrift, the domestic virtues, and even religion. The "four-strip" roads of this region are not a bad analogy—a high-speed, hard-driven traffic with weaving, passing cars and all the lovely landscape something to get through as quickly as possible, as though life had no meanings save in its remote ends and the speed with which they can be reached. And when the ends have apparently been reached they are either not there or still ahead.

* * *

It has been a long time now since Western civilization lost the art of living in the present. Its religion made time only a prelude to eternity. Its statesmen have sacrificed the well-being of any present to grandiose policies of national aggrandizement. Its financiers have issued stock to return dreamful dividends out of future business at the cost of present solvency. Its idealists have always been adjourning its millenniums, its prophets have given it their

vision for bread. About the only thing left to the present has been confusion and frustration. And yet life is always an affair with the present tense.

The protests which meet any insistence that we should perfect the art of living in the present and and explore the secrets of contentment are the best demonstration of how completely our entire force is spent upon preparation for something in the future and how narrow the margin we allow ourselves of actual realization. Our malaise is rooted deep in just this temper. Economically we have taken far too much out of any productive present to create a capital for future production, a capital which eventually turns out to be in a sadly considerable part only expensively engraved high-grade paper, and is not even like a well-known definition of faith, "the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen." It is rather the evidence of the self-defeating nature of a system which substitutes thing-wealth for life-wealth and seeks to defeat the age-old law that what comes out of life must go back into life again—or else end in sterile death.

* * *

In such ways as these, and in the braver, happier human temper which they might engender, something of our malaise might be cured, and what of it is left might be sublimated into the noblest qualities of our nature. There will always be left in any human endeavour a margin of the unrealized—perhaps of what can never be realized—some nostalgia of our spirits to save us from an utter at-homeness in that to which, by some deep mystery of our personality, we are not and were not meant to be completely akin. Religion has always offered itself as the final escape. It has built its shelters for the soul warm with a divine concern in the cosmic loneliness and given timeless meaning to our brief venture through time. Perhaps religion merely as an escape, in encouraging us to try to escape what we cannot flee, has always carried at the heart of it the fatal force of its own undoing. But on a higher level, as the orientation of the soul, the facing of the surplus toward a more enduring order, and with the persuasion of a Divine transcendent reality in co-operation with Whom life finds its ultimate meanings, religion becomes the supreme adventure of the human spirit which accepts its own limitations only as a challenge to transcend them, and believes it is not alone in the venture. Religion thus in action will never be undone.

It will change its form but not its essential spirit, and renew its flame above the ashes of its seemingly ruined altars. It will help a man to burn his own smoke and make an incense of it. It will save him from futile complaint and teach him that though he sinks 'tis to another sea. Some travail of the surplus he calls his soul will

always remain, but he will gratefully recognize it as the price he pays for being a man.

* * *

How much so wandering an article as this leaves unsaid and unsuggested is too evident to need saying. It was itself suggested by an article in *Harper's* some months ago in which an unhappy writer, after describing his symptoms of spiritual unrest, asked for a remedy. I doubt if he would find this discursive reply what he wanted. But it is an attempted answer: which in all probability he will never see. His malady is, however, so widespread as to make some answer useful to most of us.

GAIUS GLENN ATKINS.

Here are reviews of two books by American writers:

Readers of these pages will, we hope, have an opportunity of sampling the works of Prof. H. P. Van Dusen, of Union Seminary, New York, whose *God in These Times* (S.C.M., 7s. 6d.) is now before us. Prof. Van Dusen has read widely and thought deeply, and his vigorous style drives home his arguments. In this volume, which discusses the message of the living God for the modern world, his searching analysis of modern life and thought continually sets the reader thinking. The final chapter on "Two Specific Issues" — "The Christian Critique of Communism" and "The Christian and Compromise"—shows the author at his best: he shirks nothing, and he can state a case with force and precision.

Mr. J. W. Krutch, one of the most incisive of American thinkers, shows himself, in *Was Europe A Success?* (Methuen, 3s. 6d.), as a shrewd critic of Communism. Four of the essays may be said to illustrate the remaining one, which gives the book its title. Mr. Krutch refuses to believe that catastrophes, wars, and revolutions are inevitable, and that the only alternatives are an inequitable civilization and an equalitarian barbarism. He regards the achievements of Europe, a little promontory on the continent of Asia, as amazing, though they had "ghastly" accompaniments (chivalry and slaughter, religion and persecution, *etc.*). Those achievements—liberty, personality, sensitiveness—must be preserved against all enemies, including the machine discovered by America, and the Communism of Russia. In short Mr. Krutch argues, in the words of Prof. Joad, who contributes a Preface, that

> it is by reference to its art, its science, its philosophy, its religion, and its ethics that a civilization is ultimately to be judged.

THE REV. HENRY HARDIN (1838-1904).

When my father first came to the village of Montacute as its Vicar in 1886, Mr. Hardin, the Baptist minister (well-known in South Somerset), had been pastor of the village chapel for sixteen years. During this period he had won the love and respect of both rich and poor. The year 1875 had been marked by a severe epidemic of typhoid fever, and Mr. Hardin, who in his youth had been trained for the medical profession, had worked day and night to relieve the sufferings of the people. When the pestilence was over Mr. Goodden, my father's predecessor, persuaded the squire to make a formal presentation to Mr. Hardin of a gold watch and chain, together with a subscription purse of eleven guineas, to show the gratitude of the inhabitants of the village.

I remember Mr. Hardin very well. He seldom went out without a brown shawl over his shoulders, a protection against the weather that he did not hesitate to wear even with his high silk hat, if the wind was in the least chilly. He was a man of great character and had a gift for unexpected utterances, often loaded with some verbal ambiguity calculated to puzzle the slow wits of his neighbours. I myself was once the target of a light irony. I had heard the sound of footsteps coming up the station road and in a moment of idle curiosity had peered over the garden wall to see whose they were. Overcome with embarrassment I found myself looking down upon Mr. Hardin and another Nonconformist minister. I dropped back, but not before Mr. Hardin, who had evidently appreciated the situation, had asked me with a smile of friendly raillery to tell him what had been the text of my father's Sunday sermon. Thoroughly mortified I ran off to recount my adventure to my mother, who was not a little amused.

My father always appreciated Mr. Hardin's striking qualities, and although I often heard him inform a visiting clergyman with a heavy sigh that the Baptists were very strong in Montacute, yet I as often heard him pronounce Mr. Hardin to be "a very good man", which was the highest form of praise he ever gave to anyone. The doctrinal differences between my father and Mr. Hardin seem negligible to me now. My father was an old-fashioned evangelical clergyman of the Church of England, and Mr. Hardin was an old-fashioned evangelical clergyman of the Baptist persuasion, and when the more radical controversies of the present day are considered their theological agreements seem fundamental, academic questions such as Apostolic Succession or Adult Baptism not appearing to be of any great importance in an age which under the least provocation is prepared to dispute the theurgic hypothesis itself.

Henry Hardin was born at Woolwich on 24th March, 1838. When as a brilliant youth he decided to abandon the medical profession for the Baptist ministry his father, a shrewd man of business, was greatly troubled by his change of mind, describing his boy's chosen vocation as "a beggarly profession", "a miserable do nothing sort of life." After two previous appointments he began his work at Montacute in April, 1870, remaining its Baptist pastor until his death in March, 1904. Thanks to some papers lent to me by the Hardin family and a small but excellent Memoir written by his daughter, Mrs. Helen Osborne, I have been able to get a fairly clear idea of those thirty-four years spent by him in the beautiful country village that was also my own home. The more I consider Mr. Hardin's life, the more deeply do I respect and honour the memory of this singular man. It was not for nothing that on one occasion Mr. Hardin paid an especial visit to Elstow, for he shared in common with Bunyan a life-long unfaltering conviction that God was immediately concerned with the happenings of every moment of his days. It was God's spirit that sustained his body and gave him eloquence in the pulpit. It was God who saw to it that a falling beam from the scaffolding of his new chapel did not kill him. It was God who reassured him with a sudden ray of sunlight when he felt anxious about the weather.

> 1880 May 12th. A heavy piece of wood fell off the scaffold this morning, giving me a very ugly cut on the head. Preserving mercy.
>
> 1902 Sunday, July 27th. School anniversary. Congregations very good, especially at night. Weather very boisterous in the morning. Several showers. I had not troubled about it, but became anxious at the morning service, and could not help praying for the shining of the sun; and immediately the sun shone. Blessed be God.

On all occasions God seemed close to him. He felt He was at his side when he arrived at Montacute for the first time, drenched through, having walked from Yeovil in the rain—and again when he walked to Martoch in 1881:

> Below Cartgate the snow filled the road as high as the hedges. Had to get over and walk through the fields . . . Bless the Lord, O my soul;

and especially did it seem to be so on 12th May, 1884, when the night was spent by him walking up and down talking to himself. There is something extremely moving about the simple record forced from him that tragic evening:

> My dear wife entered into rest at ten minutes past nine to-night. Alas! What can I say? Lord comfort, Lord bring us all to meet before Thy throne, there for ever to dwell. The

greatest trouble I have had . . . The Lord is wise and kind, but, oh! the anguish of the present.

She was buried at Five Ashes in a romantic grave-yard situated to the right of the road that runs from Odcombe to Ham Hill. The plot is surrounded by high walls and stands in an open field far from all human habitations. It was first used, so it is said, at the time of the Civil War for the burying of Cromwell's soldiers. Each Anniversary of May 17th found Mr. Hardin at the grave of his "Lady Jane Grey," for his mind was never able to rid itself of "the greatest trouble of his life," until, on a bitter February afternoon twenty years later, he himself was carried up Woodhouse Lane by his sorrowing people to be laid by her side.

To lessen the immediate shock of her loss his friends persuaded him to take a holiday in America, and the feeling of Montacute was shown on his return when he was greeted on the platform by a band of children and was conducted to his manse by his people dressed as for a gala day, with the church bells ringing.

Oct. 17th. Arrived at Montacute. A grand reception. Church bells ringing and all the people at their doors to welcome me. At home there was a motto "Welcome home to our dear father!" Bless the Lord for His *great* goodness.

Although Mr. Hardin used to give himself pleasure by calling Montacute "the hub of the Universe," it would be a mistake to suppose that his interests were entirely confined to that lovely old-world village. For forty years he never missed a single Baptist Union Meeting. He was an energetic member of the District Council and the Board of Guardians, and a vigorous supporter of the Liberal Party in all its undertakings. On more than one occasion he was offered wide fields for the exercise of his remarkable gifts, but it would seem that the common lure of worldly advancement had little influence with him. The two principal interests of his life centred upon his children, and upon the welfare of the Dissenters of the West Country village to which he had been called. Christmas was to him a season of great happiness, and plays an important part in the diary of each year.

December 25th 1897. Helen, Blen, William, Arthur, Florrie, Ethel, and Arthur Austen here to dinner. Bless the Lord, O my Soul. One of the happiest Christmas Days I have ever had . . .

December 25th 1902. A letter from Helen in her own handwriting. Lots of cards . . . a jolly Christmas. What shall I render unto the Lord for all his goodness? Bless the Lord, O my soul.

Dec. 29th 1903 (Mr. Hardin's last Christmas) All my children at home . . . Grant that my children, and children's children, may every one be Thine. Give them length of days, abundant

> prosperity, great usefulness in the service of Thy kingdom, and bring them at last to join their mother, me, and all our dear ones in Thy eternal glory . . . Mr. Osborne and family. C. Osborne and family. Twenty seven in all. Dinner in the schoolroom. Prayer Meeting in the chapel at night. A *very* happy Christmas. The Lord be praised.

The author of the Memoir I have mentioned was evidently a favoured child. She is now dead, but I remember her as a woman of great gentleness and sensibility. Her husband, the William of Mr. Hardin's diary, was the Baptist minister of a small village in Westmorland called Tottlebank. Some of Mr. Hardin's happiest holidays were spent here with this son-inlaw, for William Osborne, though not a born Dalesman, was full of a truly Wordsworthian simplicity and piety. Mr. Hardin writes thus of Tottlebank:

> It made me think of the promise, the mountain of the home of the Lord shall be established on the top of the mountains. It is high up, about five miles from Windermere . . . the Chapel is to me as beautiful as the scenery. A long, low, old-fashioned building, from which you can see a farm house, the minister's house, and no other. Its beauty lies in the fact that it was built there because it is just over five miles from every corporate town, and, therefore, the Five Mile Act could not touch the Minister . . . It was fine to see the knots of people coming up the roads from all quarters. It reminded me of the Psalm, "Whither the tribes go up, the tribes of the Lord, a testimony unto Israel—"

Mr. Hardin was truly apostolic in his care for the poor and destitute. At any hour of the night he would leave his house at the first call of distress, whether to attend upon the sick or dying, or, as happened on one occasion, to cut down a man who had hanged himself.

Many decades will yet have to pass before the tradition of his ministrations has left the cottages of Bishopston, Middle Street, and Townsend. He kept an accurate record of his medical visits with the medicines he had given to each patient, and the number of these professional calls amounted at the end of his life to close upon one hundred thousand, for none of which had he received a penny.

It was an interesting and characteristic practice of his to write at the close of each year a rhyming commentary on the most important events that had taken place in the Montacute Baptist world. Many of these Watch-night verses were printed and are still extant. In them each cottage death-bed drama takes its place in the universal plan, so that a humble upper room under a Somerset thatch becomes a departing place for a flight to the throne of God, cradled in an eternity beyond the uttermost star "grown red with age."

> Old Mary Rugg, feeble and blind,
> And long unto her bed confined
> Breathed out her life so frail.

Of Joseph Lugg we nothing say,
Until the last Great Judgment Day
We leave his dreadful case.
Next, sister Elliott was laid low
By His all unexpected blow;
And then old William Geard,
At more than fourscore years of age,
Was blotted out of life's fair page,
And at God's bar appeared.
Amidst the silence of the night
His spirit took eternal flight
Without one warning note;
A piercing scream, and all was o'er;
And death his helpless victim bore
From earthly help remote.

Mary Anne Taunton left behind
The cares and toil of mortal kind
At four o'clock this morning.
She too we hope had found the light
And now amid the ransomed band
Receives the crown from Jesu's hand
Her temples to adorn.

The writer of this appreciation has for many years now been an independent thinker with strong anti-religious opinions, and for this very reason the tribute he is offering to this dead man may perhaps carry the more weight. Mr. Hardin's virtue cannot be measured by the standards of sect or creed. He was a humanist, bold and resolute to resist oppression. His confidence in the literal interpretation of the Scriptures was so deep-rooted that to him a golden stairway seemed to rise direct from the Montacute Borough to the gate of the celestial city.

My sensations during my study of his ministry at Montacute might be likened to those of a heretic looking through a hagioscope, so far removed from his is my own vision of life. Yet with truth I may say that through the influence of the cosmogony of this prophet of the "God of the burning bush" the blue bells beneath the beech trees in Park Covert, the Abbey pond by the huge sycamore, the quarry men with their trousers yellow from the dust of their toil, have come to lose something of the inconsequent dream quality they had heretofore possessed in my mind; lose it, to become, below the mocking mackerel skies of my childhood memories, solid phenomena held firm, and no longer to be apprehended as insubstantial images drifting at hazard upon the surface of a many shadowed river that flows on and on towards the marginless ocean of an eternal oblivion.

There used to be an idiot boy named George Stuckey at Montacute whose name became inscribed on the Scholar's Honour Roll which

hung upon the wall of the Baptist schoolroom. In medieval times a man so afflicted would have been called a "Christian." This guileless and gentle human creature lies to-day buried near his beloved protector and pastor at the Five Ashes. Mrs. Hardin was never tired of recounting the following dialogue that had once taken place between them:

> "Thy chaps do poke fun at I and do say 'Georgy do bide in a stud all stupid-like and don't learn nothing at Sunday school', but I have learned sommat and no mistake".
>
> "And what may that be?", asked Mr. Hardin with interest.
>
> "I do mind", the boy said simply, "how Jesus Christ did die for sinners".

LLEWELYN POWYS.

Another review of a book by an American writer:

It is, we are told, a mistake to mix your drinks; that may be the reason why we like our biography, our fiction, and even our philosophy "straight." Prof. George Santayana's *The Last Puritan* (Constable, 8s. 6d.) is a concoction of the three, and while its 720 pages have kept our interest and stirred our thoughts we cannot think it the writer's best medium. Oliver is a rich young American, scrupulous and conscientious, with "inhibitions" which prevent him from enjoying life on any side: he says:

> I have been a conscript all my life; a conscript son, a conscript schoolboy, a conscript athlete, and a conscript soldier—

and it was not his fault he was not a conscript husband. He could not be satisfied with

> the busy cheerful life everybody seemed to live in America; simple spontaneous immersion in what happened to be going on: a perpetual boat-race: a perpetual football match: a brave struggle with no further purpose, yet not without moments within it of pride and satisfaction.

He had

> a transcendental mind, like a duck's back; it shed and rejected everything that merely happened to flow by. Nothing existed for him save that which his moral tentacles were ready to seize.

In writing the life of such an one, Prof. Santayana, it will be readily seen, is dealing with the root problems of human existence. Some of his characters are admirably portrayed, but many of them, Rose Darnley as much as Oliver, talk pure Santayana. Something seems to have gone wrong with the geography of Oxford on page 301, and would even an Iffley clergyman know anything about Freud in 1914?

THE SURVIVAL OF PERSONALITY.

THIS subject is not only the most important which can engage the human mind, but easily the most difficult of which to treat. It would be absurd for anyone to attempt such a treatment without being aware of its difficulties. This question of the survival of the personality is no matter for journalistic impressionism. It concerns every individual so deeply that the answer we give to the implied question makes all the difference to the attitude of our minds and the direction of our lives. Even if many of us are not in a position to come to any definite conclusion on the subject until our own lives are nearly over, the question remains one with tremendous implications for our generation and our race.

So far as humanity considers itself entirely mortal, to that extent its final destiny as attested by the telescope of science is only too apparent. We know what is going to happen eventually to our own world as certainly as we know the calendar for the coming year. This earth will eventually grow cold and be unable to support life of any kind. If that is the only result of the toil and turmoil of human development, if the end is simply a frozen silence, if spiritually and mentally as well as physically the movement of life is to cease, the prospect of such a fate must have a profound influence on human outlook and conduct. I do not say that, even if that be the destiny, life is not worth living. So far as we are in life we do proceed to live it with some satisfaction, and get happiness out of it if we face it in the right spirit, even though it should end in complete tragedy. But our higher ideals, our hopes for something permanent, something that will transcend all that is petty and selfish in us, those ideals and hopes are doomed to disappointment. I do not range myself with Tennyson, who said that if immortality were not assured he himself would regard God as something malignant and would sink his head in a chloroformed handkerchief and end it all. I do not agree with that attitude, and I am sure that Tennyson himself on other occasions would not have subscribed to it, but in a wider sense this question of immortality represents for us the watershed dividing idealism from materialism.

In early times there was a belief in continuance, but little belief in survival of any great spiritual value. The *Sheol* of the Hebrews and the *Hades* of the Greeks were simply realms for the attenuated shades of departed spirits. They represented mere continuance, and a continuance which was not desirable in itself. The reasons for believing in such continuance in those days are fairly obvious. The people misunderstood such facts of science and psychology as were presented to them. Dream phenomena and hallucinatory experiences

had their most ready explanation in terms of animism, of a theory of the mind as something that duplicates the body, like reflections in water or from polished surfaces, or like shadows cast by material objects, and this was conceived as persisting after the body had reached its end.

In the Orphic mysteries we find the beginning of a slightly higher point of view, the conception of reward and punishment, and the need of purification of the departed spirit; and in some of the mysteries we have the beginnings of the idea of mystic participation, for example, in the hunting of the Maenads, the tearing of the victim limb by limb, the eating of the raw flesh, so absorbing and internalizing the virtue of the sacrifice. Later on in Plato we have an intense belief in survival as almost a first principle, in the soul as having a greater reality than the body. But the arguments as we find them set out in the *Phaedo*, and less systematically in the other Dialogues, are really unsatisfactory; not a single one will stand the test of logical investigation, they are all merely verbal justifications worked out with quite other motives.

With Aristotle a more cautious attitude is adopted. The soul is the ἐντελέχεια, the functional completeness of the body; it is considered biologically, and its survival after bodily death is not for one moment recognized. But even in Aristotle we find that although the fugitive soul (ψυχή) in its entirety is not regarded as capable of survival, one part of the mind is regarded as transcending material existence, namely, νοῦς or reason. Towards the end of Aristotle's *Ethics* he exhorts his readers to be as far as possible immortal (ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν) even in this life, living the immortal life through philosophic contemplation (θεωρία). So far as we participate in strict logical thinking, purifying our thought and making it more and more accurate, and are more thoroughly conscientious in our thinking, to that extent we transcend the doom awaiting us, we are beyond "the changes and chances of this mortal life".

That position, set out so clearly by Aristotle, is to be found down the subsequent ages among philosophers. We have it again voiced very eloquently by Spinoza, when he regards the eternal power of thinking as raising us above mere temporal existence; although really, for Spinoza as for Aristotle, this eternity of which they spoke, and which seems so attractive at first blush, is simply the necessity of thinking. It can be summed up by saying that the eternal nature of thought derives from the necessity of all thought. If we work it out according to the rules of logic, it follows that it is eternally true because it is necessary. The eternality is really the necessity of thought—the necessity, that is, apart from time and all temporal sequence.

In this historical survey I should here interpolate the eastern

doctrine of *Karma* as illustrating again, just as the Orphic mysteries did, the emergence of a new viewpoint, namely, the moral or ethical viewpoint, the difference between right and wrong, the seriousness of sin and the necessity for its expiation, the correction of wrong conduct, the responsibility of the individual for his acts. Although the system or theory of *Karma* is found so attractive by many people in that it seems to rectify the difficulties and injustices, the differences of fortune among people in this life, by an explanation of what they have been in previous lives, the great argument against it that cannot be countered is that the thread of memory is broken. These previous lives have no moral relation to the one lived at present. If we have lived before we do not remember our former existence, and if we are now being punished for a previous guiltiness, since we can by no means recall it the punishment has no moral value. It might equally well be visited upon a different person altogether. Indeed, in that sense the principle of *Karma* does hold good for those who, while not believing in immortality, believe that each individual inherits from all that has gone before, so that what is done wrong in one generation has to be expiated in the generations that follow, that any violation of the moral law brings its inevitable "punishment", if not in the life of the wrongdoer, at all events in the shape of re-adjustments in the lives of those who enter upon his heritage. This is not according to any principle of vindictiveness, any principle of *lex talionis,* but it follows from the nature of things and of good and evil that any inadequacy in one generation works itself out in the generations that follow, just as the ill-functioning of some piece of machinery may produce effects remote from the original cause.

We come thus to the question of ethical principle in relation to immortality. This is most clearly set out in the writings of perhaps our greatest philosopher, Kant. He first cleared the ground in his *Critique of Pure Reason,* in which he showed how intellectual knowledge in terms of concepts cannot transcend experience and must work within the forms of space and time and the framework of the categories. Of God, freedom, and immortality we have ideas, but not concepts, and according to Kant any attempt to give a reasonable proof of the existence of God, or of freedom, or of immortality is for ever doomed to failure, because in making such attempt we are using ideas in the wrong way. Ideas, as distinct from concepts, for Kant are "regulative", but we in our sophistry attempt to use them in a "constitutive" way.

In his *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant demonstrates that we can only know phenomena, we cannot know the thing in itself, neither "the thing in itself" of the material world nor "the thing in itself" of the mind. But in his *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant turns to the fact of morality, of duty, the sense of moral obligation, and argues

that the fact of morality proves that the mind of man is free. That freedom is not a freedom of phenomena; so far as the mind is considered as a sequence of phenomena in time, so far it cannot appear free. Every moment of experience is linked up by the mind's own activity with previous experience under the category of causation, so that everything seems inevitably due to previous mental changes, and those to still earlier mental changes, and so forth. But the mind itself as a "thing in itself" may be free—Kant will not say it is free, but it may be free—and since morality is possible, then it is free, because morality comes to us in the form of a categorical imperative, "I ought, therefore I can". We are aware of obligation. Obligations change, but obligation itself remains. Duties change, but duty remains. If we accept that we have to accept—I will not say the hypothesis, for Kant does not deal with hypotheses here—the deeper fact of freedom. The soul is free and good: as Kant says in some other part of his writings, the only thing completely and absolutely good in this world or in the next is the good will. He argues thus on the ethical side in terms of obligation, and his categorical imperative, his version of the simple rule, is summed up in other ways: "Treat everyone as an end and not merely as a means"; "Act so that the law of thy action can be taken as law universal". Such rules as those transcend mere opportunism of any kind, any relation to the fortune or misfortune that may at the moment come to the individual soul. The soul has to do good because it is its duty. The difficulty here is to decide exactly what is one's duty, and that thread of the argument I shall take up again later.

Turning back somewhat in our historical survey, we may note that Descartes, the founder of modern philosophy, was an interactionist, a dualist. He believed body and mind to be distinct—*res extensa* and *res cogitans*, with mutually exclusive characteristics. The only point where they came into contact, he considered, was the pineal gland, the only unpaired organ in the brain. We now know the pineal gland to be a vestigeal remnant, having little or nothing to do with the nervous activity of the brain. In the sense in which Descartes separated mind and matter as with a hatchet it was impossible to bring the two halves together. It reminds one of the old conundrum: "What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind". Successive philosophers struggled hard with this problem. There were the so-called occasionalists, Guelinx and Malebranche, who believed that when a change in the brain took place, say, in sense perception, God arranged that the appropriate change in the mind should occur. Then, despairing over this solution, there came Spinoza to cut the knot and say, "These two are not separate substances, but attributes of the same substance". Mind and matter were considered different but parallel attributes of one

universal substance. Leibniz at about the same time was working out his more complicated system of monadology and pre-established harmony.

In modern science we have these same possibilities presented to us. There are three fundamental theories of the relation of mind to brain, though there are many subsidiary possible forms of the theories. There is the theory of materialism or automatism, according to which matter is the only real agent, and complex changes in some parts of the brain, especially in the cerebral cortex, produce sensory or motor consciousness, which consciousness when produced has no real effect upon subsequent activity in the brain, for in this theory of materialism consciousness is rather like a will o' the wisp burning over the surface of a lake, or the shadow that accompanies the pedestrian without influencing his steps, or the melody that floats from the harp-string without influencing its rate of vibration. In this theory of automatism or epi-phenomenalism the mind is not active at all.

The second theory is the theory of parallelism. It follows almost automatically from our rejection of materialism. We reject materialism because it assumes causal relations nowhere else to be discovered in nature. It supposes that material changes can produce a conscious process, and yet that that conscious process in its turn is unable to produce anything else. In all other branches of science there is a continuous sequence of causation, so why should this be supposed to be different? Moreover, the materialistic theory can be easily refuted. According to any theory of materialism mental activity is illusory. If illusory, then intellectual activity, which is one form of mental activity, is illusory. If intellectual activity is illusory, the products of intellectual activity are illusory. One such product of intellectual activity is this theory of materialism, and therefore the theory of materialism is illusory and contradicts itself!

In order to get over that difficulty the passage is made from materialism to parallelism, just as Spinoza made it more than two centuries ago. The modern theory of psycho-physical parallelism is really Spinoza's theory that mental process and physical change are two aspects of the same thing. The cerebral cortex is the part of the brain in most intimate relation with consciousness. For parallelism consciousness is one aspect of brain activity. Consciousness or mental activity is the same activity seen from the mental side. This theory may take different forms—it would take too long for me to enter into it in detail—but in the form known as psycho-physical idealism the mental process is regarded as "the reality" and the physical process as the way in which that reality appears to any other individual or centre of consciousness. According to this theory the brain of any particular person may be regarded as simply the other aspect of his

mind, which is the reality. Although the mind cannot be directly observed, one can deduce what is happening in different parts of the cerebral cortex corresponding to different modifications of consciousness through which the individual is passing. But mind and brain could not both be observed simultaneously. The observer could not be directly aware of the other's mind, but he could, theoretically, see his brain. On the other hand, the person observed could be directly aware of his own mental processes but not of his own brain. That all fits in with the hypothesis that the reality is the mind and the brain is simply the other aspect of it.

According to both of these theories, materialism and parallelism, survival after bodily death is impossible. We know what happens to the brain at death; it disintegrates, and that, so far as materialism is concerned, is the end. According to parallelism likewise, knowing what happens to the brain, the mind, being the other aspect of brain activity, must be disintegrated also. If mind be but the other and invisible side of the complex process in the cerebral cortex, it follows that with the disappearance of that complex process there can be no survival after bodily death.

We come to the third general possibility, that of interactionism. According to this theory the mind and brain are in relation to one another, the mind being relatively passive in sensation and relatively active in thinking and volition, though to some extent it is always active. One of the greatest of the older interactionists was Lotze, who believed in the soul as something distinct from the brain. He did not say, in his interactionist theory, that the brain interacted with consciousness, but rather that the brain interacted with the soul, which is not consciousness, lacking indeed sensation and other forms of conscious activity. One of Lotze's great arguments for the distinction of soul from brain is that based on the unity of the soul or the unity of the mind as distinct from the brain. The mind is a unity and the brain is not. But actually a point of criticism must be made there, for the brain is a very complicated integration of nervous functioning, and that integration is a unity. It may well be that the unity of the mind is an integrated activity of the nervous system. Indeed, one is prepared to say that in one sense the two are in complete correlation with one another. We may dismiss psycho-physical parallelism altogether, there being no completely adequate evidence of a point-to-point correspondence between certain parts of the cortex and special kinds of mental activity, but, while dismissing that, we can nevertheless hold to the view of a correspondence between the unitary activity of the nervous system in its co-ordination of behaviour and the unitary activity of the mind. Even if we do not accept psycho-physical parallelism in the technical sense we can believe in a psycho-neural parallelism—a parallelism between the

mental process and nerve change, not a point-to-point correspondence, but a correspondence in general, the whole nervous system being taken into account.

There are logical difficulties in the way of interactionism in that it seems to assume a causal relationship between two entities or two forms of reality that are absolutely different from one another. Brain and mind are so distinct, nervous activity on the one side and mental process on the other are so different, that it is impossible to conceive a causal relationship between them. This argument, however, assumes that we understand the causal relationship in other domains of science, whereas actually we do not. So far are we from understanding causal relationship that the category of causality is tending to disappear from physical science, and science is concerning itself more and more with the expressing of events by means of differential equations, describing as accurately as may be continuous changes in time, without reference to the causal concept.

The theory of interactionism may take many forms. The original form was that the soul was an indivisible indestructible substance, and that its unity had to be assumed in order to account for the unity of conscious life and thought. But Kant himself showed that the only unity of the mind of which there could be absolute certainty was the unity of the logical subject—the "I think", or the subject of any proposition. It was the process of experience as distinct from the object experienced, the synthetic unity of apperception, which was timeless but not immortal—timeless in the sense of being a necessary implicate in all our knowledge, and so accompanying our knowledge, but not just for that reason immortal and sure to survive the death of the body. Kant illustrated the situation by an analogy. He assumed a number of elastic spheres, each sphere carrying its own "consciousness", also its own energy of movement, and he imagined one sphere hitting a neighbouring sphere and transmitting to it both its consciousness and its energy, and that sphere in its turn hitting the next sphere, and transmitting consciousness and energy, and so on. Thus there would be, on that analogy, a continuance of consciousness and energy, and yet with no unitary sub-stratum.

The same idea appears in William James's *Principles of Psychology,* in which he speaks of the passing thought as that which carries the unity of consciousness, the passing thought which is "born an owner and dies owned", which takes up in itself the previous moment of experience, and, having made it its own, gives it up to the next moment of experience. Thus every passing thought is born an owner, owning what has previously passed, but it dies owned, the possession of the next passing thought. I have taken up this argument in order to dismiss the idea of the soul as necessarily a unitary metaphysical entity.

The only great philosopher in recent times who has held that view of the soul as something metaphysically original and indestructible is McTaggart. He held the monadistic view that the individual soul was there from eternity, from the beginning of time, and cannot be destroyed. But the argument that dismisses the rationalistic doctrine of the unitary and indestructible soul would also dismiss McTaggart's view. The soul is a process of development, of growth and organization, and we need not be afraid that in accepting that view we are handing ourselves over bound to the materialist who considers that all that is being developed is a physical system which in process of successive generations becomes more and more complicated, and therefore becomes an increasingly complicated form of experience for the organism. The soul is in process of development in relation to the body. It is through the body that the soul gets its experience. It is through the body that the soul comes into existence, but theoretically that does not force us to the view that when the body begins to fail and ultimately disintegrates the soul must share its fate. That does not follow—I am speaking now theoretically and in terms of logical analysis.

The soul as it is developed is described and explained to a certain extent by psychology, but as it is understood more deeply in the mental sciences of ethics, æsthetics, and logic it has the aspect of value-experience. Thought has a value, appreciation of beauty has a value, and moral obligation and appreciation of good has a value. As all these develop in the individual mind, although it is true that their development is in relation to changes in nerve fibres and in complexity of physical function, they may in the course of their development achieve a degree of permanence and a degree of power that can survive the death of their physical partner, the partner that assisted in their birth. We may look upon the mind as the ἐντελέχεια of the body, as pervading the body, not necessarily surviving bodily death because it is mental, but if in its mentality it is able to rise above the stratum in which it is first unfolded and the attending sequence of experience, and to possess not only consciousness but self-consciousness, knowledge of itself, the ability to look before and after, self-control and organization, in a word, character—if it is able to do this, acquiring thereby the strength which can not only magnify the individual but through him affect societies and nations, then surely it has in it potent elements of survival.

The difficulty, of course, is to understand how the mind can survive the cataclysm of death. As we watch the approach of death in others we can see how, before the death of the body, the mind can be changed by disease, especially by toxic absorption working on the brain and producing different degrees of mental alienation or insanity. The mind seems to be disintegrating even before the body,

and the person in serious mental illness is "not himself", as we say. No wonder we ask ourselves whether mind can survive bodily death when it seems so cruelly affected even by death's approach. This is where scientific investigation of whatever evidence there may be for the continued existence of the mind after death is not only justified but demanded of the human race. The science of psychical research is an essential science in the sense that we should investigate any kind of evidence, but take care to investigate it in a scientific way. We must remember also that whatever evidence we may find for the continued existence of the mind after death does not necessarily prove immortality, nor does it necessarily help us on the moral and religious side.

I have merely wished to refer in passing to this question of psychical research, but I must turn back to our greater theme, not of the possibility of the mere continuance of the mind after death, but of the reasons from an ethical and religious point of view which make us hopeful of continued existence.

These reasons are, first, ethical, in the sense that moral obligation seems something imposed upon us in an absolute way. But here again, of course, we must realize that it is not easy to know what is the right thing to do. At the present day we may seem to see a tendency towards the loosening of moral integrity. But that is appearance rather than reality. If we look into the matter more deeply we see that it is just because the moral sense of the human race is deepening and moral values are being taken more seriously, that changes are being demanded. The old tables of stone are being broken up, but only in order that they may be replaced by new. The modern attitude towards war, for example, as compared with the general attitude even just before the last war, shows what a tremendous advance has been made, at any rate by a large proportion of the human race, on the ethical side.

It is rather curious to find that with this intensification of moral earnestness there seems to enter a scepticism as to the possibility of survival, a scepticism with regard to the claims of religion altogether. I believe that this scepticism is sceptical only of the old forms of religion and the old views of survival, the more mechanically accepted views, set up on the basis of a formal theology. Instead of considering that religion is less prominent than it was, we should say that the whole human race is becoming more and more religious, more and more moral, in its outlook.

We may well consider it rather unfortunate that just now, when great advances are being made in our appreciation of moral problems and individual freedom, we should find a school of thought which launched us on our way taking a firm stand against religion—I am referring to the Freudian school. Religion, Freud says, is an illusion,

a wish-fulfilment, that it is man's crippling environment in the past that has produced the religious reaction, and that with further insight into physical and mental science that religious reaction will disappear. It seems to me that Freud has put up a man of straw to knock him down again. Freud's view of religious origins is not the view one finds among those who are truly religious either now or in previous generations. Had Freud been as great a philosopher as he is a psychologist he would never have written some of the things he has. He has made the mistake of talking about reality without giving any definition of reality, but implying that it means the harsh physical circumstances of our lives. He has failed to realize that reality includes everything, all our aspirations, all our courage, our strivings after good, our desire to get beyond our self-centred selves, a process, indeed, which Freud has done more than anyone else at the present day to facilitate, because the method of psycho-analysis is a method of gaining increased freedom of the mind from the more mechanical entanglements of the past. How does one acquire greater freedom? By changing the unconscious into the conscious, so that in true consciousness there is freedom. Although Freud himself is a determinist, and in his argument for determinism points to the part played by unconscious forces and repressed tendencies in our conscious choice here and now, nevertheless that is not the same thing as proving that our conscious choice is entirely determined and unfree. Indeed, the conclusion to be drawn is just the opposite. We find that when we analyse ourselves or others we or they become our true selves, more capable of directing our energies along the one channel with singlemindedness and according to a single motive. So with religion; all that analysis does of a destructive kind is to kill false religion, the shortsighted infantile outlook on life that may have held us back. It enables us really to grow up in our minds as we grow up in our bodies. As we grow in mind we do not see religion disappearing; on the contrary, it becomes deepened, just as the sense of obligation becomes deepened. We feel more and more now, as regards obligation, ready to accept the view, "To everyone according to his need; from everyone according to his power". We tend to reverse the categorical imperative, "I ought; therefore I can"; we psychologists would say, "I can; therefore I ought"—that is to say, our obligation is according to our real power. Owing to the fact that so many people appear weighed down by fatuousness and weakness, dominated by worn-out views and attitudes towards life, so that the same misfortunes keep recurring to the individual and to the race, we may feel inclined to be pessimistic. But the more we study and trace the forces working within the mind, and the more ready we are to use and apply our knowledge, the more capable we make the mind of rising above its difficulties and carrying us on to

higher things. That process in the individual and the race is the process of achieving freedom, and as a process of achieving freedom it is a process of achieving immortality.

One may recall the line of Robert Browning:

The soul doubtless is immortal, where a soul can be discerned.

That will survive for each one of us which is capable of surviving, which is capable of eternity. We can have that immortality now, and everyone of us responds to that view when it is put to him—we can live in the eternal here and now. But that does not mean that therefore we do not survive all the same. The fact that we can live the immortal life, the truly spiritual life, here and now, rising above the limitations of mere material and biological reality, that very fact gives us hope that at death we shall survive, not because we love our own lives, but because we give importance to the eternal values. If we love the beautiful and true, in a social sense, not merely for the saving of our own souls, if we develop ourselves, realize our personality, not in a sybaritic or a pseudo-æsthetic way, but because these are parts of an ideal plan and system, we have hold of eternal life.

Perhaps what distresses the mind more than anything else in the face of death is the breaking of bonds of friendship. The friend has passed beyond. One wonders what has become of him, and what has become, too, of that very bond of friendship which made him so dear. Can God cause to spring up amongst us all these bonds of friendship and mutual insight that we have in this life only to destroy them in the end? If we were merely egoistic, merely thinking of ourselves only, then no doubt we should deserve extinction at the end of our own petty lives. But we form part of an ideal system, a spiritual plan, a kingdom not of this world; we have a city in the heavens. Can that die? Is there not something there that far transcends death? Is not love greater than death? Death has never conquered love—true love. Words like that slip into consolatory speech, but they may not be mere words, mere metaphor; they may be abiding reality, the most assured and well attested thing known to the mind of man.

WILLIAM BROWN

THE POLITICS OF JESUS.

Politics in these days are the concern of us all; and those who, as Christians, feel themselves not only faced with political responsibilities, but committed to certain rather definite Christian ideals and values, not unnaturally desire that their political views should be in harmony with their religious beliefs and professions. This desire has produced an immense body of literature in which are discussed the innumerable problems concerning the relations between Christianity and politics. Most thoughtful Christians recognize that many of the problems in question are far too complex to permit of any cut-and-dried solution by a formal application to them of some recorded utterance or action of Jesus. At the same time, it may be maintained without fear of contradiction that a right historical understanding of the actions and utterances of Jesus, in so far as they bear at all on the problems of politics, is a necessary pre-condition of arriving at any truly Christian solution of them. What follows here is intended simply as a contribution to this right historical understanding, and will not enter upon the further important question as to how the example and teaching of Jesus ought to be applied to-day by those who reckon themselves as His followers.

It has long been customary with interpreters of the Gospel-story to take it for granted that Jesus regarded political affairs as entirely outside His orbit. He was so concerned, it is thought, with the all-important spiritual foundations of life that He could give no time to politics. All He had to say about the rights and wrongs of Cæsar's supremacy in Palestine was to bid men give to Cæsar what belonged to Cæsar and to God what belonged to God. He framed no political programme; He enunciated no political principles; in particular, He gave no ruling on the legitimacy or otherwise of war. So general has been this interpretation of His attitude that it would be as easy as it is unnecessary to compile and present a great collection of modern opinions to this effect. I cull a couple of quotations which will serve as typical expressions of the usual view. Troeltsch, after outlining the ethic of Jesus, says[1]:

> From this point of view we can see plainly the attitude of Jesus towards the State . . . There is no thought of the State at all. Jewish nationalism and all its expectations are ignored entirely, even though Israel appears as the germ of the new world that is to be.

And Mackinnon says[2]:

> He was too spiritually minded to concern himself with the

1 *Social Teaching, etc.*, I, 59.
2 *Historic Jesus*, 49. *Cf.* 105f, 110, 176, 183f, 321f.

crass politics of the time. His absorbing interest lay in the moral and spiritual life.

I propose now to give reasons for regarding this widely-held view as erroneous.

1. Let us consider first how definitely *the life-work of Jesus had reference to the Jewish nation.* Doubtless the Christian Church was right in concentrating on the universal significance of the Gospel, and in interpreting the Master's words as enjoining the removal of "the middle wall of partition" between Jew and Gentile. Yet the Master Himself had addressed His own efforts exclusively to the Jews; and that limitation must be given its due weight in any attempt to understand His purpose rightly. I regard it as an indubitable historical fact that He thought of Himself as the Jewish Messiah. It is, of course, true that Messiahship meant for Him something very different from what it meant for the average Jew. So different indeed was His view of it from that of His fellow-countrymen that some are disposed to doubt whether he seriously appropriated the title to Himself at all. I believe that doubt to be unjustifiable. The stories of the Baptism, the Temptation, the conversation at Cæsarea-Philippi, the trials before Caiaphas and Pilate, not to mention the incidents of the crowd-feeding and the entry into Jerusalem, make it certain that Jesus regarded Himself as Messiah. Now one might doubtless picture to oneself the activities of the Messiah in many different ways: but there was one feature about Messiahship without which the very term would have been meaningless; and that feature was—the *national* character of the *rôle*. If Jesus then thought of Himself as Messiah, He thought of Himself as charged with a distinctively *national* task. This conclusion is confirmed by His well-attested avowal before Pilate, at the most solemn moment of His life, that He was the King of the Jews. It is further confirmed by His confinement of Himself to Palestine (*cf. Mt.* 10^{5f}, 15^{24}), and by His settlement of the number of His special disciples at twelve (in conformity with the number of Israel's tribes—witness also His promise that they should sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel). There is one more manifestation of this national reference of His mission, the importance of which is apt to be overlooked or under-rated: I refer to our Lord's custom of calling His followers "brethren", *i.e.*, fellow-Jews, and explicitly contrasting them, not with unbelieving Jews or unbelievers in general, but simply with the Gentiles. Thus, "if ye salute your brethren only, what special thing do ye do? Do not even the Gentiles do the same?" (*Mt.* 5^{47}: Luke's parallel "sinners" [6^{32ff}] is almost certainly less original). "When ye pray, do not go babbling on like the Gentiles; . . . " (*Mt.* 6^{7}). "So do not worry, saying, 'What shall we eat', or 'What shall we drink' . . . For after all these things do the Gentiles seek" (*Mt.* 6^{31f}; *Lk.* 12^{29f}).

"Those who aspire to rule over the Gentiles subjugate them, and their great men wield authority over them: but it is not so among you . . . . " (*Mk.* 10^{42f}=*Mt.* 20^{25f}=*Lk.* 22^{25f}). Now the only natural antithesis to the Gentiles as such is Israel as such: and I can therefore make no sense of these passages except on the assumption that Jesus addressed His appeal to the Jews *qua Jews,* in distinction (for the time being) from the Gentile world, just as one of the national prophets of ancient Israel might have done.

2. Not only was Jesus concerned in some very special way with Israel as a nation, but He *expected at the outset that His plan for them (whatever it was) would be successful.* The bare possibility that the nation would reject Him may well have been before his mind from the first: His familiarity with the Servant-Poems of *Deutero-Isaiah* would suggest that it was. And when once the nation had finally rejected Him, it was very natural that Christians ever after should suppose that from the first He had quite definitely expected it. Not only so, but as soon as the growing opposition began to make final rejection increasingly likely, Jesus Himself—in the semi-deterministic manner customary to the religious Semite—would begin to think and speak of it more and more as foreordained, without, however, necessarily ceasing His practical endeavours to avert it[3]. But we must not allow the Oriental religious idiom to blind us to the practical common-sense and redemptive energy of the Messiah. The fact that towards the close of His ministry He uttered words of bitter disappointment over unresponsive Jerusalem (*Mt.* 23^{37ff}=*Lk.* 13^{34f}; *Lk.* 19^{41ff}) is proof positive that in the earlier months He had hoped for and actually expected something better. Whatever may have been His expressions regarding Providence or destiny, He never simply played a part: if He expressed disappointment, the reason was that He was really disappointed; and if He was really disappointed, He must in the early part of His ministry have expected the nation, not to reject Him, but to follow His leadership[4].

3. Having regard to the place given in His teaching to the Kingdom of God, we can safely say that His plan for Israel, whatever it was, must have formed an integral part of His anticipations regarding the Kingdom. A great many different opinions exist as to how precisely Jesus envisaged the Kingdom and the manner of its coming; but this at least is certain—the Kingdom was to come *on earth.* The disciples were to pray daily: "May Thy Kingdom come, may Thy will be done, as in heaven, so also upon earth" (*Mt.* 6^{10}). Men still living should not die "until they should see the Kingdom, when it had come with power" (*Mk.* 9^{1}; *cf. Lk.* 9^{27}, *Mt.* 16^{28}). Combining this fact with those previously adduced, we reach the conclusion that Jesus must have had in mind as part of His great plan something for Israel

[3] *Cf.* Burkitt, *Earliest Sources,* 70.
[4] *Cf.* R. Mackintosh, quoted by A. D. Martin, *Holiness of Jesus,* 208f.

as Israel to do upon earth, something practicable enough for Him to expect seriously that Israel would do it.

4. When now we realize that, with the exception of the Sadducees and Herodians, the whole of Israel was during this period wrestling with a political problem of the first magnitude, it is impossible (if the conclusion just reached is sound) to believe that Jesus could have ignored that problem as completely as modern scholars generally believe—nay, that He could have avoided offering at least a tentative solution of it. And that the nation as a whole—Zealots, Pharisees, and the quiet of the land—were in point of fact agog with such a problem, there can be no reasonable doubt. Not only was God's holy land defiled with the presence of numerous Gentile populations, but Israel was actually in chains. Instead of a Hebrew monarch of David's line reigning mightily and righteously from Jerusalem, one half of the Jewish people was governed by a procurator of the Roman Emperor, and the other half by a prince of the hated family of Herod, a semi-heathen *protégé* of the same heathen Emperor. Some Jews might revolt; others might resignedly submit: but all alike disapproved, and longed for the day when the iniquitous Roman yoke should by the power of God be broken off His people's neck. It is no exaggeration to say that the mind of Israel was in Jesus's day *obsessed* with this political issue; and the only inference we can draw from the fact that He had a plan for the Jews to fulfil on earth, is that *He had something to say to them about the political issue* that obsessed them. His acknowledgment to Pilate that He held the royal office surely puts this conclusion beyond question.

5. What has been hitherto said justifies, I submit, the belief that, in framing His message and carrying on His work, Jesus took into account the political servitude of His people. Before we proceed to inquire as to what precisely He thought about it, we must note one other factor in the situation; I mean the unanimous expectation that, as a means to the great end, the Gentiles were to be overthrown by Divine power in a Messianic War, and partly annihilated, partly enslaved, and partly (but only to a very small degree) converted. Once again, opinions differed between Zealots, Pharisees, and the quiet, as to their immediate duty regarding the great conflict that was coming; but they were all agreed in anticipating such a conflict. In the *Old-Testament* prophecies and the Jewish apocalyptical writings, there was ample warrant for the anticipation; and it was still further supported by the normal human view of tyrant-empires and unwilling subjects: no one could deny that there was a good *casus belli*. Whatever, therefore, was the solution Jesus offered, it must have been fashioned in some direct relation—either positive or negative—to the prevailing expectations regarding the conquering Messiah's *rôle*.

That then is the background against which, or the context within which, the detailed records of the life and teaching of Jesus have to be studied: and to a consideration of these, so far as they are pertinent, we must now turn. Perhaps it will be as well if at this point I state my main thesis, and then proceed to survey rapidly the specific evidence on which it rests.

I conceive that Jesus began His mission with an expectation of the impending approach of the Kingdom—an approach effected indeed by Divine Power and initiative, yet at the same time very materially assisted by the trustful prayers and energetic obedience of men[5]. To this end He called for, and thought He would get, a nation-wide repentance, a rallying of all Israel to Himself as the Divinely-commissioned leader, a united national effort in the service of God, such as would contribute effectively towards the Divine introduction of the Kingdom on a world-scale. An integral part of this plan was that Israel should unitedly turn away from desiring vengeance against Rome and destruction for the Gentiles, should meekly submit for the time being to servitude and injustice, and, trusting wholly to deeds of love and words of truth, should undercut pagan hostility, outmanœuvre political lordship, convert enemies to friends, and stand forth in the name and power of God as the heralds and propagators of the one true religion, as "a light to them that are in darkness", as the guides, philosophers, and friends of mankind. This policy Jesus eagerly advocated as the only alternative to what He saw was but too likely to happen, namely, that the Jews would, by their national spirit of revolt, by their hatred of Gentiles in general and of their Roman masters in particular, draw down upon themselves sooner or later a national punishment in the form of a Roman invasion, which would overwhelm innocent and guilty alike in one terrible flood of carnage.

Some such scheme seems to me the only one which gives unity and point to the following episodes in the Gospels.

1. *The temptation to secure world-empire by worshipping Satan* (*Mt.* 4^{8-10}=*Lk.* 4^{5-7}). Worshipping Satan cannot here refer to the formal religious act which the words suggest: the phrase probably expresses Jesus's disapproval of the most obvious way of securing His empire—the use of the sword. The usual explanation that He was tempted to desire a *political* kingdom is true only if, by political, we mean military. A political kingdom, if by that we mean simply the exercise of authority over the nations and not only over individuals, He certainly did desire: for was not worldwide rule the Messiah's privilege?

2. *The injunction in the Sermon on the Mount of love for enemies* (*Mt.* 5^{38-48}=*Lk.* 6^{27-36}). These words, addressed to Jews as such (as

[5] *Cf.* Cohen, *Every Man's Talmud*, 373.

the allusions to "brethren" and Gentiles show), have usually been taken to refer exclusively to individual conduct in the private relationships of life. But there is no indication that they are limited to these private relationships: on the contrary, the reference to the system of forced labour ("if anyone compel thee"—ἀγγαρεύσει: *cf. Mk.* 15[21]) strongly suggests the overbearing attitude of the Roman or Herodian official, as also, though less strongly, does the reference to cheek smiting. The word for "enemies" (ἐχθροί) is likewise perfectly general, and would well cover the foreign rulers in the midst. The word "neighbour" is a technical term for "fellow-Israelite" (*cf. Lev.* 19[18]), and the exhortation to love not neighbours only is therefore an exhortation to love Gentiles.

3. *The woes over the unrepentant Galilean towns* (*Mt.* 11[20-24] = *Lk.* 10[13-15]). Refusal to repent at Jesus's bidding involved a refusal to love Gentiles at His bidding: the final result of this refusal on the part of Israel would be war with Rome. Galilee lay on the direct line of march from Antioch to Jerusalem: it had been before, and would be again, traversed by invading legions, who would of course commit slaughter as they went. Is this impending slaughter the Hades to which Capernaum was in imminent danger of descending?

4. *The passage Lk.* 12[54]-13[9]. This section of probably Jerusalem-sayings, usually regarded as a random collection of unrelated scraps, is really pervaded throughout by a single *motif*, namely, a sense of the most urgent need that Israel should repent before it is too late and the short interval allowed for reconsideration has passed by for ever. But what palpably imminent danger then overhung the nation other than revolt against Romans and its consequences? Thus Jesus first asks the crowds why, if they can read the weather-signs, they cannot interpret "this season" (12[54-56]). He then warns them to seize the chance of reconciliation with the adversary, instead of incurring, like an insolvent debtor, the extreme penalty (12[57-59]; *cf. Mt.* 5[25f]). On hearing of a brutal act of bloodshed on Pilate's part, perhaps occasioned by some outburst of Jewish patriotism, He does not treat the news (in the way He was perhaps expected to) as a fresh illustration of the need for revolt; He points out that that sort of fate (the indiscriminate slaughter of innocent and guilty, such as of course always occurs in war-time) will befall the population generally, unless it repents (13[1-5]). Finally, in the parable of the unfruitful fig tree, He pushes home once again the urgent need for a national change before the time has passed (13[6-9]). Thus Jesus is seen here making a last despairing appeal to His fellow-citizens not to call down on themselves the red ruin of Cæsar's vengeance.

5. *The lamentation over Jerusalem recorded in Lk.* 19[41-44]. The city has by now finally made it clear that the things which belong unto peace are hidden from its eyes: it is therefore to undergo siege and

sack, because it had not seen in Jesus and His policy of love and forgiveness the season of its visitation from God.

6. *The parable of the wicked husbandmen* (*Mk.* 12^{1-12}, and parallels), with its prediction of doom, is an enforcement of the same lesson.

7. *The advice that Cæsar's tribute should be submissively paid* (*Mk.* 12^{13-17} and parallels) is in line with the whole scheme of effecting a reconciliation between Israel and Rome.

8. *The prediction of the destruction of Jerusalem in Mk.* 13^{1f} and its parallels, is in line with His previously quoted prediction of disaster; and the most telling expression of His dread is His reply to the women who wept after Him on the way to Golgotha: "Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me; but weep for yourselves and your children: for lo! days are coming when they will say, 'Happy are the barren, and the wombs that have not borne, and the breasts that have not nourished'. Then will they begin to say to the mountains, 'Fall on us', and to the hills, 'Cover us'; for if these (are the deeds) they do when the tree is green, what will happen when it is dry?" (*Lk.* 23^{27-31}). I understand the obscure closing sentence to mean: If the Romans practice such cruelties as this crucifixion of me when peace is flourishing, what atrocities will they commit when it has withered away amid the storms of war?

I submit that the foregoing evidence suffices to establish my thesis, *viz.*, that Jesus, foreseeing the terribly disastrous outcome of militant Jewish nationalism, made it part of His work for the Kingdom of God to commend to the Jews the definite abandonment of all thought of a war of liberation and vengeance, and the adoption in its place of a policy of patience, loving-kindness, peace, and reconciliation. This attempt of Jesus and its failure help to explain—and show the connexion between—the following facts:—

1. *The loss of His popularity on the eve of His arrest.* How can we explain why those who hailed Him with Hosannas at His triumphal entry shouted "Crucify Him!" a few days later at His trial? Is there any more likely explanation than that His words and conduct had disappointed their patriotic expectations and wounded their patriotic sensibilities?[6]

2. *The inevitability of His death.* His death was the result of two conditions: (*i*) the hatred felt towards Him, and (*ii*) His unwillingness to defend Himself by force. I do not argue that His political views were the only reason why the authorities hated Him: that was indeed not the case; their hatred had several causes. But I do contend that His pacific Messianism was *one* of the causes, even in

[6] So Klausner, *Jesus of Nazareth*, 318; Goguel, *Life of Jesus*, 377; and to some extent Mackinnon, *Historic Jesus*, 265.

the case of the authorities, and that what compelled Pilate to yield to their demand for the death-sentence was the patriotic animus of the crowd. While, as regards the unwillingness of Jesus to defend Himself, is not that exactly what we should expect from one who advocated pacifism in the international relations of the people?[7]

3. *The fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D.* There is no need to labour the causal connexion between the militant nationalism which Jesus opposed and under which He suffered, and the calamitous war of 66-70 A.D. The relation between them is sufficiently obvious. It is, however, worth while to note that the events of 70 A.D are regularly represented by the early Christian Fathers as a punishment directly inflicted by God upon Israel for the murder of His Son forty years earlier. In what sense, if at all, is this early Christian judgment sound? Surely in this: the disaster of 70 A.D. supervened on the Jewish rejection of Jesus and His policy, and did so by virtue of an inexorable law—not of physical nature—but of psychological Nature (as evinced in the normal Roman reaction to revolt); and inasmuch as the laws both of physical nature and of human psychology are providentially ordained, we may say that the disasters of 70 A.D. (like other disasters), being the consequences of Divinely-ordained laws, represent the *contingent* Divine Will, though it was not the *absolute* Divine Will, that the Jews should commit that sin and folly which made the disasters an inexorable necessity.

4. *The connexion, such as it is, between the Fall of Jerusalem and the Parousia.* Jesus clearly foresaw the fall of Jerusalem as the result of His rejection by the Jews: He also foresaw His own ultimate triumph, and pictured it as a cataclysmic re-appearance on earth. How did He relate them in His own mind? I suggest that He expected the latter to follow very shortly after the former, and both to take place within the lifetime of His own generation. Beyond that, we cannot speculate. It is doubtless a mistake to endeavour to show that at or after the fall of Jerusalem His Parousia-prophecies were actually fulfilled, exactly as He expected them to be fulfilled. But it is legitimate to observe that the fall of Jerusalem was an historical proof of the folly of rejecting Him, and as such stood in a positive relationship not to any temporary manifestation of the triumphant Messiah on the clouds of heaven, but to His eternal triumphing in the hearts of men.

In conclusion, we need only to clear our minds on the reasons and motives behind the efforts Jesus made to get His policy adopted.

It has been argued that He repudiated the way of war because to take that way would have been anticipating God's sovereign act of

[7] *Cf.* Weinel, *Die Stellung des Urchrist, zum Staat*, 9: *Sein ganzes Leben ist ein Kampf mit der politischen Frage seines Volkes gewesen, und er hat mit seinem Leben seine Stellung bezahlt.*

supernatural intervention[8]. We need, however, to bear in mind that belief in the initiative and agency of God does not exclude, but presupposes, the initiative and activity of His servants. The ancient Hebrew warrior who believed that Yahweh alone gave victory did not therefore omit to fight lustily himself. The Jewish peasant, who knew that God alone could make his fields fruitful, knew also that he must do his part in ploughing, sowing, and reaping. And the Messiah, who believed that His Father was pleased to give the Kingdom (*Lk.* 12[32]), knew also that He must do His utmost to make the gift possible, and all the more because He *was* the Messiah, through whom the Almighty was to act. Morever, when we consider how freely Jesus shaped His own views about what Messiahship meant, we see how unlikely it was that His own independent judgment would be dominated by some arbitrary *a priori* apocalyptic programme.

Another suggestion is that He avoided all nationalistic plans because He saw that Israel was morally and spiritually unready for any great redemptive task. But can it be seriously suggested that, if Israel had been morally and spiritually ready, Jesus would have had some better policy to recommend than the policy of non-resistance and peace? And in any case, the fact that He made His appeal (as we have shown) to the Jews as a body, shows that their unreadiness came out only in their rejection of His policy, and was not a deciding factor in the formation of it.

A still more frequent explanation of the course He took is the supposed certainty that armed revolt would be unsuccessful. Now it must be admitted that revolt certainly appeared to Him likely to be unsuccessful: and we have noticed that He frequently referred to the suffering certain to be involved in failure as a reason for not making the attempt. But it must be remembered that all such references presuppose His own abstention from any part in the revolt: and it is that abstention that needs to be explained. Had He been willing to put Himself at the head of a national rising, it is by no means certain (when we consider the achievements of the Maccabees against Syria, and the Parthians against Rome) that He would not have been successful. Still less certain is it that He would Himself regard the effort, if led by Himself, as foredoomed to failure. He was, as the event shows, clearly willing to die for His cause: why then should He not be willing, as Judas Maccabæus had been, to risk His life in an armed rebellion?

We are thus shut up to the only true reason for the course He took: it was the only course He regarded as inherently right, irrespective of the risk of immediate failure. The way of war—whatever might be pleaded on its behalf on the ground of Scriptural precedent, practical necessity, or moral justice—was inherently evil. It rested

[8] *Cf.* Burkitt, *Earliest Sources*, 62f.

upon a deliberate and systematic disobedience to the Divine command: "Thou shalt not kill". It involved the indiscriminate massacre, at least to some extent, of the populations of captured towns; it maimed and destroyed the innocent with the guilty; abominations like scourging and crucifixion were parts of its normal procedure. How could all this seem other than immoral to one who thought and taught of God as Jesus thought and taught? Do we need to go further than His own words as reported at the close of *Mt.* 5 for the reason underlying His politics? What is there in His politics that is not explained by the words: "Love your enemies . . . in order that ye may become the sons of your Father in heaven"?

I submit therefore that it is an error to suppose that Jesus gave no attention to politics and no ruling as regards the legitimacy or otherwise of war. It is, on the contrary, clear that He was passionately concerned over the political problem that faced his fellow-countrymen, and that He showed them "the things which belong unto peace". It is further clear that His policy was based, not (like the quietism of the Pharisees) on a willingness to wait until God should of Himself inflict condign vengeance on the hated foe; it was based on a knowledge that God loved the foe as He loved Israel, and that Israel's task was to be merciful as the Heavenly Father was merciful. Nor must we call such a policy quixotic or fantastic. Had the Jews as a body been fired by the ideal Jesus set before them (and what was there to prevent them being so fired?), it is hard to exaggerate the blessings which would as a result have befallen humanity. On the vexed question as to what all this means for the modern Christian I do not here enter: I close rather with the observation that the politics of Jesus were no mere incident or accident in His ministry; they were interwoven with the most central things in His Gospel. It was His politics, more than anything else, that brought about His death; and it was by and through the temporary defeat of death that His ultimate and eternal victory was won. That is why Christians believe His death to be the most central and important fact in history. But if they are right in so emphasizing the significance of His death, then surely the ethical principles from which both the politics and the death resulted ought to be emphasized as of central importance also.

C. J. Cadoux.

EXIT THE LEAGUE?

I.

On Nov. 18th, "Sanctions Day", flags were hung out, in every house throughout Italy, on the suggestion of the Fascist government as a sign of defiance of the League of Nations and of the sanctions imposed by the leagued Powers, under the Covenant. "Aloof contempt" is prescribed as the correct Blackshirt attitude to Geneva.

It is seldom in the history of diplomacy that a statesman has presented so clear cut a defiance of the principles of international law and morality as Signor Mussolini has done in the last few months. His apologists have worked painfully hard to make out a case for him. British and French statesmen at Paris laboured to compile a list of equitable or arguable Italian demands. These have been brushed on one side. The statesmen have scarcely received for their pains a minimum of diplomatic courtesy. The reward of the apologists has been a snub. It is the new Fascist style in politics, which places the will of genius above the restraints of commonplace morality.

After advancing, it will be recalled, to a post that almost every map, including Italian ones, charted as within Abyssinian territory, Italian troops were involved in a minor affray which Italy chooses to regard as "an affront to the flag". Further, while declaring that the League must not become a

> tribunal before which the negroes, backward peoples, and savages of the world can arraign the great nations that have civilized and transformed humanity,

Italy chooses to regard one of these barbarous peoples as constituting a serious military threat to Eritrea and Italian Somaliland—although Abyssinia is not apparently so regarded in either British or French Somaliland. "*Cet animal est méchant; quand on l'attaque, il se défend*"—the revived Roman Empire is menaced by Ethiopia. The guileless Ethiopian is, therefore, marked down for improvement and his lands for higher uses.

These arguments, never reduced (despite ample opportunity) to precise demands, are supplemented by interpretations of the agreement of 1906 and interchange of Notes of 1925, clearly put forward as an afterthought, which the British Foreign Office officials have been able to demolish item by item.

These claims are so flimsy that it is futile to pretend that they constitute the serious Italian defence. If they did so, they could be liquidated without difficulty. No more can the "Case" presented by the Italian delegates in Geneva be considered adequate, even when it is relevant. Signor Mussolini has regarded the statement of a legalistic case with such indifference and contempt that he has

obviously left his experts to patch something together, as it were, in a luncheon interval, when momentarily not preoccupied with the elaboration of serious war schemes.

As Mussolini himself said, in January, 1935, "Fascism believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace . . . . A doctrine which is founded upon this harmful postulate of peace is hostile to Fascism". "Italy", he said earlier, "is impervious to criticism from abroad". The substantial Italian demand is not difficult to detect, although it may at the moment be embarrassing to state. It is for Abyssinia, the whole of Abyssinia and nothing but Abyssinia, and this, as Signor Mussolini has said, "with Geneva, without Geneva or against Geneva".

It has been sufficient for Signor Mussolini that war is required as a means essential for the fulfilment of Italy's national policy. The Duce's policy traverses the principles of the Kellogg Pact with a precision that is elegant and patent to all. Signor Gayda has stated the position clearly enough, when he writes:

> Although the League wishes to avoid war, it can neither ignore nor arrest the movement and the needs of the nations of the world. Human history has so far found only one way of balancing and deciding these needs, and that is by war. If war is suppressed, which new force can be applied?

Italy needs the land, just as she needs revenge for Adowa, to heighten her prestige. The Duce wills it. It is possible to put forward an equitable claim for new lands on the ground of Italy's alleged growth of population. (Actually the birth *rate* is not increasing.) But the growth of population is not some mere fact of nature; it has been deliberately stimulated by legislation. The Duce wills that also. That also is an item of deliberate national policy. Fundamentally the Duce despises mere petitions in equity; what he will confront the world with are seizures by virile power. As Sir Austen Chamberlain has put it, it is "a policy of force and conflict".

Opposite the Colosseum at Rome are affixed, for the citizens of Rome to see, large maps, showing the old Empire of Rome. It was an Empire that included Egypt and North Africa. It also included Palestine, Malta, and Cyprus; and held the Mediterranean. The restoration of the glories of that Empire is the announced object of the present Fascist Government. The appropriation of the head waters of the Blue Nile will make a good beginning. Moreover the Abyssinian war may remedy an unemployment problem and cover over a risky financial situation such as threatens a dictatorial *régime* that must live on the sustenance of continuous popularity. With entire consistency, therefore, Benito Mussolini declared in August to his Blackshirts at Isernia, "We shall go forward until we have achieved the Fascist Empire". He added at Benevento, "In this hour

speeches are to be banned". The democrats and pacifists can talk: it is for Fascists to build the new Rome—across the route to India.

II.

The Abyssinians may be, in many ways, a rude and unpleasant people. The Moslem tribes, conquered by the Amharic ruling class during the reign of the Emperor Menelik, are doubtless even more backward and more unpleasant. Unfortunately conquest has been tempered by inadequate control, and customs still prevail that are singular in peoples ruled by the champions of a Christian civilization, however ancient. The salient fact, nevertheless, is that the civilizing and progressive intentions of the present Emperor are not open to serious challenge. To aid him in his task some more appropriate instruments of civilization than the Italian machine-gun and the Italian bombing airplane appear to be required.

That the real issue at stake is something far wider than the protection of Abyssinia from an international brigandage on the moral level of the Partition of Poland, miscalled "a white civilizing mission", is not one seriously open to question. Abyssinia is merely the Serbia, the Sarajevo, of our present crisis.

In America the international implications of the issue, so far as they touch the Kellogg-Briand Pact, are fully recognized. The Pact was to be a purer document than the Covenant, uncontaminated by the rivalries of Europe and psychologically somehow far more effective. It represented "the right road".

The Pact, signed amid much mutual congratulation by sixty-three Powers, Mr. Secretary Hull declared on the 14th July, constitutes a treaty between the signatory nations. It involves

> a solemn obligation that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts among nations, of whatever nature or of whatever origin, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

Mr. Kellogg himself has said,

> The Pact has a significant applicability to the present controversy between Italy and Ethiopia . . . Neither nation can go to war without openly intentionally violating its solemn pledge.

It is true that the economic individualism of the United States is still such that there was, until the other day, no certain means of preventing private manufacturers of arms from trafficking in innocent blood, even despite the express sentiment of the President and American people. This anomaly has now been remedied by Congressional action, which, thanks to an alliance of Simon-pure pacifists with closed-economy isolationists, penalizes the innocent and the guilty with majestic impartiality. On the other hand, the Stimson, Norman Davis, and subsequent declarations make it apparent that

(whatever may be said by interested parties to the contrary) the United States is not likely to interpret the law of neutrality to the detriment of a Power honestly endeavouring to take agreed measures against an aggressor under the Kellogg Pact. That is important.

The foreign policy, however, of the United States, so far as its electorate can decide it, has one prime object: to have no foreign policy. Action will depend upon the attitude of the Great Powers associated with the League. Of these Italy herself is one; and two (also Fascist, in their philosophy of the State) have seceded. Collective action in effect means the joint action of Britain and France. France has laboriously built up during these last years, under cover of the League, an alliance against Germany. The Stresa Conference appeared to complete the links. It is difficult for France, obsessed by the German danger, to take vigorous action on principle against the Italian ally; and Mussolini knows it. The watch on the Danube is the strategic complement of the watch on the Rhine. To France, therefore, Italy turns, brokering her favour. French apprehension was apparent at an early stage of the present dispute. *Le Matin,* commenting on the probability of an Abyssinian appeal to the League, said:

> It is almost certain that France will henceforth observe in this matter an attitude of strict neutrality.

Le Peuple said:

> The Briand-Kellogg Pact is already on the shelf. The League Covenant counts no longer. All that remains is force.

M. Laval's policy, at every point, has shown that Mussolini guessed right about the French attitude.

What French opinion at this early stage had failed sufficiently to allow for was that nations who might be interested in collective security might not be equally interested in a version of collective security that appeared, quite barefaced, as no more than the enforcement of the Versailles *status quo* against Germany. France had for so long, while upholding the banners of civilization and humanity, always, in fact, discovered the claims of civilization and humanity to be indistinguishable from those of France. It was, therefore, disquieting for France to find that French cynicism about the claims of Abyssinia and black humanity might lead to a revival of cynicism about France. Moreover, there was the thoroughly unpleasant consideration that, whatever claims Signor Mussolini might make and successfully "get away with" at the present, would within a couple of years or less be made, with compound interest, by Adolf Hitler. After all, Herr Hitler is only waiting the hour for his campaigns in the south and east, so well outlined in the Hugenburg memorandum. The statesmen south of the Alps will not be left alone to enjoy the fruits of *Real-politik.*

The fate of the League, therefore, rests with Britain, although British action rests on the assumption that a vigorous British lead will be followed by France. It has rested with Britain since the beginning of the dispute and, to-day, the issue of "sanctions" against Italian oil imports shows that it still rests there. British opinion is strangely ambivalent. It genuinely desires international peace, but is not sure whether this means upholding international law. On the one hand, it is not enthusiastic about either Abyssinia or Geneva. Its attitude resembles that of Horatio Bottomley's *John Bull* when, in July, 1914, it came out with the placard: "To Hell with Servia!" The *Evening Standard* recently pointed out editorially, in one breath, that there would, and must, be no sanctions exercised against Italy, and that the League was too weak-kneed for it to be worth the while of Lord Beaverbrook to aid in preserving it. Lord Rothermere's *Sunday Dispatch* asked the question, "Should we evacuate the Mediterranean?" and seems to answer this question in the affirmative. Others feel that the League is "for peace, not war", and that, in the event of war, it should be like a police force that, when it has reasoned with a criminal gang with patience and humour, retires into the police station and lets events take their natural course.

On the other hand, British opinion has been outraged by the Duce's effrontery. The cause of peace is one, as that of anti-slavery, in which Englishmen are not inclined, in Lord Lugard's words, to hesitate in taking a lead "from craven fear of being great". The exhortation of Milton is being quoted, by naval commanders in the press, that England shall not "forget her precedence of teaching the nations how to live".

There are, however, solid reasons for thinking that, granted French support, it is still possible to strike, on behalf of collective security, the Covenant and the Pact, with resonant success. Italy is not yet a first-class Power in the sense in which this term can be applied to Germany. She is deficient in natural resources and has planned a campaign on the rash assumption that it will not be interfered with. If Italy turns for support to Germany, she has little to offer except the last thing she desires to offer—facilities for the German occupation of Austria. Germany may indeed seize the opportunity for action of her own if the League Powers have the courage to act against Italy—but Germany will far more certainly act, within a year or two, if they do not display this courage. Finally, the non-support of Britain by France can only mean that Britain will lean, so far as practicable, to a "Loose from Europe" policy. That Britain should be induced to adopt this attitude of neutrality is the announced object of Herr Hitler's foreign policy. Certainly, British lives will not be sacrificed to prevent an Austrian *Anschluss* that many, if not most, Austrians desire.

On the assumption that the courage of France fails in this juncture, and that, for example, she avails herself of the notorious "Polish veto clause"—the "unanimity" clause—of the Covenant, then two considerations stand out, salient. The first is that it becomes a matter of months before Herr Hitler will deliver, backed by his new air-force, his new, comparable demands for expansion. The other is that the Fascist idea of the State—that of Japan, Italy, and Germany—will dominate, not only Western civilization, but world civilization, for the next generation. However much democratic countries may reprobate it, and prefer international co-operation, they will be given no choice save to build up their armed forces on Fascist lines. An epoch of international hope will be definitely at an end.

The United States may boast that it is militarily secure as a country, even on the Pacific seaboard, and that it can afford a policy of detachment. The boast may be justified, so long as Americans are unconcerned for the rights, in a Fascist world, of their international trade. But even the United States will not be proof, as a democracy, against the infection of political ideas so patently triumphant in the Fascist countries of Europe. The democratic Powers will not be the dominant Powers, whose will is law, but Powers on the defensive, nervously avoiding embroilment with countries prepared, on principle, to make the profession of arms their everyday concern and the ideal outlet for their energies.

III.

The above may be taken as a fair description of the argument that will appeal to what I will call "the fighting democrat"—the man who believes that the making of the world safe for democracy is bound up with some form of international federation, and who has pinned his faith to the League of Nations as one of the few real gains that are to be shown for the Great War.

There is, however, another point of view that is shared by so good a democrat as Mr. George Lansbury and by Mr. Frank Simonds. It may appear strange to put in conjunction the romantic ex-leader of the British Labour Party, who desires the Pope, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and other religious leaders of Christendom to proclaim a Truce of God from the Holy Land in these days of militant neo-paganism, with an eminent, cynical, and entirely pessimistic American journalist.

If, however, Mr. Lansbury's proposal is examined, it will be perceived that it is, in fact, a plea so to share out the territory and control of raw materials that the "have-not" nations—the "Cinderella Powers", Germany, Italy, Japan—shall be satisfied. With this Mr. Lansbury rather oddly conjoins the hope that "the white and coloured races can co-operate to create a better civilization"—

odd, because the immediate objective obstinately envisaged by Italy is a species of relation between white and coloured races more reminiscent of that between tiger and lamb than any generally described as co-operative. Mr. Lansbury also wants the Covenant maintained. The first part, however, of Mr. Lansbury's thesis is precisely that of Mr. Simonds's book, *The Price of Peace.* The re-distribution of territory and raw materials so as to satisfy the "have-not" nations (quite wrongly described as the dispossessed nations) is precisely the price of peace.

If, in the opinion of Mr. Simonds, the satisfied nations, the British Empire, the United States, the Union of Soviet Republics, and France do not make appropriate surrenders in time, then the cost that must be paid is the Next and Greater War. Doubtless what Italy would desire would be Egypt, Palestine, and the control of the Eastern Mediterranean.

"The price of peace must be paid by these nations", says Mr. Simonds,

> whose material resources bestow the largest measure of economic self-sufficiency . . . . So far in the post-war period, all attempts to establish a viable system of order have failed because of the resolution of the more fortunate peoples, and particularly of the British and American, to combine the profits of exclusive nationalism with the benefits of inter-nationalism.

Mr. Simonds points out that the attempts of the Holy Alliance to suppress political nationalism were upset because the young nations preferred war to peace at such a cost. So now only economic security for all (*i.e.*, for those strong and "dynamic" enough to be dangerous: not Abyssinia) can assure peace; and the "have-not" nations will prefer again war to peace, if peace is coupled with economic starvation. How one balances "have-not" Germany against "have-not" Lithuania is not explained. Apparently an age-long series of wars of "balance" and international thuggery is envisaged. This is euphemistically called "life in history".

With much of Mr. Simonds's argument a British Free Trader might well agree, and merely protest that Britain, despite the Ottawa Conference, has in fact practised much less "exclusive nationalism" economically than Mr. Simonds suggests.

The trouble with his argument lies elsewhere. The insurgent nationalities of the nineteenth century claimed self-determination against an Alliance that established no procedure of international right but imposed by *force majeure* its own political solutions. The League, on the contrary, formally established the methods for the revision of the *status quo* with safeguards, substantial if imperfect, for impartiality; and has actually applied these methods in the case of the Saar—not to speak of the Gran Chaco and various Balkan disputes.

What, however, is noteworthy of the insurgent claimants of the twentieth century is that, while protesting against the monopoly of territory and raw materials adverse to themselves, they are precisely the most fanatical exponents, in the contemporary world, of economic nationalism. Here are no advocates of national rights for all and of economic security through co-operation and international free-trade. Here are imperialists, full-blooded and unashamed, who seek to annex portions of their neighbours' territory, and to absorb it into their own closed and exclusive economies.

In effect, we are now hearing from Italy—and from Mr. Frank Simonds—a plea that, for some time now, has been heard from Germany. It runs thus:

(*a*) There is such a thing as international law and justice. Under this, Germany (or Italy) is entitled to extensions of territory, and the possessor Powers who refuse this are guilty of a crime against civilization. (*b*) There is no such thing as international law and justice, and talk of allegiance to the interests of humanity is mere Liberal twaddle. The subjects of a Fascist power owe no higher allegiance than to her, and she has no higher moral concern than her own interests. It must be the sole concern of her foreign policy to increase her power by any efficient means.

To all this there can be only one answer. If civilization is going to advance—however gradually—to the federation of humanity and the World Federal State, then it may be appropriate for the great possessor Powers to make concessions in order to bring nearer that dawn. It would, for example, be perhaps proper for Britain to turn over her colonies, where the coloured population predominated, into mandated territories (such as Tanganyika now is) under the final control of an international mandates commission, and with economic and immigration guarantees to other nations of an "open door", so far as may be consistent with the interests of those for whom the trust is held. It might be possible, by an arrangement or purchase, at an early date to internationalize the extensive Portuguese colonies. In the advantage of this process the "Cinderella Powers", granted good behaviour, would have their very full share.

If, however, the Fascist Powers are right and all this is Liberal Utopianism—if, in brief, we have definitely reverted to the International Anarchy—then *all* Powers (and, among them, the Fascist Powers) must accept the consequences of this position. And the first consequence of this position is the ruthless rule of the strong man armed.

It is no good whatsoever, in these circumstances, for Fascist Powers, with or without contempt in their bearing, to make pleas to democratic altruism. The day for that kind of thing has gone by, thanks to the very act of these Fascist Powers themselves. The answer to be given by Western democracy is plain. It is the answer that must be given by British statesmen. "We wish for and seek

peace; but not an inch of British territory will we surrender, not a native subject under the British flag will we hand over. Before we do that, you shall have war". The wolf is not to be turned away by humanitarianism and tit-bits, but by buckshot. It is to be hoped that Englishmen have still enough courage left to give that answer—and with a crystal clarity that will be understood.

IV.

It may be that, by the time this article is printed, the League of Nations will be a dead thing. Fortunately, the probability of this in November is less than it was in August. If so, the fair hope of a generation will have perished—the hope of the thousands who volunteered and who died in the "war to end war" and who found, even after death, a prophet of hope in Wilson. Like a greater than himself, Wilson died a reviled and a broken man—but his cause seemed to have triumphed and been founded on rock. Now that may be overthrown too. It is pathetic, and it is tragic. We have, however, only seen as yet the first scenes of the tragedy. Adolf Hitler waits, and has not yet spoken.

The first enemy of the youth of this generation was Senator Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, who was, of course, as are so many deadly men, an honest man and patriotic according to his lights. Inspired by partizan zeal, he wrenched away the not excessive supports that France, in the early days, demanded for her security. All else of the evil followed from that. He affirmed that nations had no comity—that they could, and should, live to themselves alone. No statesman had a better excuse than Lodge. He had a great tradition (if pigheadedly misconstrued) behind him, and two oceans in front of him, as arguments. But in the day of the Last Judgment I doubt if the Lord of Armies who is Prince of Peace will listen to Senator Lodge's excuses.

The second who must stand in sackcloth are the Pacifists. They thought that by shutting their eyes very tight they could wish the evil thing out of the way and it would not be. Instinctive anarchists, wishing only to be left alone, they thought that a counsel, admirable for private conduct, was enough to offer to the statesmen who hold the sword of justice and the orb of power.

The third who must stand in sackcloth is Britain, because of the time when it turned away, "in craven fear of being great", from the Geneva Protocol, instead of accepting leadership as it had done in the suppression of the slave trade. The navy that, before 1914, had been pledged to France and that had served under a united command could not, it was felt, be pledged again. The statesmen and the Chancellor of the Exchequer found Peace by Pietism cheaper than Peace guaranteed by the sanctions of law and might.

Everyone outside France is aware of the responsibility that France bears for the present black days in Europe because of the obstinate and embittered French insistence on security. The opportunity of Thoiry came too late and did not come again. Naziism was already born. The present French policy is one of embarrassed inconsistency, shameful to a logical nation. But every one in France knows that France's insistence on security was due to the desertion of France by the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

Finally, there is the guilt of Germany and Italy. If the League of Nations is dead, the Fascist philosophy of worship of the God-State will be responsible for the death blow. But every writer to-day who picks up a pen can point out how Fascism, whether of the Italian or the Nazi brand, is the consequence of the disappointments or the suppression resulting from the Peace of Versailles. (It should be added, in correction, that excessive Italian demands at Versailles were the beginning of troubles for Wilson). It is easy sanctimoniously to add that to understand all is to pardon all. Unhappily less sentimental rules apply in the game of politics. Great nations do not accept pardons save when and how they choose. It is not enough to say: "The League of Nations is now dead" and to call the matter ended. Germany demands, not "pardon", but redress. Behind Mussolini stand Hitler and Goering.

Suppose collective security dead and discredited. The British Commonwealth can choose to offer to Italy, it may be, Egypt or, it may be, the control of the Eastern Mediterranean; and to Germany half of the Dominion-to-be of East Africa and the rule of the seas. If so, after "exit the League" comes "exit the British Empire". Or she may choose to fight—without collective security—for her own hand, against the "virile powers" in this world of virile anarchy, in some new Armageddon.

George E. G. Catlin.

THE GOOD NEWS OF THE GOSPEL IN THE HOUR OF SUFFERING AND SORROW.

I APPROACH this problem not as technical philosopher, nor skilled theologian, historian, or psychologist, but simply as a working minister dealing with the facts of sorrow and suffering that have come his way in his own daily life, or in the lives of those about him in his working days and nights. Awkward and ugly facts impinge upon that original and authentic experience of God's presence and Christ's love which made us ministers to begin with. Life as we live it is always forcing us to re-cast our theories about that experience, and at the same time probably to hold to it, or be held by it, all the more tenaciously. We become confident where once we were cautious, and we become increasingly aware of our abysmal ignorance on many matters which once we settled with a gay omniscience.

Many of us feel that our faith has continually to be fought for, or that it barely triumphs over an inherently critical or sceptical frame of mind. The odds so often seem against belief that we too have had to become "perplexed theists", as Bishop Barnes said of C. P. Scott. The perplexity springs largely from the contrast between the God of nature and the God of our own souls. We had better acknowledge that we do not at present know the connexion between the two. Our pretended omniscience is an offence unto the Lord and a weariness to thinking men. It becomes quite an item of good news itself if we parsons say where and when we do not know! Are the God of nature and the God of the soul the same? A tropical forest, for instance, is nature unspoiled by man's dark Satanic mills, and completely at God's disposal. But a tropical forest barely claims her supposed privileges, "through all the years of this our life, to lead from joy to joy." It is a wild fight for life and light. The trees struggle grimly upwards: the plants in their mad race to the light support themselves on each other's shoulders: creepers emerge which climb, and in climbing choke the trees: at the top of the forest, on the other side of the overhang, are vultures, kites, and harpy-eagles for ever soaring to swoop down on any bird or monkey that has not the wit or the alertness to dive beneath the foliage: in all and through all is the vast horde of insects living, working, dying and living again. A tropical forest is the scene not of a garden party but of a colossal war. It is a far cry from the controlling and urging power revealed therein to the God revealed in Jesus Christ. At that point there is a "stop in the mind."

Earthquakes and devastating floods set a similar problem for faith, for they are events out of the very heart of the universe, and they rather point to a universe which simply does not care at all for

man. When earthquake tremors occurred in England, and especially in the Midlands, a few years ago, we laughingly compared notes as to the time and nature of those tremors, just as in the same way the previous autumn, in the Midlands again, we laughed when the floods were upon us, at the sight of Ford cars bobbing up and down like corks in our flooded streets. But if Nottingham had been Tokyo that faint first rumble would have changed suddenly to a roar. Half of us would have been killed in the first few seconds: many would have been caught in the *débris,* and most of us burned to death in the inevitable outbreak of fire. Similarly, if the Trent had been the Yangtse, or the Mississippi, thousands of homes would soon have been ruined, and hundreds of lives lost in the devastating flood. Such facts are monstrously difficult to link up with any beneficent purpose in things. Noble heroism always arises in such disasters, but that is a consequence, not a cause, and we are not brought thereby much nearer to a knowledge of the Purpose working in and through events. If it be hinted that earthquakes and floods do at least teach men to devise stable habitations and to choose carefully where to set their dwellings, it is certainly a bitterly wasteful method of education. I simply do not know what to say.

In part I am compelled to remember for my comfort Thomas Carlyle's brilliant description of the helplessness and limitations of our human minds. "To the minnow," he says:

> every cranny and pebble and quality and accident of his native little creek may have become familiar. But does the minnow understand the Tides, the Currents, the Trade Winds or the Moon's Eclipse? Yet these are the facts the little creek is governed by, and by which the little creek may be quite overset and reversed. Such a minnow is Man. His creek is Earth; his ocean the Immeasurable All; his Monsoons and Currents are the mysterious ways of God in all the ages.

Let us thus own up that we do not know, and see what faith has to say when it honestly does not know. Thus am I led to assert with joy that we "perplexed theists" share the scientist's faith as he faces a mountainous mass of unrelated facts. The scientist can and does believe that some stroke or flash of order and meaning will leap across the chaos. If he has not such faith, he would surrender his quest and life would become insipid to his taste. Likewise, religious men and women can believe that though it may not be till our after-life, or at best till long after we have passed from the scene, yet the connexion between the God of nature and the God of the soul will be known and understood. Religious and scientific faith agree in their attitude of trust towards facts which lie as yet unexplained.

There is also good news for us in such mental emergency in the fact that what God and Christ have really done for us in the soul cannot be undone by what has happened, or not happened, in the realm of nature. A boy perhaps regards his father as his dearest friend. That

father may be on trial before the world for some supposed misdemeanour. The boy's faith in the father is such that even if the father be condemned he will be sure there has been a miscarriage of justice. Such boyish faith is not abject. It is worth living in and dying for. Mankind is that boy, and God is a father somewhat on trial, be it said, in the hazy mind of the average man. His faith does not yet fully know what the Father has been at in His world. In the hereinafter perhaps it will be clear, for not only will God then judge man, as we are told, but then at last man will be able to judge God and know that his faith in Him in this life has been vindicated to the full. God's ways in nature are on trial in the mind of man. God's ways in the soul fill some hearts with trust and love. If I asked God to help me in a temptation on Thursday last and He did it, no speculation about Providence can undo the event or deny my joy.

To the sorrow and grief caused by bodily pain and general illness the good news of the gospel is much more rebellious than some of our fathers supposed. We are to-day exploring a big realm of ailments and disorders where the old "Thy-will-be-done" look is neither Christian sense nor common sense. There are the ills of the flesh that man is heir to because he thinks he is, ills of the body which have their origin and their cure in the mind, the whole host of nervous disorders, hysterias, phobias and the like, which can be exorcised sometimes by psycho-therapy and sometimes by religious faith. In other words, faith-healing miracles present no sort of barrier for our minds to-day. We are beginning to see they were never meant to be confined to New Testament times. It is pathetic that we should need to be reminded by so strange a being as Mrs. Eddy how rebellious Jesus Christ was towards much disease, or that we men of faith should wait to be shown by the teaching of a non-religious man like Coué what is in men by nature. Pathetic it is, also, that Four-Square-Gospel preachers like Pastor Jeffreys should sometimes be having results in faith-healing with the authentic New Testament ring about them, whilst we moderns rather airily talk about having achieved a more open mind. These events, ancient and modern, are not miracles in the narrower sense of laws being broken, but in the wider sense of higher laws invading. "If our love were but more simple, We should take Him at His word." Prayer circles and Faith-healing circles are being increasingly established even in Congregational churches —and results are being reached. Jesus Christ as the fighter against disease is proving as thrilling an inspiration as Jesus Christ, the burden-bearer of sin and wrong.

Let me confess openly, however, that as yet I cannot place troubles like cancer or consumption amongst the list of physical ills that are directly amenable to prayer. What have I then which is really good and true to say in face of such comparative sentences of death? I

have found some eyes brighten when I have dared to say outright that I did not believe such distress were in any sense the will of God. A good and gracious woman I knew had just been told about her malignant cancer. I made bold to say to her: "I feel absolutely certain that cancer is not sent by God." "Are you really sure?" she asked. "As sure as can be," I replied. "Oh, thank God you feel like that about it," she said. "I can love Him again now. I'd hate Him if He had sent this. Now you go downstairs and play me *Finlandia* on the piano. Perhaps it will be the last music I shall hear." It was. She died in just a week from that day—but she died with a calm and loving and unquestioning trust in God. Many modern-minded men and women are braver to face the real limitations of our knowledge than we have supposed, and they know in their very souls that, though logically God may be somehow responsible, as allowing a world in which such things could happen, yet they could never believe of Him that He sends such things for inscrutable reasons all His own. It braces some folks to see that they are chance victims in a causal sequence where something—somewhere—went wrong. They may even be big enough at times to see that only by there being no exception to a causal chain can man win his victories over some kinds of ignorance and disease. The majority of men and women in our churches are tough-minded here and have quite surrendered the Victorian providential scheme of things. Thousands of modern minded people outside our churches would rejoice if they knew how largely that view had gone. There is greater willingness to face the fact that there are many untoward events in life of which there is as yet no satisfactory explanation.

It is wrongly supposed that Jesus Christ believed that no personal disaster would come our way if we only had faith in God. Did He not say: "The very hairs of your head are all numbered," and "Two sparrows cannot fall to the ground without your Father —"? These texts are used to suggest that God will intervene on our behalf. But He will not and does not. It may even be true to say that being Himself He cannot! If God is capricious, this life is impossible. Certainly the texts referred to do not bear the interpretation of a capricious, interfering, invading God. The hairs of our head may be all numbered—but a bald man can get no help out of that! It is not promised that hair that has gone will be restored. The meaning of the words surely is that God knows all about us and shares all that happens to us, but not that certain sad happenings are warded off by His protecting care. As Professor Manson comments on this very passage:

> Whereas philosophers have striven to attain to the idea of God by a process of abstraction from all the particular interests, sorrows, work, woe, and sufferings which have to do with human life, Jesus, taking the opposite way, seeks the fullness and glory of the divine

being in the complete identification or integration of that being with all that concerns the life of his creatures. God, because He is God, is interested in everything that affects His creatures and therefore on their part the complete trust is necessary.

There is an interesting item of translation about the sparrows falling to the ground. The plain words of the text definitely assert that no sparrows fall to the ground *without the Father*. Without the Father what? Shall we leave it there, or is some verb implied? Moffatt suggests the word "willing" it. But it seems just as likely that the implied verb is "knowing," for the gist of the passage is that spiritual harm is far more perilous than physical suffering, and in any case, no physical harm can come to us without the knowledge of God. If we are told He acquiesces and wills it, then indeed we are back again to the mysterious potentate who is personally responsible for all evil, and who sends it for some inscrutable reason of His own. It hurts and even angers to be told He sends *all* that happens. It is invigorating truth that He knows, and is with me as Father and Friend in it all.

The realm of life called death is one in which ministers have either the saddest, or the finest, tasks of their calling. Death is the Great Leveller. It is the portal of pain through which believer and unbeliever alike must some day pass. Not our own death is the greatest anxiety or problem, but the passing of those whom we love. What have we to say? Taken all in all, there is more undiluted nonsense to the split second talked on this theme than on any that could be named. A little child dies in infancy, when he or she has hardly arrived. Scripture is strangely silent about such a tragedy. There are those who out of the madness of their own imagination have diagnosed some sin in the parents, for which God was exacting penalty, as the cause of the tragedy. Thank God, that is a lie. Again, it has been said that God must have wanted that little one for some purpose all His own. Why then was the little one allowed to come? It is sheer maladjustment to send, and then to take so suddenly away, and it is also callously cold to give no sort of hint of what that higher purpose can be. Again it is beautifully and imaginatively hinted that heaven will be all the lovelier because a little child will be waiting there. There will be many who are thus comforted for the loss of a little one, but I prefer to think that life on the other side means activity, that the child's spirit has developed, and that he is growing a real boy and a lovable soul. The miracle God will work will be, not that a little one shall still be there, but that, like Mary Rose and her baby-grown-a-man, we shall see the little child-that-was in the spirit of the man-that-has-come-to-be.

It is recorded of Silvester Horne that his saddest task as a minister was to have to visit a young bride who had been made a widow on her honeymoon. He had married her only three weeks before in

the glorious happiness of a crowded church. On the third day of the honeymoon the husband had taken some chill, pneumonia had developed, and in just three weeks it was all over, and she was standing there in the hall, pale and ghost-like, greeting her minister, and he was wondering, as she had been wondering for hours, what in heaven or earth he could say. Some such agony has faced many of us either in our own lives or in the lives of our people. At such times of Gethsemane one feels silence, or silent prayer, is the safest speech. At the actual moment there feels to be no untying such a knot. The jagged wound is too raw for any sudden healing. Certainly we have a limp way of saying that Time will heal, which is rather like saying that Time will do what God cannot. The difficulty, however, is undeniably great. Two things, I imagine, will have amazed us all, namely the way in which some lifelong believers crumble up in such emergencies and reveal far less courage, in spite of all their supposed life of faith, than the average stoical pagan; and, on the other hand, the unsuspected bravery of many simple souls who hold no theory, ask few questions, but accept the sad events as the allotted arena in which it is for them to decide whether they still find Him or lose Him. And they have found Him. It has at times been a strange, glad comfort for some such sufferers to have their minister call right at the end of the day and read with them the story of Gethsemane. They have seemed to have a deeper understanding of Christ's agony and His prayer, to have known now from experience how *He* wanted to get away from it, but then how at last how He was able to raise the triumphant, "Nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt." They too have been able to say, "Thy will it must now be for me to accept the inevitable, and begin here, with Thy help and in Thy strength, to build or re-build my life as best may be in this loss and loneliness."

To be blunter in this paper than we can dare to be, or would ever wish to be at the moment of anyone's tragedy, if we are to lose our faith in God as Father or Friend because tragedy has come, it is like saying we will not keep friends with our human friends if they cannot do certain things for us. After all, we did not love Christ or believe in God initially because we were made happy, but because love called for love, spirit spoke to spirit, and there was the response of the soul. Thus we became happy. We surely do not lose that love because life goes hardly with us. Love and friendship, when we face them squarely, are independent of good fortune. They are superior to the sorrows of being tragically caught in the mere machine of life. Surely we love God, if we love Him at all, whether life goes well or ill, and if happiness proves not to be our portion.

The one big gospel truth, and the only real solace in face of death, early or late, is the unswerving certainty about life beyond, that death

is not a barrier but a thoroughfare. We have to ask ourselves boldly as Christians "On what does our belief in that life after death depend?" To us as Christians there is more than the shadowy hope flitting in and out of the mind of man that it is not into nothingness we pass. Our certainty of the beyond centres somehow in Christ. But how? The difficulty, as I conceive it, is to decide the setting or basis of our Resurrection faith. Some say boldly that because Christ rose from the dead we can believe our loved ones are not held of death. But that interpretation of the Resurrection story may hinder more than it helps in that very respect. If it be asserted that the empty tomb is the basic fact of the Resurrection, it is difficult to see how we pass from Christ's empty tomb to the certainty of after-life for ourselves and our loved ones. Nothing is surer than that whatever happened to the body of the Lord, there will be no such empty tomb for other people. Though our souls will live in the beyond, our bodies will still be mouldering in the grave. As the Apostle puts it, "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God." Moreover, concerning that risen and revivified, if transfigured and glorified, body of the Lord, the spatial and temporal difficulties are urgent. When we ask what kind of body it was which could pass through closed doors and yet be seen and touched, and then suddenly vanish out of sight, there is no answer. Faith can believe these things happened, though it may not know how they happened; but their having thus happened sheds no sort of light on our personal problems of immortality.

I suggest that the same new emphasis can be made about the Resurrection as has already been generally accepted concerning the Atonement. It is now generally agreed amongst us that Christ's death did not *alter* God, but revealed Him, that in the death of Christ we see the sort of love God the Father always had, and was, and will be. Likewise, the Resurrection does not alter the conditions of life and death, nor even bring Immortality to light. The Resurrection *reveals* immortality. Jesus Christ came back in some fashion or other out of the kind of after-life which awaits us all. His real presence, spiritual, and glorified, and independent of the body, brought such radiant faith to the disciples in the midst of their bitter defeat that life for them was changed, and they went forth to win, to outlive and out-die the pagan world. "Jesus is Lord": "Jesus is risen": "Jesus was not held of death"—was their glad news. The difficulties arising from this spiritual interpretation of the Resurrection are admittedly great. What sort of psychic event, for instance, could produce such psychological certainty about the risen and reigning Lord? And how on this view did the story of the empty tomb become established in the tradition? But the difficulties from the other interpretation are greater, as I believe, and I have the advantage of

seeing how in life, and in death, and in risen life, Jesus revealed the quality and content of our life in God, its inspiring love and gracious fellowship, and also the kind of life awaiting the souls of all men at the end of the thoroughfare men call death. Such good news steadies and nerves the soul against one of the bitterest losses and sorrows we humans can know.

There remains, however, to be considered the great wrong man does to man, the way the innocent are made to suffer by the guilty. How shall we bear it? Is there real good news for us even at that hour? The cruelty of men to men is surely about the hardest thing in the universe to explain.

In order to give point and bite to my question I would ask the reader to consider any of "Life's little ironies," as Thomas Hardy calls them, or a major tragedy either, in which the problem of personal forgiveness arises: a workman hounded out of a job by a rascally foreman, a trader or shopkeeper driven to bankruptcy by a merciless or mean competitor, an innocent manufacturer woefully let down for life by the actual or impending bankruptcy of some rogue; sons, daughters, fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, lovers, jilted, scorned, and wronged. Let us go carefully and orderly here, for there is much of God's life and God's love to be discovered from these human problems. What have we to say?

First, forgiveness towards real wrong is no light and easy thing. To treat a downright wrongdoer affectionately is hard, even if he or she plead for mercy and forgiveness, for it evolves so much like condoning a definite crime. If indeed there is no real repentance, forgiveness is out of the question. We do not forgive a stone that hurts, or a motor-car that maims. Forgiveness is essentially a personal relationship, and in serious issues it can never be easy.

Secondly, bare justice, on the other hand, is difficult both to discover and to apply in a personal world. Bare justice, for instance, may seem to demand a clean cut with the wrongdoer whose life may have been intertwined with one's own. But if such bare justice be offered, it might mean sending the sinning soul through torment and hell for a life-time. The innocent sufferer can find no peace for his own soul in wilfully inflicting bare justice. Moreover, it is useless to meet a sin of the flesh in someone else with a sin of the spirit in one's self, the sin of lust with the sin of hardness. What the saints have been saying about God and Christ all down the ages looks like being amazingly true for humans as well. *There is no dealing with sin till it is taken to the soul of the righteous one and suffered through to the end.* By act of will and imagination as by grace of God, to make the other's wrong to be one's own, bearing its shame and stain, praying for strength to let resentment go, caring mainly at first, and only, at the last, for the wrongdoer—that highest and hardest way

proves in the end to be the only way. Any who are wronged get peace again in the discovery that Jesus Christ was likewise wronged, and found it hard to bear, that He had to fight for strength, and in the end accepted the wrong that was being done while remaining still in love with those who were doing it. Our bitter experience proves to be what God and Christ have passed through. Their love has lasted in spite of the cost. So, please God, our love will do the same.

Summarizing, then, our Good News in the hour of suffering and sorrow, I want to say that believers in God must have the same kind of faith in His goodness and love as the scientist has in the ultimate discovery of truth. The chaos of facts he believes will clear into order, just as the loving wisdom of all God's ways we believe will at last be revealed. Meanwhile our faith should be far more rebellious against many forms of illness and anxiety, but concerning those physical ills which we feel too deep for faith to cure, we must at least be brave. We cannot throw them back on God. And at any rate there have come from them some of the happiest and most intimate experiences of life—the deeds, words, ways, prayers, and letters of loving friends, together with the conviction that we have with us a suffering, sharing, and loving God. Such happy compensations are the consequence and not the cause of our sorrow, and they suggest a type of life that can be triumphant over all troubles and worry, and even over death. Of that type of life Jesus Christ is the supreme revealer, bringing even to the soul that is wounded sore by another's wrong not only the love of God, but the only method of living. There is no peace between man and God save as man repentantly accepts God's love, and there is no peace for the sufferer save as forgiving love from God flows through him. Man's heart is like metal in that it must be melted before it can be remade. Forgiving love melts, remakes, and redeems broken lives and hearts. We must see if that is not so. "Father, forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those that trespass against us." Such, then, is the good news of the gospel in the hours of suffering and sorrow that I want to preach and practice until I die.

HOWARD PARTINGTON.

DEVELOPMENTS AND EXPERIMENTS.

This Section of our Journal aims at chronicling not only developments in theological thought and in ecclesiastical organization, but also practical experiments in all branches of religious life and service.

Often when successful attempts have been made to solve some problem in one part of the country, the rest of the Churches remain ignorant, and we trust that these pages will not only serve as a clearing-house of ideas and a record of changing emphasis, but also broadcast valuable information of progress in Church and denominational life.

Our representatives in the Colonies and the United States will from time to time contribute accounts of similar movements. The Editor will be glad to consider brief articles serving this purpose.

THE PRESENT-DAY DRINK PROBLEM.

Unless the Churches and the Temperance organizations bestir themselves the ground won for sobriety since the War may be lost. I propose in the following brief article to indicate: (1) the measure of the advance made from 1915 to 1932 in the reduction of national intemperance, and the reason for it; (2) the brewers' new policy devised in 1932, and its first results; and (3) the urgency of the need for a forward Temperance policy.

I. An Era of Progress. 1915-1932.

For some years before the War little, if any, advance was made in the diminution of the national problem of insobriety. For example, police-court convictions for drunkenness throughout England and Wales in 1908 totalled 187,803; in 1913, 188,877. The restrictive work of the Government Liquor Control Board during the War initiated the era of progress. Mainly by a drastic reduction in the legal hours of liquor sale and supply, the Board cut down the sum of intemperance so drastically that in the later years of the War advance in sobriety was well-marked and general. The 1921 Licensing Act gave permanent effect to the scheme of restricted hours for liquor trading. The Act registered the close of a long-drawn-out controversy between the Churches (whose Temperance Executives had federated in the Temperance Council of the Christian Churches) and the national organizations of licensed victuallers and registered clubs. The forces of social welfare triumphed, and for a decade the ground won for sobriety was held successfully against the incessant challenge of vested interests.

There were, of course, other causes for the advance of sobriety than the reduction of facilities for the sale of intoxicants. Heavy war taxation on beer and spirits made them dearer, and therefore less

accessible to the would-be purchaser. Scientific teaching on the ill-effects of alcohol on mental and moral control (teaching based on the researches of the Medical Committee which advised the war-time Control Board) had become more general and influential. The wide-spread movement towards social betterment, including advance in education, housing, and public hygiene, had raised the general standard of life. Science had equipped the new generation with multiplied interests—the cinema, wireless, the motor-car, travel facilities—and in so doing it headed youth away from the traditional attachments of the public-house.

The broad result of these legislative and cultural influences making for reform can be stated in a sentence. Comparing 1932 with 1913, the change within the twenty years is indicated by the remarkable fact that the national consumption of beer had fallen by no less than one half, and the national consumption of spirituous liquors by more than two-thirds[1]. It is significant that Police-Court convictions for drunkenness in England and Wales fell from the 1913 total of 188,877 to 30,146 in 1932—a reduction of no less than five-sixths!

II. The Brewers' New Policy.

Small wonder that the brewing interests took alarm. Brewing dividends had been more or less maintained during the period of decreasing consumption, but the maintenance of dividends was due to causes which were in their very nature ceasing to operate—savings through amalgamation of brewing firms; the "tied house" system which directed the larger share of retail as well as all the wholesale profits to the brewers' exchequer; and pressure on "tied tenants" to secure the best financial result for their brewer-owners. Little increase of gain could be looked for in these directions. The brewing trade, if it were to continue as a profitable industry, was compelled to set itself to regain its lost market. Hence in 1932 the national Brewers' Society created the new office of Director, and appointed Sir Edgar Sanders to this position to re-establish, if he could, the prosperity of a declining trade.

The new Director's first and successful enterprise was to mobilize the brewing trade and its allies for an attack on the Beer Duty, which had been substantially increased by Mr. Snowden in the Budget following the 1931 economic crisis. The endeavour was successful. Mr. Neville Chamberlain easily yielded to the clamour and pressure. The Beer Duty was reduced so that beer could be sold at a penny a

[1] Average Consumption per Head of Population.

BEER.

1913	... ...	27.76 gallons.
1932	... ...	11.19 ,,

SPIRITS.

1913	... ...	0.70 of a gallon.
1932	... ...	0.21 ,, ,,

pint cheaper. The actual result, which any social student could have anticipated, was not mentioned in the Chancellor's speech—an increase in convictions for drunkenness.

But Sir Edgar Sanders's main attention was directed elsewhere. He recognized that the youth of the country was the potential market for an increased sale of beer. Speaking to a conference of brewers in 1933, Sir Edgar said,

> Unless you can attract the younger generation to take the place of the older men, there is no doubt that we shall have to face a steadily falling consumption of beer. That is a very serious matter indeed for an industry of this sort, where you have not only got a large amount of capital locked up in your brewery, but you have a far larger amount locked up in your licensed houses, three-quarters of the value of which will entirely disappear if they cannot keep the trade they do to-day.

It was on this conclusion that the plans for the brewers' National Advertising Campaign were founded. Sir Edgar Sanders's notorious statement should be quoted in full—the oftener it is quoted the better:

> If we can once attract a new class of customer, we shall see the brewing trade turn round and start the ascending scale. I am not saying that the present beer drinker should drink more, but rather that we want new customers. We want to get the beer drinking habit instilled into thousands, almost millions, of young men who do not at present know the taste of beer. These young men, if they start with what beer they can afford to-day, as they grow up they will afford better beers to the great advantage of the brewing industry.

It is common knowledge that in the last two years hundreds of thousands of pounds have been spent by the brewers' organizations to familiarize youth with the misleading slogan, "Beer is Best". The skill of the artist was bought, so that the brewers' posters associate health and beauty and prowess in sport with the use of beer. Nor has this gigantic advertising effort been in vain. Its results can be expressed in four succinct statements:

1. The national consumption of beer increased by sixteen per cent in 1934, in comparison with the consumption in 1932.

1932	... ...	14,449,000 standard barrels.
1934	... ...	16,817,000 ,, ,,

2. Police-court proceedings for drunkenness in London and seventy-seven County Boroughs in England and Wales increased twenty-seven per cent in 1934, in comparison with 1932.

1932	... ...	26,095.
1934	... ...	33,261.

3. The national expenditure on drink increased by £4,184,000 in 1934, in comparison with 1933[2].

1933	...	...	£224,845,000.
1934	...	...	£229,029,000.

4. Profits of Brewing Companies increased by two millions sterling in 1933-4, in comparison with 1932-3.

1932-3	...	£16 millions sterling.
1933-4	...	£18 ,, ,,

Beer up. Proceedings for drunkenness up. Drink expenditure up. Brewing profits up. And the callous enterprise of the brewers to increase their profits by the enlistment of British youth as beer-drinkers goes forward.

The present year marks the coming-of-age of the Temperance Council of the Christian Churches, which was founded in 1915. It is an appropriate moment therefore to take a new measure of the task which now confronts the Churches and the Temperance Movement in Britain.

3. A Forward Temperance Policy.

Along what lines should a forward Temperance policy be planned? The answer brings under review the two spheres of all reform activity—the educational and the legislative.

1. Educational developments in recent years have placed a new asset at the service of the Temperance Movement. I refer to the scientific verdict on the effect of alcohol on motorists and motoring. The recent report of the British Medical Association Committee to the Ministry of Transport is of the first importance[3]. It centres on "the effect of *subintoxicant* amounts of alcohol"—that is, amounts less than that customarily regarded as rendering a person "under the influence of drink to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of the vehicle". The final paragraph of the Report affirms:

> As alcohol in no greater quantity than that contained in three ounces of whisky has been found to affect appreciably the mental processes and neuro-muscular co-ordination of individuals, it must frequently affect the driving capacity of the driver who takes alcoholic liquor, even in such small amounts. After taking alcohol he may believe himself to be driving better, but, in fact, his body works less efficiently. This adverse effect generally occurs even if alcohol is taken in moderate quantities some hours before driving, and especially if taken in the absence of food.

[2] The figures for 1932 are hardly comparable, as the beer-consumption throughout that year was affected by the increased taxation on beer imposed by Mr. Snowden in the Budget following the economic crisis of 1931.

[3] *Report of Special Committee on the Relation of Alcohol to Accidents*, 1935. British Medical Association, Tavistock Square, London, W.C.1. A fuller account of the action of alcohol on man will be found in *Alcohol: Its Action on the Human Organism*, H.M. Stationery Office, 1s. 6d.

In the 1935 Highway Code the results of this scientific enquiry have been expressed in the now well-known direction, "To All Users of the Road":

> Before using the road be sure that your alertness or sense of caution is not affected by alcohol or fatigue. A fraction of a second may make all the difference in avoiding an accident. If you cannot give the necessary concentration, you are risking not only your own life but the lives of others.

The problem of road safety affects everybody, motorists and pedestrians alike. The scientific verdict that alcohol is a menace to all road safety should enable the Temperance Movement to win a new hearing for its case and claim; for what is true of the public highway must be true of the road of life on which we all are travellers. Alcohol is the enemy of mental and moral control. It is that fundamental fact which needs to be pressed home.

2. Legislatively, the recommendations of the recent Royal Commission on Licensing (1932) should receive attention in the new Parliament. A complete revision of the licensing code is long overdue, and the Commission's Report indicates in careful detail sound lines of revision. The most urgent legislative need is an Act to bring under effective public control the supply of intoxicants in registered clubs. The menace of the drinking club to home and public welfare is too obvious to need illustration. A second claim of acknowledged urgency is the right of the residents in the new housing areas on the outskirts of all our towns and cities to determine for themselves whether or not liquor licenses should be granted; the Commission's carefully drafted recommendation for Informative Polls on license applications in such neighbourhoods is of equal urgency with the need for restrictive legislation affecting clubs. A third element in the Commission's recommendations is the proposed extension of the area of State Control of the liquor traffic. The unchecked freedom of the drink interest to exploit the community for private profit is in itself an evil; this is illustrated afresh by the brewers' national advertising campaign. The replacement of the present system by some system of direct and restrictive State Control is requisite.

The proper anxiety of reformers to see Parliamentary effect given to the work of the Royal Commission on Licensing should not obscure the necessity for efficient use of existing legislation. Brewster Sessions last year witnessed an organized attack throughout the country, by "pub" and club, to obtain the later hour of closing which it is within magisterial discretion to grant, "if satisfied that the special requirements of the district render it desirable". Judged by the standard of the public interest the attack in 1935 was far too successful. Local preparations by the Churches should be so careful and thorough that the strong case for the earlier hour of closing may

be convincingly presented to the Justices at the coming Brewster Sessions.

3. It would be impossible for the present writer to conclude without insistence upon the need for a renewal of the Christian witness of personal total abstinence. The claim of the Church for action by the State against the drink interests should assuredly pre-suppose that Church men and women themselves accept the path of self-discipline, and affirm in practice their willingness to abstain from the use of alcoholic liquors for the sake of communal well-being.

HENRY CARTER.

MAKING THE BEST OF CHANGE.

IN the year 1813, at York, eighteen citizens were executed on a charge of wilfully destroying machinery. They were not prophetic martyrs but working men who feared the machine age, and made a blind, ineffectual, and pathetic gesture against the coming of change.

To-day, such stories as theirs arouse our sympathy and, possibly, even our condescension; for we constantly assure each other that this is a changing world. We are caught up in a breathless press of alteration. We witness more changes in a hurrying decade than our ancestors accumulated throughout a leisurely century. Moreover, our changes range from spectacular revolutions in forms of government to the installation of pulpit microphones; from scientific portents like the discovery of new planets at the rate of a hundred a year, to minor transformations like an American chemist's demonstration that you can easily make a synthetic silk purse from a sow's ear. On the personal side, the idea that we shall be changed is the most familiar feature in life. We realize it before we are through the childish excitements of shedding our first teeth, and although subsequent alterations to our appearance are not always satisfactory, they certainly enforce change as the law of life.

Altogether, we ought to know enough to avoid making futile gestures against the changes of time. Yet few of us can deny that "the changes that will surely come" are often what we most fear to see. We can amend a well-known line of W. S. Gilbert's by declaring that each of us is born both a little Liberal *and* a little Conservative, for our dual personality of Diehard *versus* Radical is never more clearly revealed than in our attitude to change. One self cries, "Go forward!" but the other would hold back. Change may mean failure, warns our cautious self: refusal to change does not always mean success, replies our impatient self. Change is unsettling, says our little Conservative: of course it is, counters our little Liberal, but salvation is not found in slippered ease, nor does survival lie in resignation. In contentment man conceives a Pilgrim's Progress, insists our orthodox adviser. But it is the story of struggle, responds

our rebel; only in aspiration does man write the Epistles, face a heresy tribunal, lighten a dark continent, and create the weapons that re-make the world.

So we waver over familiar *pros* and *cons*; so we face an impending change as if half afraid of the frying pan and half afraid of the fire, but not always awarding the clinching argument in this recurrent debate to that self who would be up and doing. Puzzled and uncertain we may be, yet no single issue can be indefinitely adjourned. Not for us is the refuge of that stalemate known to Omar Khayyam's spiritual wanderer who evermore came out by that same door wherein he went. For the plain facts of change are amongst the most uncomfortable of life's necessities. Since they are inevitable and must be faced, we can either make futile, ineffectual gestures against them and be defeated, or we must develop a capacity to handle them. As individuals and as church members we must meet the coming of life's new ways with adaptability and use them with perception; we must consistently master change or be mastered.

The copybook gospel of self-help, which is older than the story of Joseph's rise to power, always insisted that opportunity should be taken by the forelock. The Christian is compelled to be an opportunist in good deeds and high thinking; that is, he is compelled not to suffer change as an unwelcome imposition, but to make the best of it literally by finding new opportunities of serving his generation in a changing world. Even allowing for the direct inspiration of prayer, all practical religion demands practical self-help. This is acutely brought home to every modern man who desires to interpret Christianity to-day. For its Founder, instead of suggesting cures for this or that hour, dealt with the permanent needs of men: instead of fixed laws, He gave us principles. With every class of change those principles must be thought out afresh—and we are to do the thinking for our own time.

We cannot always dig up precedent, like lawyers, and copy a judgment made a generation ago; we cannot always diagnose symptoms, like doctors, and apply a remedy half as old as time. For history does not repeat itself to the extent of solving our problems before they are stated, nor does private life set questions to which all the answers are ready made. The warning, "Ye have not passed this way before", remains true of us to-day. We are forced to realize that the experience of the past is only useful up to a point; in the long run, each generation must face its own problems in its own way.

This simple necessity carries a double-edged implication. It demands that the mature generation shall try to understand what is happening to its young people, and it requires that young people shall prove themselves capable of sharing the re-thinking of their own problems.

On the first point, there is genuine bewilderment amongst many earnest-minded elders as to what is happening to produce our changed generation: nor can our young people themselves easily analyse the forces which mould the 1935 "design for living." In a modern play, Eugene O'Neill causes a character to search for God in the dynamo of a power plant: he does not find God there, but the search is significant of one of the changes which gave us the modern spirit. Youth has gone the way of all flesh and become mechanized; its heroes come from the air, the engine room, the laboratory, and its books reveal how expertly it follows the scientific trend. Any parent knows that the literature which delighted his adolescent mind does not appeal so strongly to a son who constructs his own radio and understands the wind stresses of Sydney Harbour Bridge.

But the changed new world of knowledge which the present generation inherits goes deeper than mere scientific progress, and means more than a few extra knobs to turn. It means that man is radically changing his way of thinking, and the signs of his changing mind are written boldly on every wall of life. We are aware, for example, that modern musicians have forsaken sweet melodies; that artists no longer paint landscapes prettily; that poets no longer use capital letters, punctuation, or even rhyme; in fact, that all forms of expression are changing. Behind these outward signs are profound changes in our learning. From the beginning of this century, forces of transformation have worked to produce reformation in art, scholarship, and science; they have changed the interpretation of history, have affected theology, and are changing politics under our eyes. We may not profess to understand these revolutions, but we cannot ignore them.

In the recent past the average man was only indirectly affected by changes in thinking. He rarely heard of them in his lifetime, and was not always trained to appreciate such new knowledge as did trickle his way. This is not quite the case to-day. Not the least significant factor in the present situation is that we are now reaping the benefit of the first sixty years of compulsory education ever known in our history. Moreover, that training is being supplemented by a widening stream of culture; popular culture provided by twenty thousand new books every year, by newspapers read by forty million people every day, by films exhibited to twenty million people every week, and by a myriad radiations over many wave lengths. Ideas are in the air, and we catch them as easily as we catch a cold. No generation has been so well-informed as ours, none has developed so many tastes, shared so many interests, discussed so many questions as this half-educated generation which is even now realizing that it has much to learn. Day by day the influences of popular culture

gather force, and it is impossible to foretell how deeply they will cut into the future of life and religion.

Here, indeed, is the vital point: these changes are not merely signs of the times, they are factors of supreme importance to the Church of Christ. Because they create the atmosphere into which the Christian message is now delivered, because they create the life and mentality of 1935, they demand attention from anyone who hopes to understand the generation they produce. Here are factors which thrust upon young people a score of questions about which earlier generations knew nothing.

God can still be worshipped in Gothic buildings but it is no longer possible to serve him in thirteenth century lives. It is no longer possible for young people to live with the standard ideas their parents nursed even from 1900 to 1913. In consequence, those who believe that young people are interested in hearing what is worth while, feel that the great need of this generation is to hear Christian teaching directly related to the problems of life in this year of grace. As individuals must handle change or be defeated by it, so the Church must handle change if it is to serve its generation.

Facing this need, Christianity calls for young people as it never challenged them before. It needs them, not merely as new church members, but needs them for the new outlook they can bring, and their direct help in thinking out afresh what Christ means to the modern world.

New knowledge, progressive science and new movements are, we perceive, touching the life of this generation more intimately than in the past. Now the charm of knowledge is the appeal of something fresh to learn, the call of science is to the questing spirit, the magnetism of new movements is the urge to rebuild the world. These things, let young people be reminded, lie precisely within the province of religion. Thinking about God is a task for the questing spirit; it brings new knowledge to learn, new lives to fashion, and a new world to build. To God's thinkers is given the opportunity to join that unresting company of seekers and workers, expositors and practitioners, upon whom a world adrift in the flux of time and change is utterly dependent for its progress, its preservation, and its salvation.

A Young Layman.

TENDENCIES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

In every important educational enterprise there are bound to be many tendencies in different directions. Each observer selects those which in his judgment seem to be significant. There are reactionary trends in religious education, but these are probably familiar to every one

who is trying to improve educational conditions in church or school, and so need not be emphasized. Two or three of the more forward looking are set down in this article.

The conviction is growing in the minds of many that the aim in teaching religion is to help people in their daily living. That religious education is the ministry to life, to living persons in their total situation, rather than the teaching of courses, or doctrines, or the Bible, is far-reaching in its implications. It is the privilege of the Church to work with people of all ages and conditions and to help them to meet life, not to escape from reality. One of the great advantages of the Church, contrasted with many other agencies, is that it works for the most part with normal people and before they have broken or made serious mistakes or failures. If it could do its work better many lives might be saved from disaster.

Here is a group of people who, because of economic conditions, are going through their Gethsemane. If religion is a force in life it should help them to work their way through. It is much easier for the leader to explain a passage from the Scriptures, but that is evading the issue. This type of teaching religion necessitates getting hold of essential facts, and instead of dealing in "glittering generalities" about "the Gospel" and the "Kingdom of God" it must help these people to find strength to endure and develop insight as to what to do. Such a test will clarify ideas of God and necessitate abandoning inadequate ideas that still persist even among religious people.

Children of nursery age have their needs. It is possible for the teacher of religion to help these little people to enlarge their vocabularies, acquire increased co-ordination, gain self-control, attain good social attitudes, have their imaginations stimulated normally by contact with concrete materials and their sense of wonder and worship developed wholesomely. In situations as much like life as possible teachers and pupils together experience something of what friendship and co-operation mean and of what God means in daily living.

The nature of the curriculum and of educational procedures is greatly modified by such a conception of religious education. The curriculum is no longer confined to courses of study but embraces all the experiences of the pupils, at least as far as these come under the direction of the school or are involved in its work. The primary material with which the teacher works is human life—boys and girls, men and women, in concrete situations in a real world. When it is said "A teacher must know what he teaches" this is the first thing that is meant: his pupils—not merely their names but a real understanding of their complex lives, as friend knows friend. For this type of teaching his sources cannot be confined to the Sunday School journal or textbook. The storehouse from which the wise teacher draws is as rich as all nature, history, art, and literature.

The teacher becomes one of this group as together they seek a better way of living. This is the distinctive characteristic of teaching procedures. As the class works at some enterprise his special contribution is to stimulate, to awaken and arouse, to suggest ways of working and sources, and to develop skill in meeting situations. One difficulty in teaching religion is that it tends to deal with abstractions. Religious causes are associated with church and Sunday and not related to school and business and politics. Religion means at least better human relations. If this is so, "the will of God" is no abstraction. Injustice, prejudice, hatred, poverty, ignorance, snobbery, slavery, disease, war, are enemies of human welfare and opposites of God's will. In human conditions and relations God is seen. Each one can help make his home and community at least more friendly, helpful, co-operative, beautiful—a place that "means something clean and decent and sweet." Teaching must lead not merely to abstract ideas of good but to doing something that is good.

It is a great mistake to assume that such procedure rules out distinctively religious topics. It will be found that nothing leads so directly to the most searching questions, such as the idea of God, the meaning of life, prayer, the hereafter, the Bible, foreign missions, If these arise out of problems actually faced they become vital issues rather than abstract "topics" for discussion.

Much emphasis is put on worship. It will be evident that if classes engage in their own vital enterprises the very nature of the work will lead inevitably to spontaneous worship. It would be difficult for a Christian teacher to face some serious personal or social conditions with a group without being driven to commune with God. This experience of God in daily life is what is supremely desired. In addition, it is important to have the most beautiful services of worship that can be had. Only the best literature, art, and music deserves a place and the expression of the noblest religious ideas. Such standards call for a searching examination of hymns, prayers, and other materials used. If classes or groups are dealing with concrete problems the worship service will emerge from them. Without the feeling of reality the most beautiful order of worship will fail. Pupils need to be trained in planning and leading their own worship. But it needs to be emphasized that worship does not consist in "putting on services of worship," but in leading people into worship experiences.

Church school buildings reflect the changes in attitude to religious education, especially during the last century. Formerly the church had but one room—the sanctuary, nave, meeting-house, or "auditorium" (a significant term) for the regular "divine service", with perhaps a vestry for the minister. The Sunday School met in the pews, all the classes being within sight and sound of each other. The

next step was to excavate basements for the Sunday School. Someone humorously suggests that this burrowing resulted from the experiences of the early Christians in catacombs! Most of these basements did not come up to the minimum standards set for public schools. Indeed, this is still true of scores of buildings used for church schools to-day.

The Akron plan made the first striking change in Sunday School architecture. The design was a large room with a balcony on three sides, the space in the gallery and below it being divided into stalls for classes. All were visible from the platform, from which point of vantage the superintendent conducted the opening and closing "exercises" and held the "superintendent's review."

Beginning with the present century the idea of graded work has been adopted, and is expressing itself in a new type of building which may be called educational. It is necessary to have rooms with solid walls for worship, study, and construction activities. These rooms should be light, well ventilated and heated, and furnished to suit the age and purposes of the various groups.

It is true many congregations have no notion of educational needs and erect huge, high auditoriums with costly towers and spires, crippling their work for lack of suitable accommodation and mortgaging the future with large debts. The amount of money misspent or squandered in church building is enormous. Educational buildings are not expensive, but it is difficult to change the ideas of congregations whose heart is set on the old type of church, with its showy edifice and huge auditorium that is never filled except on some centenary occasion. Several denominations maintain architectural bureaus and if their suggestions were more generally followed thousands of dollars would be saved and at the same time buildings erected providing accommodation which would marvellously promote (not hinder) the Church's rich and varied ministry.

The picture these tendencies suggest is the whole constituency of the churches busily studying and working at real conditions, co-operating with other upbuilding agencies in promoting richer and more abundant living, and in thus ministering to human need finding a very real fellowship with God.

A. J. Wm. Myers.

ON LIFE AND BOOKS.

LAWN SLEEVES

The Life of Charles Gore. By G. L. PRESTIGE, D.D. Heinemann. 18s.
Randall Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury. By the BISHOP OF CHICHESTER. Oxford Press. 2 volumes. 36s.

Here are authoritative biographies of two of the outstanding figures in the English Church in our time. I cannot help but wonder what a first century Christian—or one of the twenty-first century—would make of the picture they present! Would they be impressed by the activity of the administrator or appalled by it? Would they marvel at the knowledge of the scholar or at the limits of his tolerance? Would they be astounded at the organization that had grown out of Galilee or would they shrink from its complexity? Some of them, I imagine, would join in Cromer's laughter at Bishop Blyth's eager anxiety as to how converts in the Sudan were to be confirmed. He said that

> when men and women have been running about for centuries without a stitch of clothing the question of their confirmation can quite well be postponed until they have learned more elementary things.

How different the two men were: the one shrewd and ever mindful of consequences, the other impulsive and even wayward; the one loving to work behind the scenes and pull the wires, the other hating administration and at home with ideas and principles. The contrast is well seen in Gore's own words:

> When I go up the stairs at Lambeth, I say, *Charles, you be very careful.* When I come down the stairs I say, *Charles, you know that you never meant to agree to that.*

It was only in the last years of his life that I knew Gore, though his books had long placed me in his debt. I well remember his Halley Stewart Lectures, but the most vivid recollection I have of him is of one Sunday morning during the Lausanne Conference on Faith and Order. I had climbed the hill overlooking the town, and found Gore sitting there in meditation. We talked about the Conference, and when he expressed his gratification at the spirit of unity shown in the discussions, I said, "Yes; when are you coming to preach for me at Clapton Park?" He looked at me for a moment as only Gore could look, and then said, "You know, I *really* don't know why I shouldn't." Then after a long pause, "But I'd better not; I'd better not. It *might* be misunderstood". About that time I was asked to take up all kinds of work, and sit on all manner of committees, for which I had no shred of qualification, and when I inquired why the invitation came, the reply invariably was, "Oh, Bishop Gore gave us your name. We wanted a Free Churchman, and Bishop Gore suggested we should ask you".

From these personal reminiscences can be learnt a good deal of the man whose life is so fully and ably described by Canon Prestige—his love of quiet, his deep convictions, his caution, his habit of forming attachments to men of whom he knew very little, and his ability to get on with those whose views were diametrically opposed to his own. The biography quotes Dale's reply to those who wondered how he and Gore could be friendly in earlier days:

> We are very good friends. You see, he knows I am wrong, and I know he is wrong; so we get on well together,

and also the tribute Gore paid in Westminster Abbey on Dale's death to the memory of "the great divine, the great citizen, and the great politician".

Gore "got on" with the Free Churchmen he knew, and they recognized his worth. I had not met before, however, Fairbairn's reference to him when in Oxford in 1885 preparing for the opening of Mansfield. He wrote home:

> I am indeed dreadfully tired, having seen as many men as ought to satisfy the most curious. One of the finest and best was a High Churchman named Gore. He is head of a religious house in the city, and I got some valuable hints from him as to what may be attempted and how.

Gore's name is not unworthy to stand with those of Dale and Fairbairn: he too was a scholar and a preacher, and one who lived a dedicated life. True, he could be embarrassing sometimes, as many who experienced the "Cuddesdon cuddle" know, and more who have known his great generosity. But he was a good man, and, aggravated as we cannot but be sometimes by his views (there are pages in this biography which make me writhe), the man's utter consecration continually humbles the reader. His stress on the moral witness of the Church, his insistence on the root principles of brotherhood and justice, his carelessness about what men thought of him, all win constant admiration.

Canon Prestige has done his work well. There are at times signs that his knowledge of some of Gore's numerous activities is incomplete, and it may be doubted whether the Co-operative Movement "was largely based on a foundation of Dissenting chapels"; but on the whole he has given us an adequate and satisfying picture of a great figure in the religious life of our time.

Of personal contact with Davidson I had little, but my one memory is characteristic of the man. At the instance of A. J. Viner, representatives of the Churches, the teaching profession, and the local authorities met at the Memorial Hall in 1921 to consider whether the dual system of elementary teaching could not be modified (the Conferences are described by Bishop Bell, II. 1130-1131). In one of them I, with the rashness of youth, thought I had cornered the Archbishop, and said, "But last time you said so-and-so". "Ah, yes, but you will remember I qualified that by saying such-and-such". That was Davidson all over. There was always a qualification. The number of occasions when he really "let go" must have been few indeed: as revealed in the biography they can be counted on the fingers of one hand. But the number of times he showed caution was legion. Chaplain and son-in-law of an Archbishop, favourite adviser to the Queen when Dean of Windsor and subsequently, always aware that his words and deeds were carefully scrutinized, Randall Davidson, for all his good points, was not the stuff of which martyrs were made, and he had an almost eighteenth century suspicion of enthusiasm. Perhaps only once did he take his life in his hands, when in the early days he advised the Queen to publish no more of the *Journal in the Highlands*. The American Bishop at the Lambeth Conference in 1908 was not far from the mark in saying, "That Archbishop of yours has taken a return ticket on the line of least resistance!" It is because of this that while some laud his achievement in preserving the unity of the English Church amid all the discussions about doctrine and ritual, modernism and Romanism, others say its body was saved only by the loss of its soul. Who are we to settle which is the truer view? One thing is certain, that while the Archbishop continually stressed

the importance of the Establishment and made the most of his connexion with the State, its monarch, and its ministers, his long reign ended with the Bishops authorizing the use of a Prayer Book which Parliament had rejected.

If Davidson's caution was his outstanding characteristic, his shrewdness was a good second. One of the best illustrations of it is a letter to the Bishop of London on the question of the treatment of the suffragettes:

> By all means take a Deputation of Bishops to the Home Office if you have something to say. You will feel I imagine that there is no use in taking them there to tell the Home Secretary that the matter is very grave: you must have a constructive policy, and I presume that you have this as you think the Deputation worth while. I am myself in the thick of the general question, as these ladies do not leave me alone, but I do not find myself equipped with suggestions so definite that I should myself ask the Home Office to concede them. I rejoice that others see a way more clearly.

The Archbishop is at his worst in replying to a correspondent who asks, in 1916, whether conscientious objection is incompatible with membership of the Church of England.

> The Archbishop desires me to say that, while he cannot himself regard as reasonable or consistent with Christian common-sense the position of those who claim for themselves and their property the protection of a civilized order of society while repudiating its corresponding claim upon their service, he has learned by experience that membership of a religious community is not to be found incompatible with even the extreme vagaries of individual opinion.

It must be confessed, too, that Davidson liked to get his own way, and was much chagrined when, on Temple becoming Archbishop, his counsel was no longer sought. Even before this Dean Church had remarked, "Master Davidson mustn't fancy he can always get his own way!" and Dr. A. J. Mason had once turned on him and asked, "What business have *you* to catechize me?" It is plain, too, that the Archbishop's spectacles were always coloured, and not merely by the "official optimism" which so annoyed Gore, though why he calls Haig a "semi-Presbyterian", and thinks the Independents an outcome of the Evangelical Revival I cannot fathom.

If once I begin to talk about the individuals with whom the Archbishop came into close contact this article will stretch to infinity; somebody should write on the question of church preferments and appointments to bishoprics as seen in these pages. One of the best stories of the Queen I have read for a long time is her comment on the "person of some importance religiously" who in condoling with her on the death of Albert said, "Henceforth you must remember that Christ Himself will be your husband":

> That is what I call twaddle. The man must have known, or ought to have known, that he was talking nonsense. How can people like that comfort others or teach anybody?

Of Asquith the Archbishop had the highest opinion, though strangely enough (Royalist complex?) he thinks he put undue pressure on the King in 1910. In 1918 after a conversation he describes him as

> large minded, full of knowledge, and expressing himself with the force and weight which are always his in such talks.

A little earlier he had recorded Rosebery's opinion:

Pacific School of Religion Berkeley, Cal.

He thinks Asquith the greatest Parliamentarian that ever lived. Much greater than Gladstone or Dizzy, or Palmerston, or Peel. A cultured scholar of amazing power of Parliamentary speech, never a word wrong, and never a word too much; wholly unlike Gladstone whose exuberance of oratory marred its effectiveness. He thought Asquith had never been so great as since Lloyd George came into power.

Bishop Bell had no easy task, and he deserves the thanks of all students of Church history. Those thanks would have been warmer had his volumes been shorter! 1,400 solid pages seem generous for a dignitary, however eminent, whose gifts lie in the administrative rather than in the creative sphere. I admit, of course, that Davidson's extreme caution makes it difficult to condense his letters and papers, yet I think two or three hundred pages could have been saved—and with advantage, all the more because the volume never approaches an indiscretion. Not that I expected indiscretions from Bishop Bell—he lived too long near his subject for that—but I suspect that some of his chapters have been "vetted" by sundry important persons before they have seen the light of day.

The quotations which head the chapters are a noteworthy feature of the book. Bishop Bell has generally gone back a century or two and found amazingly apt passages, which sometimes give a touch of humour elsewhere lacking. I wish there were space to quote from some of them. There are few slips in the book, though it may emphasize the care with which I have read if I point out that while on p. 1251 we are told the Archbishop did not know Mr. Ramsay MacDonald until 1924, the two met at the Parliamentary banquet in November, 1923 (p. 1175). And a bad habit of referring to people as "A certain Miss Annie Kenney", "A certain Bishop Arnold H. Mathew", *etc.* should be cured.

ALBERT PEEL.

The success of Dr. Carl Ludwig Schleich's *Those Were Good Days*! (Allen & Unwin, 12s. 6d.)—365,000 have been sold in the original—is something of a mystery to the reader of the English translation. In itself it does not possess any outstanding qualities. The exclamation mark in the title well suggests its style—superlatives and extravagances, high lights and deep shadows. Possibly it met the German mood, for in many ways Schleich was a typical German; possibly the vivid account of school and student days, possibly the versatility of its author, have given it popularity. Schleich lived from 1859 to 1922; a riotous youth, in which music and poetry, rollicking and drinking, almost put an end to the study of medicine, was followed by training with Virchow, the discovery of local anæsthesia, friendship with Strindberg, and the writing of poetry. There was no modesty about Schleich, and it was probably his manner more than anything else which determined the rejection by the medical profession of his important discoveries. The best parts of the book are the sketches of the writer's father, his schoolmaster, Virchow, and Strindberg. The revealing picture of student and professional life in Germany explains much: we wish we could be sure that there had been a sea-change.

WORTH NOTING FROM RECENT BOOKS.

All that is necessary, it is assumed, is for the churches to modernize their teaching and revise their creeds and forms of service. This is one of the most pathetic of all the liberal fallacies; it is based on that romantic optimism which closes its eyes to the naked facts. Something far more drastic than tinkering with creeds and liturgies is needed. Men do not come to church to-day because the Christianity of the churches is a sham thing—because of the wide gulf which exists between professed faith and everyday practice. Before men can believe in a Gospel they have to see it lived. The Christianity of the churches is lip-service to a faith which church-goers do not in fact believe, as is evidenced by their daily lives. There is no radical difference between the lives of church-goers and non-church-goers; the former profess to believe in love, the latter do not, but both behave in exactly the same way in the market-place. Both are equally concerned with getting and spending; neither is troubled very much about the injustices of society; neither has the remotest idea of what would happen in a community which lived according to the Gospel of God in Jesus Christ.

The unadorned fact is that the majority of our countrymen have ceased to take any interest in the professions and activities of the churches because church leaders and members have never seriously attempted to live a distinctly Christian life in the world, that is to say, a life different from that which would be lived by any ordinarily good-natured and decent-minded but irregilious citizen. . . .

The Christian Church has for a long time made the mistake of trying to be the lump as well as the leaven. It is intensity rather than extensity which really matters, even though this does not pay quotas and maintain the elaborate financial organization of the parish. We must recapture the Old Testament prophets' view of a faithful remnant; ever since the days when Elijah found that there were left in Israel seven thousand men who had not bowed the knee to Baal, the prophets concentrated their teaching upon the small group of faithful men, realizing that the masses as yet could not become the instrument of the realization of God's purpose for the world. There was always the saving remnant which could be used by God, a nation within a nation. This idea of the Church as a remnant of faithful and enthusiastic people is one which the Church needs to reconsider to-day, though it would have a serious bearing upon her financial position. Not a full church of loosely attached people who like the preaching, warmth or music, nor the indiscriminate baptism of almost all the babies born in the parish, are indexes of the Church's effectiveness in the modern world, but rather the determination of the intelligent minority at the centre of her life, however small that minority be.

Alan Richardson, *The Redemption of Modernism.*

My father read widely. He had two heroes, Robert Burns and Sir Walter Scott. He revered them. To hear them called "Rabbie" and "Wattie" made him grue. The poems and songs of Robert Burns he knew by heart. His philosophy he regarded as the universal message to mankind. Robert Burns he compared with the Psalmist David.

"Men o' the soil they were, my cullan, and of the open field; where secrets are as fully revealed by a drap o' dew on a blade o' grass as by the limitless constellations o' the heavens. They were baith singers an' they

were baith sinners, wi' the same sinning. They were baith members o' a race that was faur doon the brae, an' by each o' them was the nation set high amang the nations o' the world. An' the baith o' them, in raising their ain people, spak' tae the world. One cam' to be the national King o' the Jews an' the ither the national hero o' the Scots. If ye learn the Psalms o' David and the poems o' Robert Burns, ye'll hae a thocht ready for every incident, grave or gay, that may come to ye in life."

DAVID KIRKWOOD, *My Life of Revolt.*

Throughout the history of Christianity the conception of the Communist society in which property is held in common for the needs of all, and in which brotherhood, equality and freedom are the governing principles of social organization, has emerged time and again. There is nothing surprising in this, if our account of Christianity is at all near the truth. Such a society is implied directly in the teaching of Jesus, and its characteristics are described in the New Testament in many places with a clearness of statement that could hardly be misunderstood. What is surprising is that the first great secular effort to establish such a society has been undertaken in direct opposition to Christianity by men for whom the profession of atheism is a cardinal point in their creed. It is surprising, at least to minds which have not yet recognized the dialectical nature of social development. We have seen, however, what it means. Christianity is the source of Communism, and Communism has moved into dialectical opposition to Christianity through the process by which Christianity in its conscious form has been divorced from material realities. A Christianity which withdrew its beliefs from association with the temporal reality of earthly life must inevitably produce out of itself a temporal theory which divorces itself from the eternal and spiritual reality. The clear separation of these not merely as opposing theories but as antagonistic forces in the field of social development is the necessary prelude to their synthesis in a Christianity which has become real at the full height of its mature development. The separation of Communism and Christianity into conscious antagonism means that the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand.

JOHN MACMURRAY, *Creative Society.*

The rediscovery of the art of Greece awakened the medieval spirit to the artistic spontaneity of the Renaissance, which in turn led to the rediscovery of the religious spontaneity of Jesus in the Reformation. From that moment the vast tissue of prejudice which was called Christianity was doomed. The process of its disintegration was gradual, and is not even yet complete—though nearing its completion. For in the spheres of religion and art the Reformation was a negative and destructive movement; the continuous disruption of Protestantism into sectarian fragments which enfeebled themselves by their struggle with one another for universal authority is the major effect of its historical development. The one creative achievement of the Reformation was science and the scientific spirit. Science is thus the legitimate child of a great religious movement, and its genealogy goes back to Jesus. In its true sense, science is the one proper, positive expression of Christianity that the world has yet seen. The rest of modern culture—its art, morality, and religion—is simply the disrupted remnants of the pseudo-Christianity of the medieval world. That is why the newly awakened pagan world clutches at our science while scorning our culture, though the awakening itself is largely the effect of Christian missions with their destructive power over sham faiths.

JOHN MACMURRAY, *Reason and Emotion.*

CURRENT LITERATURE.

"Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider."—FRANCIS BACON.

"A good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life."—JOHN MILTON.

(The place of publication is London and the date 1935 *unless otherwise stated.)*

The Fate of Man in the Modern World. By NICOLAS BERDYAEV. S.C.M. 3s. 6d.
Freedom and the Spirit. By NICOLAS BERDYAEV. Centenary Press. 12s. 6d.

We have long known that we must tackle M. Nicolas Berdyaev, but glances at his books have made us shrink from the task, much as we have been drawn to a writer exiled by both Tsarist and Bolshevik rulers of Russia. We began with the slighter work first, and were soon constrained to ask whether M. Berdyaev was the bearer of a new revelation or merely used a strange idiom. Clearly he comes from a different *milieu* from the average writer : even his authorities are strange; how many of our College Professors could identify these six— Jouhandeau, Malraux, Celine, Tiutchev, Heidegger, Jaspers—quoted in the first forty pages? M. Berdyaev does not make it easier for the reader by frequent references to his own works. Often we feel he has really something vital to say without seeing exactly what it is. What is "a judgment upon history", or "the failure of history"? What does this mean?

> History needed man as its material, but has not recognized him as her purpose.

Or this?

> The economism of the capitalist world recognizes spirit as an epiphenomenon of economics.

Certainly this is far from being easy, but it is child's play compared with the larger work, in which our author, describing himself as a Christian theosophist, expresses the hope that he will be clearly understood, and then begins :

> We have lost all confidence in the possibility and fruitfulness of an abstract metaphysic. For abstract metaphysics are based upon the hypostasizing of the phenomena of man's psychic life and of the material world, or still more of the categories of thought, that is to say, of the world of ideas.

This indicates at once that the reader, especially if he be not a philosopher, is likely to have a strenuous time. And so he is, for the chapter on "The Freedom of the Spirit" begins

> Spirit is freedom unconstrained by the outward and the objective, where what is deep and inward determines all,

and that on "The Church of the World" with

> Is the Church an ontological reality?

And yet it would be foolish to suggest that all the book is of this nature. Take this paragraph :

> The freedom of the spirit presupposes a kindling of the spirit, but such a kindling is not often met with nor is it on this that human

societies are usually based. Morality, custom, and society generally become enfeebled, and their very crystallization is due to the quenching of the fire of the spirit. Man can get on without freedom, and the demand for spiritual liberty which is the cause of so much tragedy and suffering in life is not a human but a divine claim. It is not man but God who cannot get on without human freedom. God demands from man the freedom of the spirit, for He only wants the man who is spiritually free. The divine plan for man and for the world cannot become incarnate apart from the freedom of man and the freedom of the spirit. Human freedom has as its foundation the demands of the divine Will.

The chapters not already mentioned deal with "Spirit and Nature", "Symbol, Myth, and Dogma", "Revelation and Faith", "Redemption and Evil", "God, Man, and the God-Man", "Mysticism and the Way of the Spirit", "Theosophy and Gnosis", and "Spiritual Development and the Eschatological Problem". Altogether the reader gets the impression that amid a whirl of words there is real meaning. As he stumbles along there often comes a revealing flash which lights up the gloom. Probably he will at times dissent where he understands, but generally he will long for some expounder who will condense and clarify and systematize what the Russian philosopher has to say. EDITOR.

Studies in the Book of Ezekiel. By JOHN BATTERSBY HARFORD. Cambridge Press. 7s. 6d.

At the present time, no *O.T.* book is attracting more attention from *O.T.* scholars than *Ezekiel*. It was for long regarded as exceptional in its unity of authorship, but in recent years serious objections to this have been raised, and widely different theories have been offered to explain the data on which they are based. The chief difficulties are the diversity of the section dealing with the reconstruction of the temple, *etc.* (40, ff) from the rest, the inconsistencies both in this and in other parts of the book, including the whole relation to the Law, and the ascription of prophecies largely concerning Judah and Jerusalem to a prophet supposed to be living in Babylon. Herrmann met these in a conservative way by supposing that Ezekiel, later in life, himself worked over his earlier prophecies. Hölscher drastically separated Ezekiel as the author, chiefly, of a few poems, from prose-writers of a century or two later, to whom the greater part of the present book belongs. Torrey maintains the general unity, but supposes that a priestly writer of the third century wrote in the guise of a prophet of Manasseh's time (7th century), and that his work was subsequently edited in support of the (false) theory of a Babylonian exile. James Smith thinks that the prophecies were actually composed in Manasseh's time, but by a north Israelite writing in north Israel. Herntrich argues for prophecies uttered in Jerusalem, which were subsequently given a Babylonian framework by an exilic editor, whilst 40, ff. are post-exilic.

Canon Battersby Harford, in his very useful book, has done for the criticism of *Ezekiel* what he did for that of the Pentateuch in his *Since Wellhausen*. He has brought the ordinary student of the *O.T.* up to date by outlining the views indicated above, and critically discussing the grounds for them. His own conclusion is that the prophecies dealing with evil practices at Jerusalem were uttered there shortly before the fall of the city; to the same author belong the allegories and symbolic acts, and probably the prophecies of restoration (34-37), these being uttered in captivity. All these prophecies were gathered and edited by an exilic disciple, to whom the nucleus of the later chapters is due.

The second half of Dr. Harford's book concerns the scholar only, and gives a detailed examination of the phrase, "the house of Israel," to show that it can refer to the southern Kingdom (against James Smith), and a more detached study of the double divine name in *Ezekiel,* and of its relation to the usages in the Septuagint. His book will be widely used as a source of information, whether or not his own reconstruction finds acceptance, and his patient work deserves our gratitude.

H. Wheeler Robinson.

The Sources of the Second Gospel. By A. T. Cadoux. Clarke. 6s.

That it is possible for a working minister to put out literary work of the first quality and to make a real contribution to scholarship, is abundantly proved by the appearance of this study, even if it had not been proved by other works from the same pen. We have long been familiar with the probability that some of our *N.T.* epistles are really made up of two or more letters (*e.g., 2 Cor.*) and with the certainty that the Gospels of *Mt.* and *Lk.* were compiled out of earlier written materials. It has even been debated that *Mk.* used the hypothetical "Q", and while opinion has gone against an Ur-Marcus there has been a good deal of support for a Proto-Luke. These considerations may help to break the shock of a suggestion that *Mk.* is a compilation of three earlier gospels, which were written respectively about 40 for Peter's mission in Palestine, about 50 for Paul's Gentile mission, and about 66-70 for work among the dispersed Jewish Christians. Ed. Meyer had postulated two Aramaic written sources for a part of the Gospel, but Dr. Cadoux goes further. The great merit of the book, which will repay the closest study, even though there may be hesitation here and there especially on points of detail, is that it provides a necessary corrective to the conclusions to which an exaggerated use of the *formgeschichtliche* method seems to be tending (as in Dibelius's *Gospel Criticism and Christology* and R. H. Lightfoot's Bampton Lectures), and helps to strengthen the belief so ably contended for by the late F. C. Burkitt, that we have in *Mk.* "the outline of the features of a real personality and a real career".

After stating the problem, Dr. Cadoux gives the evidence for his three sources and sets out the three texts. He then discusses in detail their respective characteristics and enumerates a number of "gains for history" that result from his reconstruction. That his hypothesis should receive very careful attention is only just, in virtue both of the importance of the subject and of the meticulous thoroughness of its author's treatment. He knows the best that has been done in this field, and he is himself a labourer of no ordinary understanding and insight.

Alex. J. Grieve.

The Letter of Aristeas. By H. G. Meecham. Manchester Univ. Press. 12s. 6d.

In the early part of the first century B.C. an Alexandrian Jew, borrowing the name of a Greek historian, wrote a "letter" to "Philocrates" purporting to give a contemporary account of the translation of the Pentateuch into Greek; he says that the translation was made by 72 elders sent to Egypt by the high-priest in Jerusalem at the request of Ptolemy Philadelphus, who was interested in Jewish antiquities and wished to show kindness to his many Jewish subjects.

This "letter" is obviously unauthentic, but it has considerable interest for the light it throws on Palestinian and Egyptian affairs in the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era, and on the opinions regarding the origin of the *LXX* held in the time of its real author. In its literary

form it is a good example of the Græco-Jewish epistolography which had a great vogue at the time, and as a specimen of *koine* Greek it has distinct linguistic value. It is this aspect to which Dr. Meecham has given his attention in the volume, which is a detailed linguistic examination of the Greek text very much on the lines of Moulton and Howard's invaluable *Grammar of N.T. Greek*. For the other matters (historical value, literary character, and teaching) we already have Dr. Meecham's Hartley Lecture of 1932. The present study by its comprehensiveness and conscientious workmanship assures its writer of a secure place in the little band of scholars who are experts in the Greek of the *N.T.* period.

ALEX. J. GRIEVE.

The New Testament Idea of Revelation. By E. F. SCOTT. Nicholson & Watson. 6s.

It might have been better if the author of this very readable book had called it "Some Aspects of the Biblical Concept of Revelation", for the first seventy pages are taken up with a general introduction and a survey of Revelation in the *O.T.* and the Apocalyptic literature. The *N.T.* evidence includes Jesus, Paul, and John, other writings being omitted as serving "only to supplement, and occasionally to obscure, the main Christian idea as set forth by the two outstanding teachers". One reader at any rate regrets the omission, which detracts from the comprehensive survey promised by the title.

Dr. Scott in his Preface says he has tried

> to keep clear of all theories which might lead him to impose some arbitrary construction on *N.T.* thought.

Yet one has the impression that Barthianism will keep on breaking in. For example: "Man's part in the knowledge of God is a wholly passive one"; "God has to bestow not only the knowledge but the capacity for it." And occasionally one feels that there is a sense of strain resulting in inconsistency.

It seems to me that Dr. Scott is at his best in passages like that on pp. 47 ff., a kind of excursus on the Hebrew concept of the Divine "Glory", or pp. 99f., where he discusses the Sermon on the Mount. Happily there are many such passages which will supply the preacher with raw material of the finest quality. There is a curious misprint ("Jer." for "John") at the foot of p. 142, and on p. 78 Celsus has leaped back into the "first" century.

It happened that when this book came to hand I was reading Dr. Edwyn Bevan's *Sibyls and Seers*. The two go very well together.

ALEX. J. GRIEVE.

Jesus Manifest. By DMITRI MEREZHKOVSKY. Translated from the Russian. Cape. 15s.

This book is a sequel to Mr. Merezhkovsky's *Jesus the Unknown*, reviewed here in April, 1934. The sequel resembles its predecessor in being furnished with a commendatory "Introduction" by Dean Inge, as also in its general style. It contains a series of highly-coloured and largely imaginative sketches of selected incidents in the life of Jesus from the Marriage at Cana to the Ascension. A collection of notes at the end of the book shows that the author has been at some pains to consult the best modern German and French works bearing on the life of Jesus.

Judged by the normal standards of scholarship and intelligibility, the work must be pronounced irritatingly incompetent. The author frequently

takes occasion to sneer at modern critics for what he calls their *rationalismus vulgaris*. Thus,

> To explain a miracle by common sense, *rationalismus vulgaris*, means the gladdening of foolish old devils and the grieving of wise children, the angels (such, presumably, as Mr. Merezhkovsky) . . . A miracle is like a living heart, to explain it is to strip it bare, to kill it.

Yet now and then he finds it necessary himself to be sceptical regarding Gospel-statements (for example, those concerning the multiplication of loaves and fishes, the cohort given to Judas in *Jn.* 18^3, Jesus's reply to Annas in *Jn.* 18^{20}, and the statement in *Lk.* 22^{61a}). In some such cases he has recourse to a puzzling distinction between "legend" and "mystery". With his great love of paradox, he repeats the assertion of his former volume that "the more the word of the Lord is incredible to us, the more authentic it is". These vagaries suffice to show that he possesses no sound canons of historical judgment as ordinarily understood.

Moreover, despite a great surface-show of learning, the book is marred by a veritable host of amazing blunders. The absurd form in which many of the references to ancient authorities are given in the notes strongly suggests that they have mostly been taken—and that blindly and carelessly—at second hand. (A few other errors in the references may possibly be due to the translator or the compositor). The pretence of scholarship is maintained by the quotation in the text of large numbers of Greek, Aramaic, and Hebrew words and phrases. No useful purpose is served by this device, for he who is acquainted with the ancient languages will not need them, and he who is not will be none the wiser. Indeed, there are so many mistakes in these foreign words, that the reader not acquainted with the languages will be even less wise than if they had been altogether omitted. The Greek words are sometimes printed in Greek characters, sometimes in English, without any apparent reason for the variation. Errors are numerous. Thus we are given *phronemeteroi* instead of *phronimoteroi, azim* for *azyma, chorubos* for *thorybos, doxasai* for *doxaso, ha* for *ta*. The Aramaic words have apparently been transcribed for the most part from Dalman's *Jesus-Jeshua*, yet they are frequently incorrect. For example, he speaks of "the Aramaic *bar nascha* (*bar enach* in Hebrew, *ben adam* in Daniel)", whereas *ben adam* is the Hebrew and does not occur in *Dan.*: *Dan.* has the indefinite Aramaic *bar enasch*, for which Mr. Merezhkovsky's *bar enach* is presumably intended, and of which the definite is *bar nascha*. *Isch*, he tells us, is the Aramaic for "man", whereas it is the Hebrew, not the Aramaic. *Schema', Yisrael*, appears as *scheem Isreel*. Similarly *saganims* is put for *seganim, ho hakha* for *la hakha, Shemone hezra* for *Shemone 'esra*, and so on. The names of Shiloh and Siloam are confused, and Mr. Merezhkovsky apparently thinks that *har habayit* (*i.e.*, "the Mountain of the House") means "the courtyard of the Gentiles". Among other elementary errors are "Antippa" for "Antipas", "Prienus" for "Priene", and "Tryphonius" for "Trypho".

The author naïvely tells us that the *Epistle of Barnabas* dates "from the time of the Apostolic Fathers". He gets over the difficulty of the Matthaean statement that Jesus rode on two asses (whereof the palpable explanation is that the author was thoughtlessly making the fulfilment of *Zech.* 9^9 more complete) by suggesting that the colt walked by its mother "in order to be a foot-rest for the Lord"! Here and there he shows true historical judgment: but material from the Apocryphal Gospels is freely introduced as if it were historically true, and a number of statements are made for which there is no historical evidence whatever (*e.g.*, that blood was shed by the disciples of Jesus when He cleared the Temple-courts). In

one place he prints an expanded beatitude, which the note candidly informs us is "My Apokryphon".

This list of oddities and inaccuracies could be very widely extended: but enough has been quoted to show that the author has no adequate equipment for writing a serious historical work, notwithstanding the great parade of indications to the contrary. The assertions on the dust-cover of the book that "he is an erudite theologian", and that "his interpretations are firmly based", are grave misstatements.

Has the book any definite contribution to make along other lines than those of historical enlightenment, by way, say, of spiritual insight? Here opinions will be bound to differ. Some doubtless will be captivated by the fervid devotional and mystical tone. One esteemed contemporary, I observe, says that

> no "life" of Jesus recaptures as does this the overtones of His personality—it is as though through the accent of the human Jesus, we could hear the wash of the tides of eternity.

My impression is different. To represent Jesus simply as a perpetual object of wonder is not necessarily to feel for Him that true reverence of which He Himself would have approved. As for a closer contact with eternity, that seems to me to require as its prerequisite far more faithfulness in "that which is least", the homely canons of common-sense on which the success of historical research depends, than is displayed in this book—with its over-heated imagination, its wild fancies, and its unintelligible references to Atlantis and the fourth dimension. No clear image emerges from the book as to precisely what Jesus was aiming at. Nor has Mr. Merezhkovsky at all grasped the significance of Jesus's most characteristic ethical teaching. With bitter emphasis he denounces the pacifist interpretation of Jesus's words, making much of "the scourge of the Lord" used in the temple-cleansing, treating the non-resistance sayings as being valid only at particular times, and calling for a campaign of vengeance against Russian communism as a sort of beginning of the Kingdom of God.

Dean Inge again suggests that

> it is quite possible that a semi-Oriental may help us westerners to see some things in the life of Christ more nearly as they actually were.

The abstract possibility or even (under certain conditions) probability of this help is of course not to be denied; but I cannot feel that it has been rendered, or indeed could be rendered, by one with the temperament, historical sense, and equipment of the author of this book.

C. J. Cadoux.

Christ for us and Christ in us. By Campbell N. Moody, M.A., D.D. Allen & Unwin. 3s. 6d.

The name of Dr. Campbell Moody would in itself command respect for anything coming from his pen; and, if on this account we come to this book with expectation, we shall not altogether be disappointed. There is a beautiful spirit in the little work, and it contains much ripe experience. But it only in part achieves its purpose, which is to simplify and illuminate the doctrine of the Atonement. The reason why Dr. Moody does not fully succeed in this task is that he is too much enslaved by the language and peculiar conceptions of the Pauline epistles. He is as David encumbered with Saul's armour. His Christian experience is leading him all the while towards a simpler view of the Atonement; and yet all the while he fails to reach it, because he falls back into Pauline phrases and ideas. St. Paul was a great religious genius, but his theology is not simple; and many of the

ideas which he uses belong to the first century A.D., and cannot be immediately transported into the twentieth. The only way to modernize Paulinism, and to draw out for our own time the rich content of Christian truth which it contains, is boldly to break the first century moulds of the Apostle's thought and express the content anew in quite other terminology. The attempt to follow St. Paul too closely results in an unreal Biblicism, which will treat different terms as standing for something different, even when it is clear that at bottom the experience represented is one and the same. Thus Dr. Moody writes:

> To rejoice that we are at peace with God is one experience; to cry "Abba, Father!" is another; to exclaim "I believe in the forgiveness of sins" is a third. To believe that, guilty as we are, Christ confesses our name before the Father, and God declares us righteous and good, this is yet another type of human experience.

The truth is, however, that Justification by Faith, Reconciliation, Adoption, and Forgiveness are all names for the same experience. Dr. Moody admits that this is in essence true; but nevertheless he wants to squeeze more out of the variety of Biblical terminology than is really contained in it. It is this literalism that prevents him in the end from really attaining that simple view of the Atonement which he seeks and often seems to be on the point of reaching.

The main point of the book, as the title indicates, is that what Christ does for us is not to be properly understood apart from what He does in us. In a word, what Christ does for us is never complete till it awakens in us the faith that makes us one with Him; nor is it intelligible till we see it in the light of this faith. This doctrine, when expressed in its simplest terms, seems to me to be precisely equivalent to the Abelardian or experiential doctrine that Christ by His death reveals to us the love of God and thereby kindles an answering love in our hearts. But Dr. Moody does not reach this simple statement because he cannot cut loose from Pauline terminology. He says, nevertheless, many true and good things, not all of them perhaps strictly consistent with each other, but all of them representing genuine and real reflection upon the great doctrine of which he writes. Moreover, while he uses the language of St. Paul, he is continually striving to rationalize the Pauline theology and make it more intelligible. To those who begin, as he does, with the assumption that a true evangelical theology must be stated in Pauline terms, the book may be a real help, in so far as it continually works from the language of St. Paul towards a simpler and more modern form of theology. If it stops half-way, it may at least carry them with it this half-way, and so bring them to a point where they may be prepared to go further, and so in the end reach a theology both evangelical and rational.

It may be worth while to add one thing more. Where Dr. Moody stops in his rationalization of St. Paul, he helps himself out by recognizing a paradox. It is a favourite method in much modern theology. But to rest in a paradox can never really be satisfactory. An apparent paradox is just a call to think further and more deeply, till the light shines through and the paradox is resolved into a statement luminous in its simplicity.

ROBERT S. FRANKS.

The Pain of This World. By M. C. D'ARCY, S.J. Longmans. 5s.

The problem of pain and suffering is one to which modern man is particularly sensitive. In this very interesting book the difficulty is approached from many sides. The work is written in the form of a dis-

cussion between men of very different mentalities: in it take part a philosopher, a scientist, an agnostic, a mystic, an artist, and a priest.

The *Times Literary Supplement* speaks of Father D'Arcy as possessing one of the acutest and most rigorous minds in this country. The judgment is amply justified by the present discussion, in which many arguments are elaborated and criticized, and all with a severe and exact logic. The publisher's advertisement rightly claims that the reader is left, not with a forced conclusion, nor with the real difficulties brushed aside, but with a vital grasp of the issues at stake.

The style is admirable, and the discussion is alive from start to finish. Many excellent points are made; and no intelligent and thoughtful person will read the book without profit. And yet at the end there is something very unsatisfying about the whole. Father D'Arcy himself puts his finger on the vulnerable spot, when he makes one of the speakers complain that the arguments adduced by the philosopher to meet the problem of pain are legal in character, while his method is that of special pleading. The philosopher, who is said to be a Catholic, is the reader of a paper discussed by all the rest present; and he bears throughout the brunt of the discussion, replying to objections, and bringing forward fresh arguments. He evidently stands for Father D'Arcy himself; and his contribution, together with a short addendum from the priest, constitutes the positive element in the book.

Both the strength and the weakness of this positive argument are a consequence of its scholastic character. Father D'Arcy is true to the spirit of the medieval scholasticism, which was at once so acute and so limited. Everywhere in his book the firm framework of Catholic dogma is implied; round which reason plays, but is never allowed to criticize. The reason of the schoolman is a reason which argues rigorously within certain presuppositions. Chief of these is the axiom that the rational idea of God is *ipso facto* different from that contained in the Christian faith. Hence the problem of the book is first dealt with by a reason thus limited; and then it is asked what fresh light the Catholic dogma can throw on the situation. But discussions from a limited point of view are always unsatisfactory, however rigorous the logic within the limits; nor is the defeat remedied by moving on *per saltum* to another point of view, and adding some fresh arguments from this standpoint. Truth (like the French Republic) is one and indivisible; and no really satisfactory conclusions can be reached by a philosopher who is also a Christian until his reason and his faith have amalgamated in one insight which is both rational and Christian. Only when led from the standpoint of such an insight can arguments have permanent value. Arguments from imperfect premises can never reach sufficient conclusions.

It is not implied that even from the best standpoint all the questions involved in the problem of pain can be solved: all that is maintained is that until it is reached, we are not in a position even to begin upon them.

ROBERT S. FRANKS.

History of Mediæval Philosophy. By MAURICE DE WULF. Vol. I. Longmans. 12s. 6d.

De Wulf's well-known *History of Mediæval Philosophy* needs no commendation at this time of day. Published originally in French in 1900 the book has passed through no less than six editions, and has established itself as a standard work upon its subject. With it and Gilson's admirable book, *La philosophie au Moyen Age*, the student is in a position to get as good a knowledge of medieval philosophy as can be had without a direct study of the original texts; though it should be added that nowhere is a

recourse to the originals more necessary. We are further in our mentality from the Middle Ages than we are from the classical period of Greek history; and this distance can only be fully overcome by a direct acquaintance with the medieval writers themselves. Nevertheless, the histories of De Wulf and Gilson form a most useful and indeed necessary introduction to such first-hand study.

The translation before us, by Mr. E. C. Messenger, is taken from the sixth and last French edition, which differs from its predecessors in that more of the fruits of original research by many scholars has been worked into it. Since attention has been directed during the last half-century to Medieval Philosophy, a great deal of fresh and unpublished material has been brought to view and investigated; so that the knowledge of this period to-day stands at a much higher level than it did during the nineteenth century. The different editions of De Wulf's book represent a progressive utilization of this increased knowledge.

The first volume of the English edition covers the ground from the first beginnings of medieval thought to the end of the twelfth century: thus, it breaks off just before the great age of Bonaventura, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus. When the second volume also appears, the English student will have in his hand a most excellent guide through the labyrinth of medieval thought; for in addition to the up-to-date and very clear account, based (as already explained) on the most recent research, there are also extremely full bibliographies, which will enable anyone to pursue his studies further in detail.

ROBERT S. FRANKS.

Our Heritage in Public Worship. By D. H. HISLOP, M.A. Clark. 10s.

If (which heaven forbid) there were a party in the Church of Scotland which called itself Scoto-Catholic, we should suppose that Mr. Hislop would be a member of it. This is said, not to accuse him of being a party man, but to indicate as briefly as may be the standpoint of this expanded version of the Kerr Lectures, 1933. Some Free Churchmen may think that is enough to absolve them from further concern with it. This would be a sad mistake—for at least two reasons. (1) It is an enrichment of mind and heart to "feel ourselves in" to the different (and often strange) modes of worship of our fellow-Christians. Mr. Hislop has the knowledge and understanding which make him an admirable interpreter. (2) He sets forth clearly and cogently what he sees to be the religious and psychological principles of Christian public worship, and indicates what he believes to be the right application of these principles to the worship of the Church in the modern world. Are his principles sound? If not, precisely in what respects do they err? To what practical applications do our conclusions lead us? Do they point to some of the author's which at first seemed most repugnant? Such questions urgently require thinking out thoroughly and adventurously, and in this book there is the historical knowledge, and the quality of mind and spirit, which make it an excellent basis for the enterprise. May it be widely read, pondered, digested, and criticized.

After two chapters dealing with the types and value of worship and the psychological factors in worship, there are thirteen treating respectively of *New Testament* worship and its development, worship in the Eastern Church and the Roman Church, the non-Roman Western Rites, Lutheran and Reformed worship, the Anglican *via media,* the Quaker Reconciliation, Eucharistic worship, weekly and daily worship, symbolism, prayer, and the declaration of the Word. Such is the sweep of a book written by a minister with a deep love of, and longing for, the Church Universal.

It is a pity the revision has not been more careful. The misprints are numerous, and we do not remember to have seen so many inaccuracies in the citation of book-titles. There are other lapses too, as where a famous saying of St. Augustine's is attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas. But the book is worth its money.

E. R. MICKLEM.

Kierkegaard. By E. L. ALLEN. Nott. 6s.

Sören Kierkegaard. By J. A. BAIN. S.C.M. 4s. 6d.

Contemporary German Philosophy. By WERNER BROCK. Cambridge Press. 6s.

It never rains but it pours. For a long time past a book in English on Kierkegaard has been a *desideratum*. Now within a few weeks of each other two have appeared, and with them has come a very sound appreciation of Kierkegaard's work in a study of modern German philosophy. Some years ago readers of the *Congregational Quarterly* were introduced to Kierkegaard in an article on him by Prof. H. R. Mackintosh, and on the continent he has long been regarded as a pioneer religious and philosophical thinker. Some of his writings greatly attracted P. T. Forsyth and some of his ideas are reproduced in the teaching of Karl Barth.

The three books before us are therefore very welcome, and taken together give the student a fair idea of the personality and work of one of the strangest and most tragic figures in the history of religious thought. Dr. Allen's book is the fuller and the more scholarly. Dr. Bain's is more popular and better suited, perhaps, to the younger generation. It is rendered the more valuable by a number of typical extracts from Kierkegaard's own writings and by a sketch of the condition of religion in Denmark in his day. Dr. Brock quite naturally brackets Kierkegaard with Nietzsche and regards this Danish seer as one of the formative influences on modern German thought. He calls him "the poet of religion", "one of the most remarkable psychologists of all time", and says, "If, after the war, German Protestant Christianity experienced an unexpected revival, it was above all due to the writings of Kierkegaard".

From these books, then, we may learn what manner of man Kierkegaard was and how deeply his work was affected by his training, temperament and fortunes. From a repressed boyhood dominated by a stern, melancholy, and rigidly orthodox father, he passed to a youth of rebellion and disillusionment. In his twenty-fifth year a change came.

> As he sat alone in the morning, the doors were broken down and Christ came in. Something entered from without or surged up from within to take possession of his whole being. The shoals and shallows of his existence up to that moment were submerged beneath a flood-tide of joy.

But the joy did not last. Soon he became engaged to Regine Olsen, but broke the engagement for reasons that are still obscure. He suffered horribly in making his loved one suffer, and the scars of it remained all his life through. From this time forth he went on his way a solitary and a rebel. A deep student of theology and philosophy, he felt that God had called him to the defence of a true Christianity, and that he could do this with the pen rather than in the active work of a parish. His literary output was enormous, and all his work is marked by subtle analysis, acute criticism, and a rich imagination. Some of his writing is purely devotional, and here perhaps he is seen at his best. But much of it is critical and polemical. He fought hard against Romanticism, on the one hand, and against Hegel and all his works, on the other. But he also fought against

the dull orthodoxy and conventional piety of the contemporary Danish Church. This brought him many enemies and he was rudely and bitterly attacked in a comic paper, *The Corsair*. It was characteristic that he should have made so much of this. It served to increase his sense of loneliness and his bitterness against his fellows. Against theologians like Martensen and ecclesiastics like Mynster he stood for a free ethical and sacrificial Christianity. His religion was always coloured by his own sufferings. This helps to explain the subjectivity of his approach to Christianity. Christianity, he argues, is a paradox, an intolerable burden to the mind, but a boon to simple faith. Its central fact is the Incarnation, which must be accepted as a venture of faith though the intellect rejects it. For there is an infinite qualitative difference between God and man, and between eternity and time. How Kierkegaard worked out these ideas and how they have emerged again in the theology and philosophy of modern Germany may be read in these three books. Those who were theological students fifty years ago and remember how Martensen was thrown at their heads may be glad to make acquaintance with one who refused to bow the knee to that Baal, while younger men will find much with which they can sympathize and from which they can learn in this man who was a rebel against convention and a slave of Jesus Christ.

W. B. Selbie.

Social Salvation. By John C. Bennett. Scribners. 6s.

This "Religious Approach to the Problems of Social Change" is both a sign of the times and a promise of the future. Men of "concern" in the United States are awakening from easy optimism to grim reality. They no longer live in a social Utopia, and the commercial paradise of a relatively brief tradition is now an outworn myth. They are facing the problems that older nations have had to face, and doing so unweighted by the half-solutions of an older heritage of thought. One is impressed in particular by the way in which the effects of war and economic collapse have suddenly become real and menacing, and are no longer conceived as due to European stupidity or crass national maladjustment.

Described as a theological preface to social action, Prof. Bennett's book is in fact an earnest effort to dig with a new spade down to the roots of the great human problems of our time as found in society. Its acuteness of thought is disguised by its simplicity of arrangement and the perspicuity of its analysis. Obviously, the author belongs to a group of relatively young men who have been stabbed awake by war and economic confusion, and who have been drawn to deal with the deepest problems of the partnership of God and man in making the world as it ought to be.

Prof. Bennett begins by cutting a cross-section through the half-truths which too often salve even Christian consciences. He shows that social evil is only partially due to personal sin, and therefore can be only partially alleviated by personal salvation. This solution, frequently offered by most eminent believers, and also by the Oxford Groups, is too facile, if only because social evil may be committed by sheer loyalty to established principles. The sins of the present generation play a part, but only one part, alongside such things as the congealed results of the sins of past generations, inertia in ideas and institutions, narrow loyalties, honest rationalizations of evil policies, and lack of imagination.

Analysing social salvation in the same fundamental fashion, Prof. Bennett shows the wrong of regarding social conditions as ethically neutral. Present tendencies are characterized by undue concentration of power both economic and political, by the de-personalization of society,

and the like. As a consequence, unconverted men in power can destroy any good—rather an overstatement perhaps—but social change can give the better elements a better chance. After pointing out the relevance of Jesus, he startles us by declaring that we can no longer speak of a Christian social order, that "the best we can hope for in this world will involve compromise with the ideal of Jesus", and that there are in fact two standards of morality, one for the individual and one for the group. The treatment of this subject is very fresh. The function of the Church is shown clearly in the discussion of war which the Church may perhaps not be able to prevent but which it can undercut. Similarly in regard to the economic struggle it can teach the basic ethical and religious principles, and make possible repentance for one's own share in specific social evils. "Politics is the way society makes its moral decisions; and the only known alternative to political action is revolution". The Church is in place here as a teacher and an inspiration.

Discussing the idea of progress, the author deals particularly with moral behaviour and human welfare. He makes excellent play with the cumulative influence of persons moved by faith and love, but might well have pointed out that this is really as effective, though not so obvious, as the cumulative heritage of progress in science and knowledge generally. But his argument can stand by itself and he rises to great eloquence:

> The great Prophets of Israel are still a power in the world although the kings have only historical interest. . . Paul has more power to-day than all the Roman Emperors. . . Out of the sixteenth century, it is Luther, Calvin, and Galileo who still have power, and not Charles V nor Leo X.

The real problem of evil is the unequal distribution of divine grace, especially as seen in the incapacity of many souls to meet evil unspoiled.

After a penetrating discussion of the limitations of Providential action in the world, we learn how God really does work in society. There is present a power which makes for the greatest good of our increasing oneness; a process of persuasion in history, society, and nature; a process of judgment by which evil is its own nemesis and violence self-defeating, for "Men cannot combine both violence and persuasion"; a process of healing making it "possible for the common man to endure the unendurable" (a fine passage).

Thus we come to an incisive, but all too brief, consideration of the work of God and the responsibility of man. The hope for the future is not that God will triumph, no matter what men may do, but that we can work in harmony with the grain of the world. God does make unexpected combinations and gives the ultimate, though perhaps not the detailed, shape to society. Our confidence is drawn not from some eschatological faith, but from the fact that "the ideal and real are both on the side of peace and justice".

> It depends on us whether or not that new world is to come soon or late . . . and whether or not the persuasive process is powerful enough to prevent destructive catastrophes. . . It is the fate of the victims which is at stake when we accept or reject our responsibility in the social process.

The book must be read as a whole to appreciate the force of its exposition, the fairness of its statements, the balance of its judgments, and the comprehensiveness of its argument, but it seems plain that a new eagle is "unscaling her sight" to make ready for the noon-day.

BERTRAM LEE WOOLF.

SHORTER NOTICES AND DESCRIPTIVE LIST.

*(Books marked * are recommended for ministerial reading.)*

Dr. J. W. Coutts's *How to Use the Bible* (S.C.M., 1s. 6d.) is a book we wish could be put into the hands of all the students for whom it is written. After an introduction, "Why should we read the Bible?", Dr. Coutts takes half a dozen representative passages and expounds their meaning. The Rev. W. J. Ferrar's *The Purpose of the Old Testament* (S.P.C.K., 1s.) consists of three lectures delivered to day-school teachers in the Winchester Diocese. The Rev. Henry Balmforth is responsible for the School Clarendon edition of *Saint Luke* (Oxford Press, 2s. 6d.). *The Old Testament Omnibus Book* (Williams & Norgate, 6s.) is a collection of the great stories of the *O.T.* and the Apocrypha made by Miss A. C. Hannay, with an Introduction by George A. Birmingham. Sunday School teachers will find the Rev. W. J. Doidge's *Readings in the New Testament* (Ludgate Circus House, 1s.) very serviceable. It outlines a series of lessons on St. Paul. In the style well-known on platforms, Miss Wilhelmina Stitch writes *Women of the Bible* (Methuen, 5s.). She describes how she first spoke in public at Whitefield's Men's Meeting, London, her subject being "The Human Interest in the Old Testament."

The sound scholarship which has marked the many books written by Dr. W. O. E. Oesterley, both alone and in collaboration with Dr. G. H. Box or Dr. T. H. Robinson, is seen in *An Introduction to the Books of the Apocrypha* (S.P.C.K., 10s. 6d.). While ignorance of the Apocrypha is general, it is perhaps more marked in the Free Churches than in the Roman and Anglican communions. The Puritan objection to the reading of the Apocryphal books in worship is perhaps responsible, while, if memory serves, little attention is paid to them in theological colleges. Ministers and others will have no excuse for unfamiliarity with this most interesting collection of books now that Dr. Oesterley has made the way easy for them. After 130 pages of "Prolegomena" (particularly valuable they are) the books are taken one by one and discussed under the headings "Title," "Contents," "Historicity," "Text and Versions," "Date," and "Literature." A book which should be on the shelves of every student of the Bible.

Gospel Tradition and Christology (Nicholson & Watson, 4s. 6d.) contains five lectures delivered by Dr. Martin Dibelius at King's College, London, in October, 1934. They present the now familiar facts of *Formgeschichte,* and their conclusion may be stated in the words :

> The individual pericopae were pearls put together to form a string. This was done in the preaching. The Christological teaching and preaching of the first communities is the thread which holds them together, and makes their existence explicable.

Dr. J. A. Findlay's *A Portrait of Peter* (Hodder, 5s.) suffers, we think, because it is never clear for whom it is written : at many points, with its references to Aramaic and form-criticism, it seems to have scholars in view; then we have simple explanations which suggest the general reader; and the last chapter seems to be written for ministers. Dr. Findlay's treatment of the most attractive, because the most human, of the disciples, is full of flashes of insight, but at times there are modern phrases that amuse —Jesus "is not asked to address the meeting"—and exaggerations, perhaps resulting from the vividness of Dr. Findlay's impressions of Palestine : nobody who has seen the Grand Canyon will think that the Sea of Galilee, the Jordan Valley, and the Dead Sea "make the deepest rift on the surface

of the planet." They are unique in some ways, as Dr. G. A. Smith insists, but not "deepest rift," surely.

Why Do Men Suffer? (S.C.M., 5s.) has the strength and the weakness of all the Rev. L. D. Weatherhead's writing—fervour and sentiment, apt illustrations and rather cheap humour. If there is much quotation—much too much—nevertheless Mr. Weatherhead gives us some gems from his commonplace book; indeed, a couple of sentences from Dr. Maltby and a prayer for animals are among the best things in the volume. We do not think Mr. Weatherhead is a good apologist—he assumes far too much; but anybody who starts out with his assumptions will almost certainly be helped by his discussion. We do wish he would get out of some bad habits: quoting from his own books, for example, or "fine writing": how it repels to read that by the bedside of suffering men and women "I have seen the gleam of a golden secret."

The Rev. McEwan Lawson is doing good service in the way of popular apologetics, to which *Adventure and Discovery* (S.C.M., 3s. 6d.) is his latest contribution. True, indeed, Mr. Lawson's picturesque similes are sometimes far-fetched and more amusing than convincing, his citations, *etc.*, are not always accurate (*Denny* for *Denney* is a significant slip), and his defence of Christianity will not always satisfy the critic. But his book is alive, it deals with central questions, and it cannot but do good, if only people, especially young people, will read it. Mr. Lawson will start them thinking, and that in itself is no mean achievement.

The Power To See It Through (S.C.M., 6s.) contains 25 more sermons by Dr. H. E. Fosdick. While preaching is so earnest and virile there is no need to be despondent about the place and the future of the pulpit.

Miss Helen Wodehouse, formerly Principal of Bingley Training College and now Mistress of Girton, has printed in *Temples and Treasuries* (Allen & Unwin, 5s.) addresses given in these two Colleges and also some pleasing verses, "The Road Through the Mountains" (Ignatius, *c.*115). The sermons are thoughtful and searching, and would no doubt be helpful to those who listened to them; they are typical of the times in having little of doctrine or of dogmatic statement.

St. Thomas Aquinas on the Blessed Sacrament and the Mass (Pepler & Sewell, 5s.) is translated by the Rev. F. O'Neill. We scarcely think that the ordinary layman, for whom it is intended, will be able to make much of it.

The final volume of *The Complete Works of St. John of the Cross* (Burns, Oates, 15s.) is now issued. It contains "Living Flame of Love," both redactions, "Spiritual Sentences and Maxims," and letters and documents illustrating his life. Prof. E. Allison Peers has rendered fine service to learning by this modern and annotated translation. His edition, it is safe to say, will be the one always used by English scholars in future.

Two Roman Catholic books on the Virgin Mary are Cardinal Lepicier's *Behold Thy Mother* (Burns, Oates, 3s. 6d.) and Fr. Louis Perroy's *The Humble Virgin Mary* (Burns, Oates, 3s. 6d.), "Thoughts on the Mysteries of Her Life," which is translated from the French.

Canon H. R. L. Sheppard's *Some of My Religion* (Cassell, 3s. 6d.) reprints weekly articles from the *Sunday Express*. They are popular, frank, and often stirring and searching; if sometimes the illustrations are chestnuts they are usually *apropos*, and the articles will certainly have succeeded in influencing many non-churchgoing people of whom Canon Sheppard has the ear.

Dedicated to "Mary, Mother of the Mystical Body," Dr. Fulton J. Sheen's *The Mystical Body of Christ* (Sheed & Ward, 7s. 6d.) is a lucid exposition of the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Church. It would be well for Free Churchmen to read the book, for it would remind them of features in the life of the Church they have neglected. They will, however, resent Dr. Sheen's statements that the need for Roman exposition of the doctrine is urgent because "Protestantism in great part has ceased to be Christian," "our separated brethren" no longer being as dependable in regard to "the fundamental dogmatic truths of Christianity, such as the Divinity of Christ" as they were 50 years ago, or in regard to

> the basic principles of the moral law, such as the evil of sin, eternal sanctions, and the sanctity of the marriage bond

as they were 25 years ago!

Dr. Micklem's *The Church Catholic* (S.C.M., 1s. 6d.) contains three addresses and an article, all of them dealing with the relations between the Churches. In two of them, addressed to Anglicans, Dr. Micklem obviously enjoyed himself. How far either Anglicans or Free Churchmen will accept his suggestions remains to be seen. In the light of Dr. Micklem's words, "We recognize the enormous advantage of the Roman communion in the struggle for the soul of Germany," it is interesting to record that a German Roman Catholic who has held high office in the State said not long ago that religion was being kept alive in Germany by the persecuted Protestant Churches.

The Rev. Alan Richardson's **The Redemption of Modernism* (Skeffington, 2s. 6d.) is an important little book, whose value is out of all proportion to its size. Mr. Richardson's analysis of the state of organized religion is thorough and searching; he goes to the root of things, and is never diverted by glib phrases or expedients. He says:

> To continue to hold an old-fashioned theology based on a pre-war approach to New Testament criticism is surely for Modernists of all people a sin against the light.

And not in theology alone, for the Church is in danger of worldliness when it cuts down the stipends of junior clergy and prevents their marriage while allowing its higher clergy to "live like lords." He sees the need for radical changes in the methods and outlook of the Church to which he belongs, and urges that

> Christianity, if it is to be relevant in the life of the world to-day, must be understood and taught as a way of life rather than a way of thought.

The quotations under "Worth Noting" will show the nature of Mr. Richardson's handling of his subject.

The Rev. T. W. Pym's *Our Personal Ministry* (S.C.M., 4s.) is "a book for the clergy as consultants and advisers." The book is written in the Anglican idiom, and occasionally there are suggestions which seem altogether remote from the matter in hand. Thus, for hearing confessions:

> The priest is robed in cassock, surplice and violet stole: if black stole or scarf alone is used, that, of course, will do.

"A heart at leisure from itself, To soothe and sympathize" is infinitely more important. Nevertheless, there is much sound commonsense in the book, though it is rather scrappy; the stress on the need for the ministry to individuals rejoices our hearts. It is only by this kind of service that the Church can do its work. The sections on "Preparation for Marriage" are good and should be read by all ministers.

Before his death 35 years ago F. W. H. Myers arranged to communicate with his friends still in the flesh. Miss Geraldine Cummins, in *The Road to Immortality,* has already given us communications received by her in a trance and alleged to come from him. *Beyond Human Personality* (Nicholson & Watson, 6s.) is a second volume, Sir Oliver Lodge vouching for Miss Cummins and commenting on the likeness of the papers to Myers's work. In a sitting of Sir Oliver with Miss Cummins, Myers encouraged the scientist to continue his studies of the ether. The communications—on the nature of life after death, existence on the stars, prayer, *etc.*—leave us quite cold.

The "head-line" touch about the title of Mr. Rom Landau's *God is My Adventure* (Nicholson & Watson, 10s. 6d.) is maintained throughout the book—illustrations and letterpress alike. The book is said to be the result of fifteen years' search for the truth; it is pure journalism, and rather gives the impression of being "written up" in fifteen days! Those of whom Mr. Landau writes have all something of the *poseur* about them; some of them are obviously quacks, and if others do possess esoteric knowledge it has scarcely percolated down to the average student, who, we imagine, will be surprised to learn that

> the mysterious Gurdjieff and the Parsee Shri Meher Baba have both had many followers in England.

Keyserling, Stefan George, Bô Yin Râ, Rudolf Steiner, Krishnamurti, Shri Meher Baba, Pastor George Jeffreys, Frank Buchman, P. D. Ouspensky, and Gurdjieff are Mr. Landau's subjects, the sketch of Pastor Jeffreys being sympathetic, that of Dr. Buchman critical. We doubt if the average searcher will get much help from this strange amalgam of east and west, *yoga* and anthroposophy, and all the rest. It is amazing, too, how the doctors disagree, Steiner's rigid scheme, with its human changes at the ages of 7, 14, 21, *etc.*, and his seed-sowing 48 hours before full moon, contrasting with Krishnamurti's doctrine that nothing can be learnt from experience, no two situations being alike. And it is flattering, though woefully inaccurate, to learn from Mr. Landau that sex counts for little in England.

Herr René Fülöp-Miller's *Leaders, Dreamers, and Rebels* (Harrap, 18s.) is a piece of book-making, and a huge book it is. It purports to be "An Account of the Great Mass-Movements of History and of the Wish-Dreams That Inspired Them", the argument being that the power of dreams must be added to material and spiritual forces for the interpretation of history. What these wish-dreams are it is difficult to discover. First we have "Dread", under which we learn about taboos; flagellants; Calvin and Puritanism; Cromwell, Witches, Hell, the Devil, Purgatory; Judaism; the Cathari; the Church Fathers; John Knox; and much else. That is the first section only of the book; the other sections are entitled "Masters of Promise"; "Seeds of the Rights of Man"; "The Burial-Ground of Reason"; "Earthly Harmony"; "The Dream of Great Magic"; "Propitiated Fate". Readers of this journal, being intelligent persons, may be able to guess some of the subjects discussed under these heads, but nobody in the world could guess them all. And even the skill of Eden and Cedar Paul has not been able to turn the German into readable English.

In short, there is little that is right about the book; the bibliography is the best part of it. Many of the illustrations are irrelevant, and some disgusting. The author may know something about Bolshevism and about the Jesuits, but here, in roving over all time and space, he often talks of that of which he knows nothing. We give but one extract:

> The Presbyterian minister luxuriates in the detailed description of these horrors. Every word is carefully chosen to arouse the extremity of fear . . . . As the preacher warms to his work hell follows upon hell . . . . Stiff with dread sit the members of the congregation, glued to their seats, paralysed with alarm, breathless and in a cold sweat. Such sermons last for hours, as long as the minister's strength holds out . . . .
>
> The fear of hell follows the Scot home to his fireside. At every hour of the day and the night he feels that the Devil is at his heels, ready to seize him in fiery talons. There is no escape . . . . Thus their whole existence becomes a never-ending sacrifice to primal dread; they live in outer darkness, where there are weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth.

For this there is only one word, a word of five letters beginning with "t", which must not be used in the sedate pages of this journal.

Carlo von Kügelen's *The Whited Sepulchre* (Lutterworth Press, 3s. 6d. & 2s.) is a translation of a narrative of the sufferings of the late "Pastor Kern," an Evangelical Pastor in Russia. It is a tragic story of one imprisoned for "agitation," of his experiences at the hands of the OGPU (he was kept for many days and nights without sleep to make him "confess") and the "bandits" (criminal prisoners). It is a tale of horror and heroism, brutality and devotion, which wrings the heart.

The Netherlands Indies (World Dominion Press, 5s. & 3s. 6d.) is an admirable addition to the "World Dominion Survey Series," and one which will be of great use in this country, where comparatively little is known of the extent of missionary work in this island world. Four leaders of the missionary world of Holland have co-operated in the volume, which, with its excellent maps and detailed statistics, will long be the standard work of reference on the subject.

In the same series is *Religion in The Republic of Mexico* (5s.), by Mr. Kenneth G. Grubb and Mr. G. Baez Camargo. Probably no Englishman knows more about religion in South America than Mr. Grubb, and he has enriched the survey with pictures similar to those which have marked his South American books. There are only 584 organized local churches with 44,113 communicants in a population of over 17,000,000.

The "moral challenge" which Mr. C. F. Andrews presents in *India and Britain* (S.C.M., 5s.) is in dialogue form; half-a-dozen Oxford students, Indian and British, take part. The method works out well, and conveys much information about the Indian situation. The book deserves a wide circulation.

In *The Martyr Church and its Book* (L.M.S., 6d.) the Revs. J. A. Patten and E. Shillito tell the story of the persecution of Christians in Madagascar. The illustrations are a feature of the book.

Mr. Basil Mathews's *Consider Africa* (Livingstone Press, 2s.) gives some idea of the manifold problems the great and rapidly changing continent presents to the world, and not least to the Church. It is written in the vivid style of which Mr. Mathews is a master.

The Rev. J. J. Cooksey's *The Serious Aspect of the Abyssinian Situation* (New Mildmay Press, 1s.) points out the danger to missionary enterprise in the Italian attack on Abyssinian independence.

We have rarely been more agreeably surprised by a book than by the Rev. F. H. Drinkwater's *Religion in School Again* (Burns, Oates, 5s.). A Roman Catholic reprint of papers on education written between 1926 and

1934 did not promise much, but Mr. Drinkwater not only writes well; he is an enthusiast, and obviously a good teacher. The result is a book brimful of interest, and alive at every point. Of course, it is out-and-out Romanist (there is an astounding page on the Roman Church and history), and blatant in its demand for public money for sectarian teaching, but the mingled zeal and commonsense with which Mr. Drinkwater writes of the teaching of religion set an example to Protestants. Much can be learnt, too, about the use of catechisms in teaching, about Montessori methods, and story-telling; it is clear that the Roman Church will spare no effort to hold its young.

If the Revs. F. G. Baring and G. J. Ince, the authors of *The Catholic Faith in Public Schools* (Williams & Norgate, 4s. 6d.), had addressed themselves to the question "How can we win public schoolboys for Christ?" they would have been a help to many. It is, however, "churchmanship" of a particularly narrow type for which they stand, the type which talks of "episcopal contumacy," and writes

> So successfully has Protestantism poisoned the wells of spiritual devotion, that many of our Public Schools . . . are definitely frustrating the progress and extension of God's Kingdom.

The Bishop of Bradford, whose Anglo-Catholicism has become more pronounced since he reached the Episcopal Bench, sets the tone by a Foreword in which he says:

> The Church suffers in order that Nonconformist or pagan schoolboys and their parents shall not be offended.

Personality in the Making (N.A.S.U., 2s. 6d. & 1s. 6d.), the Adult School Handbook for 1936, keeps up the very high standard which has been set. The lessons cover a very wide range—the *New Testament,* Law and Convention, Public Opinion, Unemployment, and The International Outlook. This is no means the whole course, and in addition Mr. John Drinkwater's play *X = O* is printed; the volume is wonderful value. This year's lessons are not dated, but 66 lessons altogether are given.

In *Victories of Peace* (S.C.M., 2s. 6d.) Misses D. M. Gill and A. M. Pullen tell ten "stories of friendship in action," which teachers, Scout and Guide leaders, *etc.,* will find of service. The incidents related belong to modern times.

The Rev. William Cross's *The Carpenter's Shop in Nazareth* (Independent Press, 2s. 6d.) contains 23 talks to boys and girls, all of them based on the tools used in the carpenter's shop.

The Methodist Church is certainly to be congratulated on the activity of its Sunday School Department. We have just received the notes on the Sunday School Lessons for 1936. These are in the capable hands of Mr. Ernest H. Hayes, in collaboration with Dr. Newton Flew in the *Beginners' Notes* (2s. 6d.), *Junior Notes* (3s. 6d.), and the *Intermediate Notes* (3s. 6d.), and with Dr. H. G. Meecham in the *Morning Notes* (2s. 6d.), and *Primary Notes* (3s. 6d.). Dr. Flew also collaborates in the *Senior Quarterly Notes* (9d.).

The Rev. J. E. Keith Flint's *Church Membership* (Independent Press, 2s. 6d.) is "A Handbook for Ministers, Teachers and Members, and for use in Preparation Classes." It is a thoughtful little book which all Congregational ministers ought to read, but which has its message for others as well.

The lectures in Sir R. W. Livingstone's **Greek Ideals and Modern Life* (Oxford Press, 6s.) are as delightful to read as they are sensible and

thought-provoking. Sir Richard pleads for Greek studies for no less reason than that they are indispensable to the spiritual life of our civilization. In an age when men have "exchanged the certainty of faith for a twilight of opinion," a clear and accepted view of life, a spiritual unity, is necessary. This theme is developed in lectures on "The Growing Influence of Hellenism," "Greek Humanism," "Humanism in Politics and Economics," "The Age of Plato : An Analogy," and "Christianity and Hellenism." Get and read this book; you will not regret it.

If Shakespeare's religion be a matter of conjecture and debate, how shall we be sure what was the religion of Virgil? Mr. Cyril Bailey's *Religion in Virgil* (Oxford Press, 15s.) starts out by acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing between belief and interest, acceptance and understanding. It is concerned, however, not so much with the poet's personal religion as with the contents of his poems, with a view to discovering how far they represent the beliefs of their day. Students of the history of religion will find Mr. Bailey's lectures of great service, for they examine in turn magic, omen, and prophecy; the old Italian religion; the State-cult; the Græco-Roman gods; Oriental gods; Emperor-worship; Fate, the dead and the underworld. That Virgil was himself religious is perhaps sufficiently indicated by the line,

Sunt lacrimæ rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt,

but Mr. Bailey holds not merely that in *Æneid* vi we have his convictions about the after-life, but that he expounds a religion which "looks to ultimate triumph through sacrifice and suffering."

Thorough knowledge, skill in exegesis, and a spirit sensitive to spiritual values are the marks of an important book.

Mr. Hendrik Van Loon's books are always unlike any others, and we have nothing but commendation for *Ships, and How They Sailed the Seven Seas* (Harrap, 10s. 6d.). With abundant and characteristic illustrations Mr. Van Loon shows the development of the ship, from the dug-out to the ocean greyhound. Landsmen will learn much—the difference between clinker and carvel, what "a vessel of 100 tons" means, the names of sails, the nature of life on galleys and clippers, about punishments, ships' surgeons, and 101 other things. We cannot imagine a better book for a Christmas present for a boy keen on ships. Mr. Van Loon is emphatic that a sailor's life was

> nothing but one unending and gruelling record of misery and pain, and hunger and thirst, and bodily abuse, a plain slice of hell on earth,

though conditions have improved more during the last 40 years than in the previous 40,000 ! It is strange to find a Dutchman passing "Calvanistic."

"Your policemen are wonderful!" So they are, and their story is told in Mr. Alwyn Soames's *The English Policeman, 871-1935* (Allen & Unwin, 7s. 6d. & 5s.). Fifty pages are found sufficient to reach the Stuarts, with no mention of Dogberry and Verges. Later the Fieldings arrive, and then Peel, and famous magistrates and detectives, and a gentleman who within two pages is Monro, Monto, Munro, and Monro again. The sketch is rather scrappy, but it improves as it goes along.

Dr. Maldwyn Edwards's *After Wesley* (Epworth Press, 7s. 6d.), a continuation of his *John Wesley and the 18th Century,* is "A Study of the Social and Political Influence of Methodism (1791-1849)", and therefore covers much of the same ground as the Rev. E. R. Taylor's recently published *Methodism and Politics (1791-1851)*. The book surveys the development of Methodism from Toryism (Dr. Edwards points out that there is not a single Methodist protest against the Peterloo massacre) to Jabez

Bunting, leaving the subsequent approach to Hugh Price Hughes for another volume.

Miss Olive M. Griffiths's thesis *Religion and Learning* (Cambridge Press, 12s. 6d.) is called "A Study in English Presbyterian Thought from 1662 to the foundation of the Unitarian Movement." Miss Griffiths is to be complimented on her industry, though the historical sections give the impression of acquaintance with the usual printed works rather than with source-literature. It would be unfair, however, to judge the work on the historical sections (the fact that there is no mention of *Calamy Revised* is significant), for Miss Griffiths is concerned with Presbyterian thought rather than with persons or events, though to historians the chapter on "The Social Effects of the Clarendon Code" is the best thing in the volume. Under "Formative Influences," Miss Griffiths heads her chapters "England —The Breakdown of Aristotelianism," "Holland—The Relations between the Will and the Intellect," "Scotland—The Place of Reason in the Moral Life," and "Materialism in Contemporary Physiology and Psychology." Under "Development of Presbyterian Thought in the Eighteenth Century" she discusses "Arminianism"; "Arianism. The Right of Private Interpretation of the Scriptures"; "Arianism. Its Meaning and Influence," and "Socinianism." The thesis contains a mine of information and should be a great help to students.

In places Mr. David Williamson's *Religion in the King's Reign* (Pilgrim Press, 2s. 6d.) becomes almost a catalogue of names and societies, but even so it is surprising what his selection has omitted. To take one or two Congregational instances: the Brotherhood movement is mentioned without Smith and Wrigley, Congregational preachers without Leyton Richards (some quite inferior brethren are included !), and Congregational laymen without mention of most of the laymen who have served the denomination during the period—Sir Arthur Haworth, Messrs. W. F. Wrigley, Owen Kentish, and Harry Barber. *School Worship* finds no place by the side of the *Sunday School Hymnary*. On the whole the sketch is of the pious obituary type; there is little in the way of estimate or criticism, unless the striking page of statistics at the end is to serve the purpose: there Congregationalism makes a very bad showing. There is no mention of the Modern Churchmen, of the Christian Social Council, or of developments in Theological Colleges.

Miss Hebe Spaull's *The World Since You Were Born* (Macmillan, 2s. 6d.) is described as "A Junior History of Recent Years." It does for young people what Commander King-Hall's *Our Own Times* does for adults. It is excellent value, for there are many illustrations and, what is unusual in books of this kind, an adequate supply of maps.

Miss Beatrice White's *Mary Tudor* (Macmillan, 15s.) sets out to dispel a "phantom" which scholars banished long ago—that of "Bloody Mary". One of the most pathetic figures in English history, Mary has long had the pity she so well deserves, for throughout her life ill-fate pursued her. In her father, her brother, her sister, her husband she was unfortunate, and the child for which she longed so passionately as to make herself the laughing-stock of Europe never came. Only in her mother was she truly happy; from her she inherited courage and strength of will as well as devotion to her religion, and the heart warms to her as she "stands up to" her lustful and domineering father. There is no doubt, too, that in her persecutions she believed she was doing God service. Miss White's book extends to over 400 pages, and it could have been shortened with advantage; she writes well, however, and even those for whom the pages contain nothing new will find themselves carried along by her flowing narrative.

It is not the least of Mr. Bernard Shaw's achievements that he has imposed on this generation of Englishmen a view of St. Joan which they will never let go, and it is not, as Mr. Milton Waldman suggests in his *Joan of Arc* (Longmans, 12s. 6d.), of one who was merely "a stick to beat human stupidity with," for Mr. Shaw's Joan is as intensely human as Mr. Waldman's own, in which the now familiar story is related with eloquence. The only person who comes well out of the episode is the Maid, for the only question is who has the greatest shame, Charles of France who forsook her, the English who burnt her, or the Church who hounded her to death: we think the Church has it!

It is a pleasure to handle such a competent piece of work as *Richard Cromwell* (Longmans, 10s. 6d.), by Mr. R. W. Ramsey, who has made himself our leading authority on Cromwell's family. "Tumble-down Dick" has often been the butt of ridicule, but Mr. Ramsey's picture wins for him the sympathy of the reader. Richard did not seek power, and nothing in his Protectorate became him like the leaving of it: "I will have no blood spilt for me" is an *obiter dictum* of which no man need be ashamed. The account of "Mr. Clarke's" life in exile for twenty years and in retirement on his return to England is full of interest, and it was sad indeed that Richard's old age should have been disturbed by disputes about the family estate; his son Oliver died a bachelor in 1705, and there was a disposition on the part of the daughters to prevent the old man from having his rights. He was vindicated by the law, and thence lived in peace until 1712: his daughters died childless and the line became extinct.

If only 1 per cent of the story told in Mr. Robert Neumann's *Zaharoff, the Armaments King* (Allen & Unwin, 10s. 6d.) were true it would be nevertheless a damning indictment of the system which allows the manufacture of munitions of war to be in private hands. Mr. Neumann's sensational methods are ill adapted to his purpose: a simple straightforward narrative would have been infinitely more cogent. Mr. Neumann will probably reply that with Zaharoff the last thing one could be is simple and straightforward, but he has given us so much confusing detail that we cannot see the wood for the trees, or the trees for the smoke screen. How armament interests control newspapers and news agencies, banks and industries; how their ramifications stretch into every country and set nations by the ears, how the struggle for oil has already cost millions of lives—all these things are made plain—no, that is not the term—are suggested by this life of the great mystery man of our time, the date and circumstances of whose birth are themselves mysterious. The more people who read this book the better.

M. Emile Cammaerts had no easy task in writing his biography, *Albert of Belgium: Defender of Right* (Nicholson & Watson, 21s.), but he has performed it with notable success. To write of a recently-deceased and popular monarch has its obvious dangers, but these M. Cammaerts has skilfully avoided, though he does stress unduly the youth of the King, who, after all, was nearly 40 when the War broke out. Between a graphic description of August 2nd, 1914, and an account of the King's tragic death in 1934 are some 400 pages which tell of Albert's boyhood, of his courageous stand during the War, and of his leadership of his people subsequently. There seems no reason to doubt that Albert was a good man, truly devout and with a strong sense of responsibility; if it is true that, in his own words, he and his people were "cornered into heroism," many would have found an easy way out, and his bravery will always stand out as his most conspicuous quality. But he was more than a good man and a brave; he was, in Mr. R. C. K. Ensor's words, "the best constitutional monarch who has

ever reigned on the Continent of Europe." M. Cammaerts well brings out the King's character and achievements in a biography which is also a history of the Belgian people.

The untimely death of Dwight W. Morrow in 1931 is one of the mysteries of Providence, for he of all Americans was best fitted to help his country in financial depression and the world in international rivalries. Lawyer, banker in the J. P. Morgan firm, Ambassador to Mexico, delegate to Naval Conferences—he had succeeded in all these positions, and political service of the greatest kind was just opening out before him. There is no doubt that the uprightness and transparency of his character crowned his intellectual gifts and gained him the wide esteem of men : a simple faith, too, sustained him : we read in his wife's diary at a critical time, "We said our prayers together." Morrow's insight is well shown in his comments on the Versailles Treaty and the League Covenant, and his character in his words to his son : "The world is divided into people who do things and people who get the credit. Try, if you can, to belong to the first class. There's far less competition." Mr. Harold Nicolson's *Dwight Morrow* (Constable, 18s.) is a characteristically able piece of work, though he does not get into stride in his first chapter, where the word "gay" is used of Morrow's mother many times, and something has gone wrong with a mathematical illustration. The volume is packed with interest. Those who claimed that the American banks were responsible for the crisis in England in 1931 will note the Morgan offer to help the city of New York

> upon the understanding that the finances of the city are to be conducted upon a policy different from that followed during many years.

Mr. Alexander Gammie's *Duncan Main of Hangchow* (Pickering, 3s. 6d.) is the life of a Church Missionary Society medical missionary who laboured 45 years in Hangchow. A bright and cheery personality, whose motto was "Keep Smiling," Dr. Main did a fine piece of work, which is vividly described, together with earthquake experiences in Japan, in Mr. Gammie's pages.

Even those who are not musical will enjoy *Frederick Delius* (Nicholson & Watson, 15s.), in which his sister Claire gives her memories of her distinguished brother. Perhaps the best part of the book is its description of Delius's youth. One of a family of 14, the son of a naturalized wealthy German living in Bradford who ruled his family as did Edward Barrett, Fred Delius rebelled against the intention to make him a wool-merchant. His early escapades in the business must have been trying indeed to his father, and not less his attempt—or his failure to attempt—to run an orange farm in Florida. His sister tells of how he finally secured his heart's desire and gave himself to music, of his success first on the Continent and then in England (here largely owing to Sir Thomas Beecham's untiring championship), and of the undesired popularity which his blindness and paralysis brought to him. She well brings out that much of his inspiration was found on the Yorkshire moors, and especially in the Brontë country : would that he had carried out his plan of setting *Wuthering Heights* to music !

We have read many lives of Edison, but the man's marvellous story kept us up two hours after midnight to read Mr. W. A. Simond's *Edison* (Allen & Unwin, 10s. 6d.). There is nothing much that is new in the book, but the illustrations, and especially those on the inside covers, deserve special mention.

Sir Evelyn Wrench has not been well advised to stretch his autobiography out into three volumes. The first volume, *Uphill,* was so full of variety that it carried the reader along; the second volume, *Struggle*

(Nicholson & Watson, 15s.), covers the years from 1914 to 1920, and at times we felt that the blue pencil could have been employed to advantage on some of its 500 pages. It may be, of course, that this is because Sir Evelyn's imperial enthusiasms leave us cold, but we scarcely think so, for we have no lack of admiration for his work in bringing the English-speaking peoples together. The main value of the present volume is in the extracts from letters written during the war years; Sir Evelyn was closely associated with Northcliffe and Lords Rothermere and Beaverbrook in war service as in peace time, and he gives vivid first hand impressions of war-time activities, just as he does of individuals he met, such as T. E. Lawrence and "Pussyfoot" Johnson. He is not afraid of quoting bad guesses and unfulfilled prophecies, and his candour throughout adds to the charm of the book. We look forward to the volume which will tell of *Spectator* days.

Books on publishing we almost invariably find of great interest, and Mr. G. H. Doran, the author of *Chronicles of Barabbas, 1884-1934* (Methuen, 15s.), has had such a remarkable career that we eagerly perused his autobiography. Beginning in a Toronto Tract Depository, then associated with F. H. Revell in the publication of religious books, he finally emerged "from Revell Company and evangelicalism," and started publishing on his own. Hodder and Stoughton, Robertson Nicoll, Arnold Bennett, E. V. Lucas, Edgar Wallace, Hugh Walpole are but a few of those of whom he writes, while many engaged in religious work naturally find a place in his pages (the story of Newell Dwight Hillis is vividly told). The list of Mr. Doran's friends reveals the catholicity of his taste—D. L. Moody and Arnold Bennett are among his favourites! Very amusing is the account of a visit to a cricket match with Mr. E. V. Lucas, while there is much about the War years. Mr. Doran missed a scoop when he was unable to print Woodrow Wilson's letters to Mrs. Peck, but against that he can put many successes. His step is not always sure in dealing with British affairs, and one story would have been better omitted; otherwise we have little but praise for a readable narrative, though the regularity with which he regards all his geese as swans becomes tiring.

The welcome which greeted Annie S. Swan's *My Life,* now in its 8th Impression, has brought a sequel, *We Travel Home* (Nicholson & Watson, 5s.). In this book Mrs. Burnett Smith chats about her life and its interests, about fairy tales and books and haunted houses and old age, about neighbours and bores and rich people and guests—all very pleasantly and in a way that will have a special appeal to those who have been reading the writer's stories for a life-time. We like the "Worker's Prayer" she quotes:

> O God, give me work to the end of my life,
> And life till the end of my work.

Septima's *Peculiar People* (Heath Cranton, 3s. 6d.) could well be read side by side with Mrs. Burnett Smith's book, with which it has much in common. It also is a woman's autobiography, telling in the main of the growth of the children of parents who were leaders of the Plymouth Brethren: it is a much happier story than that of Edmund Gosse. The reader gets an excellent idea of the earnestness and narrowness of the Brethren, and of the clash between the two generations. Septima was the youngest of the family, all of whom forsook the Church of their parents, and emancipated themselves from the conventions of their day. We scarcely see the purpose of the pseudonymity: it would be easily possible to identify all the people mentioned.

We stand in amazement before *Middle Age : An Autobiography, 1885-1932* (Constable, 10s.). Here, too, the writer hides her name, but it is not difficult to recognize her and many of the people of whom she writes : daughters of Congregational ministers who became College Professors and Principals are so few that the attempted mystification is no mystification at all. Many people still living are mentioned by name in the book, and it is easy to spot others who are given false names. The writer furnishes much case material for the psychologists. The youngest child in the family, and evidently attractive from her earliest days, she seems to have been accustomed to having men around. She speaks of love affairs with the students, of her marriage when she knew she was in love with another man, and of the breakdown of the marriage. After eight years there came separation from the husband and subsequently the resumption of a platonic friendship which developed on lines which should not have been difficult to foresee. The husband was of a jealous disposition, and this resulted in the breaking off of a friendship with Mark Rutherford, some of whose letters are quoted in the book. The narrative is an extreme case of exhibitionism, and the only sympathy which can be felt for the writer is that she suffered so much from our stupid divorce laws.

Dr. Sigmund Freud's *An Autobiographical Study* (Hogarth Press, 6s.) was first published in Germany in 1925. An English translation, published in America in 1927, now appears in England, with a Postscript dated 1935. Written first for a series of medical autobiographies, the book is a narrative of events, an exposition of the psycho-analytic method, and an apologia. Dr. Freud denies that he has ever held that "all dreams have a sexual content or are derived from sexual motive forces".

In *Albert Schweitzer* (Allenson, 7s. 6d.) Mr. Magnus C. Ratter not only describes the life of the great missionary-musician-theologian, but expounds his teaching.

Dr. J. C. Carlile has well earned the respect in which he is held in Folkestone, in the Baptist denomination, and in a much wider field, and many will rejoice in the pages of *My Life's Little Day* (Blackie, 6s.). Especially valuable are the chapters dealing with Dr. Carlile's early life and ministry, his work among the dockers, and his association with Spurgeon, though Baptists will perhaps turn first to "When Shakespeare ruled." Though there are some excellent War stories, and some scenes vividly described, the War chapters are disappointing.

In *My Life of Revolt* (Harrap, 10s. 6d.) Mr. David Kirkwood has given us one of the most delightful autobiographies of our time. It may be criticized on the score of proportion, certain episodes, such as the munitions and shop-stewards' business during the war being given undue prominence, but apart from that it is attractive in every way. The first chapters, dealing with Mr. Kirkwood's parents (see "Worth Noting") are written with the simplicity which is true art, and will long stay in the memory of the reader. The other section which stands out is the account of life in Parliament, with its description of the leading politicians of our time—Conservative and Liberal as well as Labour. Mr. Kirkwood, we are glad to note, is a great believer in Parliament and Parliamentary methods. We hope that he will be persuaded to fill out the years that are here merely sketched : this volume will ensure a warm welcome for anything else which comes from his pen.

Lady Salmond's *Bright Armour* (Faber, 7s. 6d.) contains her "memories of four years of war." In 1914, at the age of 21, the Hon. Monica Grenfell decided to become a nurse. Previously chaperoned and protected, she

was accompanied by a maid when she first went to the London Hospital. There she began to see life in the raw, and the account of these four years makes a moving, poignant story, which is especially valuable in its picture of a nurse's daily life. In England and in France she worked so hard that she broke down in health, and before the end of the War had to be content with training as a masseuse. The pressure of work and the strain of continual anxiety were heavy indeed for a young girl to carry, and to them was added the loss of her brothers, Julian and Billy. The book deserves its place among the documents of the war years.

Mr. Stephen Lawford's *Youth Uncharted* (Nicholson & Watson, 7s. 6d.) is the well told account of a remarkable career. In it Mr. Lawford writes for his young son the story of his life in the army during the war, of his experiences as a trade negotiator with the White Russians, of service with Nansen for refugees, and of the League of Nations mission to South America to investigate the prospects of refugee settlements in Bolivia. How Mr. Lawford will settle down to a life on the League of Nations Union Secretariat remains to be seen, and we also doubt the wisdom of relating some of these experiences to a young boy.

Many who have desired to read *Piers Plowman* and been deterred by its form will welcome Mr. H. W. Wells's rendering into modern English, *The Vision of Piers Plowman* (Sheed & Ward, 8s. 6d.). Mr. Nevill Coghill contributes a useful Introduction, in which he accepts the view that the author was William Langland; Mr. Wells adds notes.

Mr. Cumberland Clark's *Shakespeare and Home Life* (Williams & Norgate, 10s. 6d.) is an entertaining and informing study. Houses and their furniture and gardens, staffs and servants, meals and home duties, dress and entertainments, customs and ceremonies—about all these Mr. Clark draws material from the plays and from *Shakespeare's England*. Few there be who could not learn something from his pages.

It may be doubted whether Rochester, the "mad Earl," the "Restoration Sensationalist," was worth the two biographies he has this year received. Certainly there is no adequate return for following him through his amours and his "rags" in one of the most dissolute ages England has known, and his merits as a poet and a wit are scarcely sufficient compensation. John Wilmot was born in 1647 and lived until 1680. In *Rochester* (Barker, 10s.) Mr. Charles Williams deals with his short life in the ironical style which to-day is *à la mode;* his romanticism, his friendships, his quarrels with Dryden and others, his poems, his disquiet, his arguments on religion with Bishop Burnet, his deathbed conversion, are all handled in the same superior cynical fashion. Mr. Williams writes well, and the book is well produced (though we suspect a letter is wrongly copied on p. 162), but was Rochester worth it? "Charming" in manners, obscene even in a lewd age, drunk for five years on end, Rochester might perhaps have been left in the grave to which his excesses quickly brought him, his sufficient monument the epitaph on Charles II:

> Here lies our sovereign lord the King,
> Whose word no man relies on,
> Who never said a foolish thing,
> Nor ever did a wise one.

In the same series is Mr. Evarts S. Scudder's *Mirabeau* (Barker, 10s.), a skilful biography of "a giant in the chains of his own destiny". Without principles and without morals, Mirabeau had great eloquence and a supreme gift of picking other people's brains. He was a realist who travelled on the earth when others were travelling on the map. A dissolute youth, whose excesses brought about his early death, Mirabeau spent

much of his youth in prison, and then he was for two hectic years in the public eye: had he lived the course of the Revolution might have been very different. An admirable sketch is marred by an "ante-royal" demonstration on p. 230.

In *Oliver Goldsmith* (Butterworth, 15s.) Mr. Stephen Gwynn has given us a masterly sketch of one who is in many ways a characteristic Irishman, alike in his virtues and his frailties. Generous, improvident, always "hoping," lacking in self-control, easily roused to jealousy, but never thinking of "the main chance," the one who wrote like an angel and talked like poor Poll has left enduring monuments in our literature. Mr. Gwynn writes of him with sympathy, insight, and sound judgment.

In *William Cowper and the 18th Century* (Nicholson & Watson, 15s.) —a well-written and well-produced volume—Mr. Gilbert Thomas champions Evangelicalism on the one hand, and John Newton on the other: whatever may have produced Cowper's madness, these two are guiltless. Mr. Fausset and Lord David Cecil therefore naturally meet with criticism from Mr. Thomas, who makes out a good case, helped by his knowledge of the religious life of the century. He sees in Cowper one whose heart frequently proved too much for the Calvinism he professed:

> His Calvinism is explicable enough in the light of his day and of his keen logical faculty, but even he could not long maintain its doctrines at full strength.

Altogether a sympathetic and discerning study.

Cowper, Blake, Edward Fitzgerald, these do not exhaust the interests of the indefatigable Mr. Thomas Wright of Olney. For long he has been working on Dickens, and in *The Life of Charles Dickens* (Jenkins, 18s.) he has now given us the fruit of his labours. There is little in the way of literary grace about the volume, but it is a mine of information about Dickens, his family and his contemporaries, while the appendixes present valuable data in succinct form. The book contains much that is new to us —though most of it may be already known to Dickensians: we did not know, for example, that Kettering was a claimant to the town of Eatanswill, nor did we realize that the picture of Dotheboys Hall had ruined the proprietor as thoroughly as it caricatured him. Mr. Wright sympathizes with Mrs. Dickens in regard to the separation, and he believes that Ellen Lawless Ternan was never happy as Dickens's mistress.

It is a relief to find writers other than D. H. Lawrence the subject of the adulation of the critics. Mr. R. H. Ward's *The Powys Brothers* (Lane, 7s. 6d.) deals with John Cowper, T.F., and Llewelyn, three of the ten children of a Somerset incumbent. The three, as all who know their writings are aware, are extraordinary in both character and achievement, but abnormal is perhaps the accurate epithet to describe them. They all write well, but at times one feels that what Mr. Ward says of a scene in T.F.'s *Unclay* is sometimes true of the writings of all three:

> perfect in form, yet with all its implications, its double meanings and its unnatural, abnormal inversions, perversions and involutions [it] is nothing less than abnormal, and produces a sensation almost physical of sickening revulsion.

That this is far from telling all the story may be gathered from Mr. Llewelyn Powys's contribution in these pages. Mr. Ward should moderate his superlatives and correct misspellings on pp. 9 and 78.

Mr. A. S. M. Hutchinson's *A Year that the Locust*— (Nicholson & Watson, 10s. 6d.)—a diary which lasts for a few months only—reveals him as a likeable person, and not least so when he talks about his little sons. As

we read some of his sentences we thought he was pulling the leg of reviewers who had ridiculed his style, but later we found the style defended on the ground that the writer felt as he wrote! But even that cannot excuse "Between Una and I," and the misspelling of a fellow-journalist's name. There are some good stories, and as a revelation of a personality the volume is full of interest.

We have spent a pleasant hour with Mr. E. V. Lucas's *The Old Contemporaries* (Methuen, 6s.), which is in the vein of his *Reading, Writing and Remembering*. Mr. Lucas tells of his Quaker ancestors (with some excellent stories), of his various schools, of the beginnings of his interest in art and cricket, and of many other things. Autobiography can rarely have been given a more attractive dress.

Sir John Squire's *Reflections and Memories* (Heinemann, 8s. 6d.) consists of previously printed papers, some of them introductions and prefaces. Perhaps the best things in the volume are "A London Reverie" and the essay on John Freeman.

Mr. Walter de la Mare's *Poems, 1919-1934* (Constable, 10s. 6d.) contains the poems in *The Veil, The Fleeting*, most of those in *Flora*, four songs from *Crossings*, seven rhymes from *The Three Royal Monkeys*, and sundry "Occasional Poems" and "Rhymes for Children."

It is not until p. 112 that Dr. David Forsyth gets to the subject which is the title of the book, *Psychology and Religion* (Watts, 7s. 6d.). Previously he has discussed religion, science, and Christianity as affected by science, and we fear it is true that he shows neither accurate knowledge of religion nor a truly scientific temper. Methodists will be surprised to know that it was in 1729 that "a large body of Church adherents broke away under the leadership of the brothers Wesley to form a dissenting body." The Bible, we are told, is of historical value "as showing the ideas that took shape some 3,000-4,000 years ago in a gifted tribe of Asiatics": apparently the *N.T.* does not count. In the discussion of psychology and religion in the chapter "Beyond Christianity," Dr. Forsyth shows himself as intolerant and dogmatic as Churchmen of any party in any age. We scarcely think his pages will commend themselves to scholars.

Dr. Forsyth writes a Foreword to Dr. Laura Hutton's *The Single Woman and Her Emotional Problems* (Baillière, 5s.), a little book written with knowledge and insight. The single women with whom it is concerned deserve sympathetic consideration rather than the ridicule they often receive. While many of them have not sufficient knowledge to read Dr. Hutton's book with advantage—and indeed, to some it might do harm in the way of suggestion—doctors, ministers, and students of psychology could learn from it.

Dr. Joan Malleson's *The Principles of Contraception* (Gollancz, 4s. 6d.) is "A Handbook for General Practitioners," which may perhaps justify its very large assumptions. It surveys methods in use and makes recommendations without adequately discussing the prior questions of the relation of the practice to marital happiness and physical and mental health. Some members of the medical profession who write on the subject seem to have little realization of the intricacies of the human personality; or of the intense repugnance of many, on æsthetic grounds, to the techniques suggested. Mr. G. R. Scott is a prolific writer of books on sex problems. His *Facts and Fallacies of Practical Birth Control* (Laurie, 5s.) is a compendium which has at any rate one merit—it is less cocksure than many books on the subject. Apart from stress on the discoveries of Ogino and Knaus, its contents are much the same as its predecessors.

Dr. V. C. Pedersen's *Nature's Way of Birth Control* (Williams & Norgate, 3s. 6d.) is in another category. It gives, with full charts, an account of the researches of the two scientists just named, showing, apparently conclusively, that the times of fertility and sterility are other than those which have generally been accepted. If Onigo and Knaus prove to be correct, there will be great consternation among those interested in the sale of contraceptives.

Disciple of Jung in psychology and of Briffault in anthropology Dr. M. Esther Harding continues in *Woman's Mysteries: Ancient and Modern* (Longmans, 10s. 6d.) the work she began in *The Way of All Women*. While she has gathered together a good deal of material about ancient myths and moon worship, and while she writes helpfully at times of the relationship of the moon cycle of women to their emotional problems, we cannot think her teaching is either definite or helpful, and sometimes (p. 318) it seems dangerous. It is no doubt true that "to ancient and primitive man the moon was the visible representative of womanhood," the feminine principle or Eros as the sun is the masculine principle or Logos; it is equally true that the task of woman is set forth in the sentences:

> What was formerly "I want, I must have" has been replaced by the capacity to love. And the woman instead of being merely a manifestation of nature, a mermaid, is reborn a human being with a human spirit.

But these crescents and dark moons, these "imaginary pictures" and bizarre parallels, seem neither scientific nor useful. If Dr. Harding, forgetting the background of the Moon Mother and the rest of it, would address herself to the emotional problems confronting most women it would be an advantage.

Our first reaction on reading Dr. Oswald Schwarz's *The Psychology of Sex and Sex Education* (New Education Fellowship, 1s.) was "These facts are not true of this country." That this was justified was borne out by a later footnote saying the figures referred to Central Europe. The nature of the teaching given challenges those who believe in Christian marriage:

> The demands of sexual development require that young men should have sexual intercourse before marriage and pass through a period of trial and error. For sexual maturity can only be reached through practical experience in the life of sex. Marriage is not a stage on the way to maturity, but demands people who are already mature.

After Mr. J. B. Priestley's *English Journey* Mr. Edwin Muir's *Scottish Journey* (Heinemann, 7s. 6d.) is disappointing indeed, for Mr. Muir has neither Mr. Priestley's eye for observation, his pen for description, nor, despite his socialism, his social passion. How many times Mr. Muir tells us he will refer to some point "later" we do not know, though we did note that the greatest expense in the upkeep of Burns's cottage must be "stationary"! The picture of Scotland given is as depressing as the book is disappointing: it may be summed up in the words:

> Scotland is gradually being emptied of its population, its spirit, its wealth, industry, art, intellect, and innate character.

Sir Philip Gibbs's *England Speaks* (Heinemann, 8s. 6d.) tells of his talks with men and women of all classes, ages, and professions. Beginning with a road-sweeper who described the Royal Family as "a very respectable lot," Sir Philip devotes nearly half his book to London; then he goes to the country, including the farmers, and finally to the industrial areas. These vivid pictures show us a population in the main apprehensive about the international, and pessimistic about the economic, situation. We hope

the book will be widely read—and with more care than the proof-reader has given to it : on p. 442 Penistone is spelt in two different ways, and both wrong ; and there are other bad slips.

The sub-title of Mr. Harold Stovin's *Totem* (Methuen, 5s.) is "The Exploitation of Youth." He finds in Toc H, Scouts and Rovers, the Y.M.C.A., the Groups, and similar movements a reversion to tribalism. "Service," "Fellowship," and "The Team Spirit" are all a form of totem worship, and dangerous to the personality. Community Singing and Camps are other expressions of the same tendency. Mr. Stovin expounds a point of view which deserves attention, though the stridency of his advocacy will irritate many who might otherwise benefit : a silly sentence on p. 62 suggests that if a book is called a "book of meditation" (Miss Underhill's *The School of Charity* is one of those mentioned !) it must perforce contain "woolly and flaccid . . . thinking about God."

Canon H. R. L. Sheppard's *We Say "No"* (Murray, 3s. 6d.) is a passionate plea for pacifism, which he believes to be both Christianity and commonsense. He is opposed to all kinds of war, and he believes that the attempt to secure peace by the way of collective security and the sanctions of force is futile. We hope Dr. Sheppard's book will be widely read : the more people are made to face up to this problem the better it will be.

More and more people are coming to believe that the only way out of the international *impasse,* with its recurring armaments races and subsequent wars, is for some nation to disarm and adopt the policy of non-resistance. In *The Power of Non-Violence* (Routledge, 10s. 6d.) Mr. R. B. Gregg gives examples of non-violence in modern history, stressing the movement of Mr. Gandhi, to whom the book is dedicated, though his name is spelt in two different ways on p. 117. The psychology of non-violence is then discussed, Mr. Gregg finding it a sort of "moral *ju-jitsu.*" He shows how it can be used in national, international, and industrial life, and finds it an effective substitute for war. Mr. Gregg believes that *satyagraha* is a practical instrument whereby progress can be made toward the Kingdom of God. He has made a thorough and thoughtful study of the subject, which deserves the consideration of all thinking people.

Inquest on Peace (Gollancz, 3s. 6d.), the work of "Vigilantes," is an electioneering pamphlet swollen to 367 pages. As an "analysis of the National Government's Foreign Policy" it is fairly convincing in its criticism. It is to be regretted that at times its note is shrill, and the omission of the last section would have been no loss. The authors present a case which the Government's election campaign did not answer.

The title of Mr. John Eppstein's *Must War Come?* (Burns, Oates, 3s. 6d.) does not indicate its contents in the least degree, for the book is a review of the international situation in the light of Papal teaching. It must be said that Mr. Eppstein's defence of Papal action—or lack of action—is quite unconvincing, especially his claim that had the letter of Benedict XV of 1st Aug., 1917, been accepted it would have been altogether decisive in ending the War and securing a better peace. The failure of Roman Catholicism to lead even its own people is not to be wondered at in the light of the ambiguous pronouncements of the Pope on the Italo-Abyssinian affair.

Recently a person in a position to judge said that no writer counted for so much with thoughtful young people as Prof. John Macmurray. We should be happy to think this was the case, and indeed to know that Prof. Macmurray's influence extended to those of older growth, all that he writes is so intensely frank, so thorough and searching, and, what is uncommon in a philosopher, so modest. Although at the moment Prof. Macmurray

writes for the times and is very much concerned with communism—and there is an absurd reference in his *Reason and Emotion* to the soon-to-be-forgotten D. H. Lawrence which will cruelly date the book—his message is more than an immediate one. Of the two books he has just published, **Creative Society* (S.C.M., 5s.) is an examination of Christianity and of Communism and a study of the relationship between them. The analysis of Christianity will provide preachers with many sermons, but it will do much more than that; it will make all those who study it see both Christianity and Communism in a new light, and will, we hope, impel them to replace the pseudo-Christianity so common to-day by a real Christianity which contains all the values of Communism, just as the teaching of Jesus exhibits its main conceptions—the unity of theory and practice, the dialectical nature of social development, the importance of class conflict, and the fundamental part played by economics. The other book, *Reason and Emotion* (Faber, 7s. 6d.) is a collection of lectures, including one on "The Conservation of Personality" which appeared in our own pages. Some of them—especially, perhaps, those on "Science and Religion," "Reason and Religion," "Religious Reality," and "The Maturity of Religion"—go to the root of things, and again urge the need of a *real* religion, not an ideal but one which creates

> conscious community among all men everywhere . . . , increasing the depth and completeness and universality of direct personal relationships to make love the universal and actual reality of our lives.

Prof. Macmurray, therefore, does not believe that religion is "what a man does with his solitariness"; it is what he makes of his personal relationships. And that is where Jesus comes in :

> For persons are not isolated, and personality is mutual. The personality of Jesus, it seems to me, in realizing the full sweep of religion in himself, created the possibility of its realization as the full life of mankind. We are only at the early stages of the realization of that stupendous work of human personality.

Throughout the essays there is insistence on personality and on the relations between persons. In "The Virtue of Chastity" some may be deterred by Prof. Macmurray's treatment; but again it is a question of personalities : Prof. Macmurray wants a real chastity instead of the pseudo-chastity of our day, just as he wants a real religion. Here as in the rest of these two volumes he is searching and stimulating. See "Worth Noting."

Mr. G. D. H. Cole is now one of the best known of the exponents of Socialism. His *The Simple Case for Socialism* (Gollancz, 5s.) shows him once again to be an ardent believer, to use his own words, "In love with Socialism."

> Our job is to promote happiness by promoting, not for a few but for all, those means to happiness which are most capable of being maximized by collective action.

Socialism, he believes, will

> make the race of men stronger in mind and body, teach them not to abuse their strength, but to employ it as brothers in the common service, teach them to practise better the living arts of production and creation in every sphere, and enable them to dwell together on terms of amity and fellowship which class distinctions and gross disparities of wealth and breeding make impossible to-day.

Mr. Cole is sane and reasonable, and even admits that Capitalism in this country is able to maintain those for whom it finds employment at a stand-

ard well above that of any great European country. His chapter "Nationalism and War" is well worth reading, not least in the picture it presents of the "true pacifist" and the "League pacifist." One or two chapters do not seem very relevant, but the whole book is readable.

All readers of these pages will be well advised to ponder *New Trends in Socialism* (Lovat Dickson, 5s.), which Prof. G. E. G. Catlin has edited. Most of the writers were Labour candidates in the last election, and most can be called young. The essays maintain an unusually high level, and they show how younger members of the Labour Party are prepared to tackle the present situation and the government of the country when it falls to them. Their emancipation from orthodox Marxism has already gone a long way, and their attitude to planning, to the transition to socialism, and to the middle classes is suggestive. The book repeatedly emphasizes the folly of the reiterated insistence that a national government is the only alternative to dictatorship, and urges that it is as harmful to the parliamentary system as the emergence of many Parties.

Although the three members of the Editorial Board—Dr. Joseph Needham, Prof. C. E. Raven, and Prof. John Macmurray—and three editors do their best in their contributions to *Christianity and the Social Revolution* (Gollancz, 6s.) the volume cries out for editing: it is evident that in the multitude of editors brevity and success are not to be found. There is much overlapping; and the *schema* is not clear (Dr. Polanyi's learned paper, "The Essence of Fascism", might well have found a place elsewhere); and some of the articles are decidedly thin. Others, however, are excellent: the calibre of the writers may be gauged from the names J. F. Hecker, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Bruno Meier. The history of Christianity and of Communism, the reaction of their ideologies (horrid word!), their relations in the past, the present, and the future are the burden of the book. There is much hard hitting, some of it below the belt:

> There is neither logic nor sense in saying Christianity is "really" pacifist, though for fifteen hundred years it has officially and enthusiastically supported and enjoined mass murder.

On the contrary Dr. Hecker makes us feel uncomfortable in insisting that in Russia Christianity was tried for long years, and with lamentable results, and Prof. Macmurray, whose concluding chapter admirably performs a difficult task, adds to our discomfiture by saying:

> The various Churches, with negligible exceptions, are so bound up with the existing social order, and so unaware of the character of the crisis which they are facing, that it would be a miracle if they did not rally to the support of contemporary law and order against any real attempt to revolutionize its property basis.

It is a pity that some of the anti-Fascist writers spoil a good case by invective. Mr. W. A. Rudlin at times mars *The Growth of Fascism in Great Britain* (Allen & Unwin, 3s. 6d.) by venomous attacks on the opponents of Labour. His contentions that Sir Oswald Mosley or some other leader may follow the example of Hitler or Mussolini, that Fascism's opportunity will come when economic decline reaches the point where the ownership of power by property is seriously threatened, and that such a decline is certain, are not easy to rebut. His little book deserves careful thought and may serve as a prelude to Mr. Sinclair Lewis's *It Can't Happen Here* (Cape, 7s. 6d.), which describes the advent of dictatorship in the United States. All the cruelties associated with Fascism in Italy and Jew baiting in Germany are seen during "the Chief's" *régime,* and one of the greatest sufferers in mind and body is Doremus, the editor and proprietor of a small-town paper, whose belief in Liberalism and freedom is

never quenched. Mr. Lewis's insight and irony are combined in his narrative, especially when he shows how individuals and classes react to the new environment. Upton Sinclair at the Court of St. James's, campaigning for the I.L.P. and issuing a brochure with the title

> I, Upton Sinclair, Prove That Prime Minister Walter Eliot, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and First Lord of the Admiralty Nancy Astor Are All Liars and Have Refused to Accept My Freely Offered Advice

is perhaps his high-water mark. Mr. Lewis evidently believes that Fascism may easily come to power here and in the United States, and his story is a timely warning.

We have often wondered why a film has not been made of the life of David, whose career seems full enough of incident and colour to satisfy even the most hardened fan. What Sir James Barrie and Miss Bergner will make of him remains to be seen, but we scarcely think they will get much help from Miss Maud Flannery's novel, *Remember David* (Methuen, 7s. 6d.), which presumes a knowledge of the Bible story while revealing the writer's unfamiliarity with the background (she falls, for example, into the "Selah" trap). Some of the narrative is so vivid as to suggest that Miss Flannery would succeed if handling a period she knew better.

Miss Mary Moore's *Dismas* (Heritage, 7s. 6d.) moves much more quickly and more surely. Dismas is the "penitent thief," who when a boy sees Jesus as a babe, grows up a robber though always feeling after better things, falls in love with Mary Magdalene not knowing her character, is betrayed, and suffers on Golgotha. It is a story of cruelty and lust, redeemed by the loyalty and love of a few women. Where Jesus appears the story closely follows the Gospel narrative.

Mr. A. J. Russell's *Christ Comes To Town* (Cassell, 5s.) is the Gospel story in modern dress. David Whiteman is born of a virgin, as a child talks with bishops, afterwards performs miracles of healing, feeds thousands of unemployed from a coffee stall, wins a Mary Magdalene, walks from Ellis Island to New York, and is lynched by an American mob.

Canon Hannay seems to be working G. A. Birmingham pretty hard just now. He has certainly given us nothing better than *Millicent's Corner* (Methuen, 7s. 6d.), a very intriguing story.

We have to confess that we found Mr. Edward Thompson's *Introducing the Arnisons* (Macmillan, 7s. 6d.) disappointing. Mr. Thompson suggests it is built up of fact and fiction, but it is meant to be a study of middle-class Nonconformity a generation ago. Mr. Thompson must have been very unfortunate in those whom he has met, and it is quite unfair to imply that Nonconformists were all like they appear to be in this book. It gives a very jaundiced impression and is as uncharacteristic of Mr. Thompson as could be.

The Maker of Heavenly Trousers (Methuen, 7s. 6d.) is a Chinese story by Signor Daniele Vare, for twelve years Italian minister in Peking. Written in very good English, it tells of China in the days of war and revolution : Chinese customs, Eastern mysticism, and the love of an Italian journalist and a Chinese maid go to the make-up of an unusual tale.

Lord Moynihan introduces *Yorkshire Folk* (Heath Cranton, 3s. 6d.), the memories of Mr. W. L. Andrews, the Editor of the *Leeds Mercury*. The title is not quite accurate, and we could have spared some of the holiday sketches for more of Mr. Andrews's excellent Yorkshire stories (for two of them see the Editorial.) Mr. Andrews hails from Hull, which, in spite of his claims, is not the real Yorkshire ! The chapters dealing with

Mr. Andrews's early experiences as a reporter are exceptionally good, but we miss some well-known names among his "Men Worth Meeting." Nevertheless we agree with him that the county is champion, with Lord Moynihan that the most lovable of characters (though we make an exception of the Yorkshire woman) is the Yorkshireman, and with both that the decay of the dialect is to be regretted.

We chuckled over some of the papers in Mr. T. Thompson's *Lancashire Brew* (Allen & Unwin, 5s.) when we first read them in the *Manchester Guardian,* and the fact that they do not fail to cause a chuckle on a second reading proves their merit. We specially recommend to readers "Curing a Cold," "The Rehearsal," and "Flannel Bags."

We are glad to have Mr. J. B. Priestley's *Three Plays and a Preface* (Heinemann, 7s. 6d.), which contains "Dangerous Corner," "Eden End," and "Cornelius." The Preface is interesting in that we get not only the author's own opinion of his plays, but his comments on the success or otherwise which met them. With Mr. Priestley's verdict we confess ourselves in hearty disagreement. "Dangerous Corner" strikes us as the most effective of the three, and "Eden End," which is Mr. Priestley's own choice, as the least, and not one of the three pleases us as much as "Laburnum Grove," but that may be only because we saw the latter and only read the three. It is easy to understand why "Cornelius" failed: its picture of a London office during the industrial depression naturally did not tempt those who were fighting with this Apollyon every hour of the day. This verdict holds despite the success of "Love on the Dole," another depression play, which won through in virtue of other elements in its make-up.

Mr. Priestley, we believe, will do better work for the stage than he has yet done; he is perhaps in danger of writing too much, and would do well to browse a little.

Mr. A. P. Herbert's "Word War" in *Punch* has been as enjoyable as it has been salutary, but it must be confessed that the whole campaign in book form, *What a Word!* (Methuen, 6s.) is rather wearisome. For the sake of those who have not read the *communiqués* in *Punch* we append Mr. Herbert's description of the book:

> An Account of the Principles and Progress of "The Word War" conducted in *Punch,* to the great Improvement and Delight of the People, and the lasting benefit of the King's English, with many Ingenious Exercises and Horrible Examples.

A host of contributors has helped to make Mr. Thomas Moult's *Bat and Ball* (Barker, 15s.) a very attractive book to all cricket-lovers, and there are cartoons by Strube and Tom Webster and excellent illustrations into the bargain—with two of "W. G." easily pre-eminent. Batsmen like Hobbs, Woolley, and Sutcliffe, bowlers like Rhodes, Bowes, Freeman, and Verity tell of their outstanding achievements. Writers on cricket like Mr. Neville Cardus and Mr. Hugh de Selincourt are, of course, represented, and chapters on the history of the game, on famous grounds, on batting, bowling, and fielding, and on cricket in literature, all add to the interest of the volume.

Wisdom of the Ages (St. Catherine Press, 12s. 6d. & 5s.) is an anthology collected by Mr. Mark Gilbert. It cannot be described better than by its caption:

> Fourteen hundred concepts of two hundred everyday subjects by four hundred great Thinkers of thirty nations extending over five thousand years, together with a preface and a final section "X-Y-Z"

(which latter should solve most problems in business, private, or domestic life).

So there you are!

Messrs. Pickering and Inglis have sent us various calendars—"Daily Meditation," 1s. 6d., "Golden Grain," 1s. 3d., "Golden Text," 1s. 3d., "Daily Manna," 1s. EDITOR.

Mr. E. Bendor Samuel's *The Prophetic Character of the Psalms* (Pickering, 2s. 6d.) is written by a Hebrew Christian for Hebrew Christians to show the testimony of the Book of Psalms to Christ. It is devotional and non-critical in character; whilst it refers to the supposed historical occasion of the selected psalms, it assumes that the Spirit of God has given a second and more important meaning to the psalmist's words, fulfilled in the life and work of Christ. We are, in fact, brought near to the point of view of the early Christians, searching the *O.T.* to justify their new faith. Even those who do not share the standpoint of the writer, and see the prophetic character of the *O.T.* in relation to the *N.T.* rather in the continuity of historical ideas than in external happenings, will be able to learn something from the suggestive exposition, which springs from intimate knowledge of the Hebrew text.

H. WHEELER ROBINSON.

On the "Higher" Hinduism reflected in the Sacred Books there is to-day a considerable literature, and it is easy to recommend to the student or the general reader books that will serve his purposes. On popular Hinduism, the religion of the masses, there are many monographs, but it would not be easy to mention a modern book at once simple and comprehensive. This lack Mr. L. S. S. O'Malley's *Popular Hinduism, The Religion of the Masses* (Cambridge Press, 7s. 6d.) supplies. The book is so freshly written that it should interest the general reader, and, at the same time, will prove instructive to serious students. Popular Hinduism has some common characteristics and yet differs so much in various parts of India that no generalization can be accurate. Mr. O'Malley is careful to supplement his first-hand knowledge of the areas of India in which he worked with information derived from other provinces. To the missionary beginning his life in India this book will be of quite special interest. It will help him to understand the religion of those among whom he works, and he will be able, as the years go by, to add to Mr. O'Malley's instances and to discover in what respects the popular religion of his part of India agrees with that of other parts. We have read this illuminating book with much appreciation, and warmly recommend it to all who desire to understand the religion of the masses of India.

SYDNEY CAVE.

The Rev. J. C. Hardwick is well-known as a left wing modernist and a rather severe critic of contemporary religious ideas and institutions. He is a Church of England vicar and has had tutorial experience at Oxford, and is a sound if somewhat erratic scholar. In *What to Believe* (Simpkin Marshall, 7s. 6d.) he covers the whole ground of Christian apologetics in a very fresh and generally convincing fashion. Some of his historical judgments are rather hasty, and on matters of Biblical criticism he is rather too inclined to accept the work of B. W. Bacon as almost verbally inspired. With these reservations we can heartily recommend this book to the ordinary intelligent Christian. It is particularly good on subjects like Inspiration, Sacrament, Prayer, and Immortality, and as a whole opens the way to such constructive thinking as is needed to form the basis of a real Christian unity.

Mr. J. R. de la H. Marett, the author of *Race, Sex and Environment* (Hutchinsons, 21s.) is a young Oxford anthropologist. He bears a name famous in that field of study, and his first contribution to it is one of outstanding value. Briefly, his subject is the study of environment in man's biological development, but he interprets environment in the widest possible way. It includes not merely country, climate, and food in general terms, but those more subtle and particular influences brought about by the chemical constituents of the soil and by the internal secretion glands of the body. Mr. Marett discusses the whole question of the origin and evolution of humanity, and seeks to show the effect of various chemical agencies and of race and sex differentiation on the rise of culture and civilization. His argument is not always easy for a layman to follow, for he pursues it with such a wealth of illustration as sometimes to cause confusion. But on the whole he seems to make out a good case for his main contention. His book is certainly one with which all who are interested in man's development on the material side will have to reckon.

For some time past the Christian ethic has been under suspicion in a good many quarters. Nietzsche has had his followers and both the Naturalists and the Humanists imagine that they have improved upon the sanctions and methods of the ethics of the *New Testament*. There is, therefore, room for a book on the other side, and Prof. E. W. Hirst has done well to use the opportunity of the Fernley-Hartley Lecture (*Jesus and the Moralists,* Epworth Press, 5s.) to discuss the whole question over again from the Christian point of view. After a brief statement of the teaching of Jesus, in which he shows how ethics are inextricably bound up with religion, Mr. Hirst goes on to compare the moral standards of Christianity and its various rivals. He deals in turn with Hellenism, Stoicism, Rationalism, Hedonism, and some modern tendencies such as the teaching of Nietzsche and the Humanists, and he concludes with a critical summary of the whole position. His general treatment of the subject is sound and readable, and his book will be a very useful one to put into the hands of intelligent young people who wish to give a reason for their faith. Our chief criticism of Mr. Hirst is that he gives too little space to the positive and constructive side of his subject, but this perhaps was inevitable from his point of view.

Mr. P. E. Przywara, the writer of *Polarity* (Oxford Press, 8s. 6d.), is described as "one of the leading religious philosophers of modern Germany". He is a Jesuit Professor from Munich, and the book purports to give a German Catholic's interpretation of religion. The translation, which is quite good, has been done by Dr. Bouquet, of Cambridge; he is responsible for the title, which he explains as

> the one which seems on the whole to sum up his message with its reiterated emphasis upon opposing yet complementary poles of thought upon tensions, rhythms, oscillations, explosions and balanced units.

This is not a bad description of a book which is by no means easy to read and whose general conclusions are rather elusive. The writer deals with the Problem of Religion in general from the point of view of its existence and essence, but the main part of the book is taken up with his exposition of the general Catholic basis of Religion and its various historical expressions. He has a great deal to say of the *Analogia Entis* as the foundation of the whole matter, and reduces it ultimately to

> the Christian-Platonic with St. Augustine as its master, and the Christian-Aristotelian as exemplified in St. Thomas as its classic instance and zenith.

The whole book is an interesting if rather restricted contribution to the philosophy of religion, and it culminates, as might be expected, in the dictum, "No salvation outside the Church". W. B. Selbie.

Dr. A. E. Garvie's *The Fatherly Rule of God* (Hodder, 5s.) is without doubt a book for the present time when the whole question of the Church in relation to the State is being raised afresh by the growth of dictatorships in Europe. Dr. Garvie discusses the nature of the State, and of the Church; and then in two most interesting chapters reviews the conflict between Church and State, and considers how methods of co-operation between the two may be established. There is also a very valuable and clear account of the present troubles of the Churches in Germany. Many other practical questions of the moment are also dealt with. This book is very different in its atmosphere from the older type of Liberationist treatment of the subject. Both for its breadth of sympathy and its freedom from the taint of sectarianism it is very welcome. Speaking of the mission of the Church, Dr. Garvie says:

> A man may be a Nonconformist towards the "Catholic" polity, and yet not inclined to the sect extreme of exalting the authority of the individual preferences above the authority which the Church in its unity and continuity as an objective reality in history possesses . . . . The authority of the State cannot be so confidently challenged by individual or denominational interpretations or applications of Christianity as by a *consensus* of the Christian Churches making manifest that unity.

One of these days the English Free Churches may have the whole question flung upon them. Dr. Garvie provides us with an excellent introduction to first principles.

The Rev. Frank H. Ballard's *The Undying Wisdom* (S.C.M., 3s. 6d.) is a series of "studies in the teaching Jesus". Without being intent on some new thing, and while keeping to the known paths, it is an instructive and illuminating account of the wisdom of Christ; and it has point and application to our own day. It has, too, the warmth of a living faith. "The way of service and brotherhood", says Mr. Ballard, "has never been so persuasively and so authoritatively set forth as in the teaching of Jesus". This is a persuasive book.

The Rev. Ramsden Balmforth would be more convincing from his own Unitarian point of view if he could be a little more patient with the traditional creeds. In his *Jesus—the Man* (Daniel, 2s. 6d.) he leaves the impression of having thrown away too much for the claims he afterwards makes for Christ. There is plenty of the modern intellect in this book; but there is something deeper that seems to be lacking. This is plain when he turns to criticize Mr. Alfred Noyes. There is good writing in many of Mr. Balmforth's chapters, but it is spoilt by what seems to be his underlying assumption, that if you are "intelligent" you will hardly be able to dispute his views.

A. T. S. James.

The Christian Life in the Middle Ages (Clarendon Press, 10s.), by Prof. F. M. Powicke, takes its title from the first of eight occasional papers, two of which have not been printed before. They range from studies of medieval education and of Dante's relation to the Crusade idea to portraits of Boniface VIII, Giraldus Cambrensis, Stephen Langton, and a noble and influential lady, who lived for forty-five years as "the recluse of Hackington". For Prof. Powicke a character in history "ceases to move before us like a buskined figure of tragedy and becomes a man", and a man who is

alive. Perhaps Giraldus stands out most prominently, but in all the essays style and vivacity are combined with the confident touch which only patient accuracy gives. In the preface the author puts in an Oxonian plea for the study of the past without direct concern for the present, and it may be that the worth of the book is realized less when reading it than when reflecting on it afterwards; then Giraldus' lack of self-consciousness, the English character of Langton, and the sense of security given by Winchester Cathedral fuse with many other things into a natural and unforced unity, which would never have been possible had one's range of vision been constantly foreshortened, and one is conscious of a picture of the Middle Ages, fresh and valuably enlarged.

Mr. Evelyn Waugh's *Edmund Campion* (Longmans, 6s.) is an act of homage to a fine subject—a Fellow of St. John's at 17, who would begin a sermon with a quotation from Pythagoras, and whose *Decem Rationes* remains an unused source-book of controverted Protestant principles; yet one who for his faith's sake chose to live "like deer when they hear the huntsmen", and, when condemned to death, only sang the *Te Deum*. Cecil called him "one of the diamonds of England", and his singlemindedness contrasts well against the shiftiness of Elizabethan politics. A more impartial study would, indeed, have recognized the shiftiness no less implicit in the lies and disguises of the Jesuit mission, and have more readily acknowledged the intrigues of Allen and others. Pp. 14f. on medieval education and "better order . . . under Mary" also need qualification, and of "the entire episcopate" on p. 17 ten had conveniently died. Wyott and Neal (pp. 49f.) were at Exeter, not at Corpus. Several names are spelled oddly: *e.g.* Wykliffe, Lynacre, Kitchen, *cf.* κεκλειομενον (p. 187). The book is, however, a delight to read, it has atmosphere and scintillating phrases; it lacks an index.

G. F. Nuttall.

The Rev. Patrick Cowley is described by the Bishop of Southwark in a foreword to *Pax Dei* (S.P.C.K., 4s.) as a young priest in his Diocese. He appreciates the wide reading of which it gives evidence, but commends it particularly because it directs attention to the present danger of forgetting that Christianity is something more than philanthropy. The seven essays of which the book is composed do in fact insist, from different aspects, on one truth, that the present planning of a new world, materialistic and utilitarian, is regardless of the spiritual side of man's nature. It is the suicide of the individual soul. It is a danger from which there is no escape except in the cultivation of being alone, freed from the clamour of external obsessions, and in the cultivation of an awareness, discoverable in the silence of the soul, of God seeking man. The writer may be described as a mystic and possibly a Barthian; but he is practical, since whatever a man learns in his aloneness he must go out to tell and to practise in the world; and, if our salvation depends on God's grace in His revelation of Himself to us, His manifestation is for all in Christ. Books such as this seem necessary to our times, and this volume will well repay everyone who reads it.

H. B. Shepheard.

Dr. Shailer Mathews's *Creative Christianity* (Cokesbury, $1.50) gives the substance of the Cole Lectures delivered last year at Vanderbilt University. Christianity is here conceived not as a philosophy but as a social ferment creating moral discontent with life as it is and making toward a life which conforms to that of God, the "personality-producing factor" in the universe.

Dr. John T. McNeill's *Makers of Christianity from Alfred the Great to Schleiermacher* (Holt, $2) is a companion volume to Dr. Shirley Case's *Makers of Christianity from Jesus to Charlemagne,* though it has its own independent value. Dr. McNeill has selected for the subjects of his studies thirty leaders who in his judgment have contributed most effectively to the development of Christianity. He includes Innocent III and leaves out Innocent IV; omits Savonarola and puts in Marsiglio of Padua; but makes his choices always for clearly stated reasons. The chief beauty of the book is its combination of scholarship and readableness: it is written for the general public by a precise and painstaking research-worker.

The Church Against the World (Willett, Clark, $2), to which H. Richard Niebuhr of Yale University, Wilhelm Pauck of the Chicago Theological Seminary, and Francis P. Miller of the World Student Christian Federation have each contributed chapters, is one of those useful books which appear at intervals to assist an era in diagnosing its peculiar spiritual ills and applying to itself the right remedies. The diagnosis is contained in a quotation from p. 82:

> In the early fifteenth century the Catholics mistook ecclesiastic forms for the content of their faith. In the early twentieth century Protestants are mistaking dynamic cultural forms for the content of their faith.

They devote themselves to their national loyalties, to business enterprises, to studies at the university, and a score of other interests, as if they were ends in themselves. The sense of separation from any basic life-purpose, which characterizes our age, inevitably follows. The corrective is to return from seeking many things in the world to an understanding of the one thing needful still treasured by the believing church. Dr. Niebuhr's contribution, and to a less degree Dr. Pauck's, have a Teutonic flavour, both in theology and literary style, but they are none the less penetrating. The book is written with the American scene in mind but may be profitably read in any Protestant country.

DOUGLAS HORTON.

NEW EDITIONS, REPRINTS, *ETC.*

Dr. A. H. McNeile's *New Testament Teaching in the Light of St. Paul's* (Cambridge Press), first published in 1923, is now re-issued at 5s. The second edition of the Rev. J. H. Richardson's *The Gospel of Modernism* (Skeffington, 6s.) adds appendices written in the light of criticisms: they deal with "The Essential Modernism of the Church of England," "The Resurrection of Jesus," and "Our Unchanging Faith and the Changing Creeds." Mr. Leonard A. Lyall's *The Sayings of Confucius* (Longmans, 7s. 6d.), first published September, 1909, has gone to a third edition, in which the text has again been revised. Sir Thomas More's *The Four Last Things* (Burns, Oates, 2s. 6d.) is a translation of the unfinished *De Quatuor Novissimis,* reprinted from Rastell's edition of More's *Works* (1557). In the "Religion and Life Books" (S.C.M., 1s.) we have Dr. A. Herbert Gray's *The Christian Adventure,* and the Rev. Hugh Martin's *Christ and Money.* The Epworth Press has gathered into one volume *Heroes of the Free Churches* (2s. 6d.), the broadcast addresses delivered last winter. New volumes in the "Thinker's Library" (Watts, 1s.) are Prof. Gilbert Murray's *Five Stages of Greek Religion,* Renan's *Life of Jesus,* and *Selected Works of Voltaire,* translated by Joseph McCabe. Prof. C. E. M. Joad's *Under the Fifth Rib* now appears as *The Book of Joad* in the "Faber Library" (3s. 6d.), in which is also Mr. Leonard Woolley's *Ur of the Chaldees.* In *Men and Deeds* (Davies, 10s. 6d.) Mr. John

Buchan reprints the Rede Lecture, 1929, other lectures, and *Julius Cæsar*: the volume well represents one side of the activity of the versatile Governor-General of Canada. Dr. J. W. Bready's *Dr. Barnardo* is now appearing in a cheap impression, the fourth (Allen & Unwin, 2s. 6d.) Two volumes (Nelson, 7s. 6d. each) first published in 1928, which have been entirely revised, reset, and their bibliographies brought up to date are Prof. C. H. Williams's *The Tudor Despotism* and Prof. Andrew Browning's *The Age of Elizabeth*, both good summaries which students will find helpful. Mr. J. R. Bellerby's *A Contributive Society* (Allenson) is now 3s. 6d. A new edition of Mrs. Margaret Holden's charming bird book, *Near Neighbours* (Heath Cranton, 6s.) is welcome, with its pleasing woodcuts by Mr. Laurence Angus and Mr. Muirhead Bone's Foreword.

PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS.

The London Quarterly and Holborn Review (October). Dr. W. L. Wardle writes on "Currents of Old Testament Study," the Rev. W. H. Holtby on "The Man of Nazareth." Dr. A. W. Harrison's "A Methodist Mark Rutherford" is W. J. Dawson. Literary contributions are the Rev. W. Bardsley Brash's "John Galsworthy," and Mr. F. R. Lewis's "Anton Chekhov." The Editor discusses the new Methodist book, *Divine Worship*.

The Hibbert Journal (October). The question of the State is the subject of several articles, including Prof. R. B. Mowat's "The Revival of Heathenism," Prof. Ernest Barker's "Foundations of Politics," Mr. David Thomson's "The Inadequacy of Private Morality in Public Action," and Mr. J. A. Hobson's "Democracy, Liberty and Force." Mr. E. M. E. Blyth has a useful contribution on "The Church of Ethiopia," and Mr. Horace Thorogood describes a stay in a Benedictine monastery. Lady Vyvyan, in "Spiritual Vagabonds," manages to quote from five different languages in nine pages. Dr. Dawes Hicks surveys recent philosophical literature.

The Baptist Quarterly (October). We wish the opening article, "The Grace of God and Free Churchmanship," by Dr. Thomas Phillips, could be broadcast far and wide. The Rev. H. J. Charter's "Some Truths I have Learned on the Mission Field" is also pertinent. Some "Letters to James Deakin, 1805-1821," are printed, and Dr. Whitley writes on "John Barber Pewtress, 1756-1827."

The Baptist Layman (October). A lively number which we hope finds its way into most Baptist laymen's homes.

The Modern Churchman (September-November). This is a conference number, the subject being "The Church of England: its Constitution, Character and Call." The papers here printed form excellent material for discussion. The Dean of St. Paul's opened the Conference, and among the other contributors were Prof. Creed, Prof. Sykes, Dr. Coulton, the Rev. J. S. Bezzant, the Rev. A. C. Bouquet, the Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich, and Dr. Douglas White.

The Church Quarterly Review (October). A rather unusual selection of articles. The Rev. D. M. Vaughan discusses "The Modern Estimate of Solomon," Dr. Geraldine Hodgson "A Great Trio" (*Macbeth, Coriolanus*, and *Antony and Cleopatra*), and an unsigned contributor, "Three Policies for the Church of England." There are two articles which deal with music, Mr. L. F. O'Connor's "Music in Cathedrals," and Mr. C. K. Pattinson's "The Father Smith Organ in Auckland Castle." Canon Maynard Smith writes on the observations of Trevisan, a Venetian who was in England in 1497.

The Expository Times (October-December). Dr. Manson deals with "The Problem of Aramaic Sources in the Gospels" in the "Outstanding New Testament Problems" series, which is concluded by Dr. Vincent Taylor. A series on outstanding Old Testament problems is begun by Dr. T. H. Robinson, who writes on "The Date of the Exodus." There is an Armistice sermon by Dr. James Reid, and among other contributors are the Rev. F. C. Spurr and Mr. J. S. Hoyland.

The Christian Quarterly (October). The Editor's notes deal with the World Convention of the Churches of Christ and with public affairs. He also writes on "The Church in the New Testament." The bulk of the magazine is taken up by a paper read at the Convention by Mr. C. R. Batten on institutional religion.

Social Service Review (September-November). This little magazine at 6d. a month enables the reader to keep an eye on social service generally and especially in the Distressed Areas.

The Common Room (Autumn). The outstanding articles are Dr. G. P. Gooch's "Freedom in the Modern World" and Miss Ethel Cotton's "An Adventure in Conversation."

Religion in Education (October). Miss B. K. Rattey makes some useful suggestions on books on religious knowledge for Secondary School Libraries. Mr. J. W. C. Dougall writes on "Religious Education in Africa," and Miss A. M. Ashley on "Christ in School Worship and Teaching." Teachers should find this periodical useful.

The International Review of Missions (October). Another useful number. Mr. S. A. Morrison's "Religious Liberty in Turkey" is followed by the Rev. John Foster's "A China Christian Movement or the Christian Church?" Two encouraging articles about India are by the Revs. W. E. Tomlinson and J. K. Hodge, and "Hebrew and Chinese Wisdom" is by Dr. Elizabeth G. K. Hewat. Dr. F. W. S. O'Neil writes on "The Church of Christ in Manchuria," and Mr. Kenneth G. Grubb on "Religion in Mexico." A Congregational contributor is the Rev. Cecil Northcott, "Lancashire looks at Missions."

World Dominion (October). Almost entirely an African number, though there is a welcome article on "Church Planting in Madagascar" from the late lamented Kendall Gale. A good many of the articles are on Abyssinia.

The Evangelical Quarterly (October). The *pièce de resistance* is Dr. G. D. Henderson's learned article, "The Bible in Seventeenth Century Scotland." Dr. L. MacLean Watt writes on "The Scottish Covenanters," Prof. H. J. Rose on "Religion and Comparative Religion," and Dr. Daniel Lamont on "Tests in the Final Judgment."

Religion in Life (Autumn). This journal again has a distinguished list of contributors ranging from Karl Heim to James Moffatt and including well-known English scholars like Dr. George Jackson and well-known Americans like Dr. Rienhold Neibuhr. There is a study of "The Sacramental Life" by the Rev. John F. Butler, of Didsbury, who has contributed to our own pages, and a searching article on "The Intellectual Life of the Preacher" by Dr. Lynn Harold Hough.

The Yale Review (Autumn). With the present number this review begins its 25th year, and a great many of its past contributors send messages. There are two unpublished poems by Emily Dickinson; Mr. C. B. Tinker writes on "Housman's Poetry." Prof. Howard Lee McBain discusses "The Constitution and the New Deal," and various other articles deal with the economic situation in the United States.

The Review and Expositor (October). Dr. Nicol Macnicol has a good article on "The Authority of Christianity among the Religions," and Dr. G. S. Dobbins on pastoral problems is again useful. There is an extensive review section.

The Harvard Theological Review (July). Most of this number is occupied by Prof. Martin P. Nilsson's "Early Orphism and Kindred Religious Movements." Canon Streeter adds some notes on "The Cæsarean Text of Matthew and Luke."

Anglican Theological Review (October). Two useful papers are the Rev. DuBose Murphy's "What Religion Owes to Literature" and Canon Hodgson's "Faiths Common and Uncommon." Dr. Easton's "Notes and Comments" consist mainly of necrology.

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor.

DEAR SIR,—Your readers will, I am sure, have appreciated your concern for the Congregational witness at Oxford and Cambridge. But some, I think, may have read your Editorial Note with misunderstanding, in so far as, while it gives the names of those who, in character and theological attainment, so worthily represent Nonconformity in Cambridge, it makes no mention of Selbie and Bartlet, who have carried on, and of the Micklems, Cadoux, Milnes, and others, who still carry on, the great traditions of Mansfield at Oxford, and Emmanuel Chapel at Cambridge, which may be described as the Nonconformist University Church there, is not comparable with George Street Chapel in Oxford, which, so far as I am aware, was rarely, if ever, attended by undergraduates.

Believe me, Sir, with real appreciation of the value and usefulness of your Notes,

Yours sincerely,
OLD OXONIAN.